21 February 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
In recent years, DeepFake technologies have seen widespread adoption in various domains, including entertainment and film production. However, they have also been maliciously employed for disseminating false information and engaging in video fraud. Existing detection methods often experience significant performance degradation when confronted with unknown forgeries or exhibit limitations when dealing with low-quality images. To address this challenge, we introduce Diff-ID , a novel approach designed to elucidate and quantify the identity loss induced by facial manipulations. When assessing the authenticity of an image, Diff-ID leverages a genuine image of the same individual as a reference and processes two images jointly. It aligns the reference image and the test image into the same identity-insensitive attribute feature space using a face-swapping generator. This alignment allows us to observe the identity disparities between the two images through the differences in the aligned generation pairs. Subsequently, we have developed a custom metric designed to quantify the identity loss relative to the reference image in the test image. This metric effectively distinguishes forgery images from the real ones. Extensive experiments have demonstrated the exceptional performance of our approach. It achieves a high level of detection accuracy on DeepFake images and showcases state-of-the-art generalization capabilities when confronted with previously unknown forgery methods. Moreover, it exhibits robustness even in the presence of image distortions.
19 January 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) is a trending collaborative machine learning model training solution. Existing industrial frameworks employ secure multi-party computation techniques such as homomorphic encryption to ensure data security and privacy. Despite these efforts, studies have revealed that data leakage remains a risk in VFL due to the correlations between intermediate representations and raw data. Neural networks can accurately capture these correlations, allowing an adversary to reconstruct the data. This emphasizes the need for continued research into securing VFL systems. Our work shows that hashing is a promising solution to counter data reconstruction attacks. The one-way nature of hashing makes it difficult for an adversary to recover data from hash codes. However, implementing hashing in VFL presents new challenges, including vanishing gradients and information loss. To address these issues, we propose HashVFL, which integrates hashing and simultaneously achieves learnability, bit balance, and consistency. Experimental results indicate that HashVFL effectively maintains task performance while defending against data reconstruction attacks. It also brings additional benefits in reducing the degree of label leakage, mitigating adversarial attacks, and detecting abnormal inputs. We hope our work will inspire further research into the potential applications of HashVFL.
2 November 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Despite of its tremendous popularity and success in computer vision (CV) and natural language processing, deep learning is inherently vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Many defense solutions in CV have been proposed. However, most of them, e.g., adversarial training, suffer from a low generality due to the reliance on limited adversarial examples. Moreover, some solutions even have non-negligible negative impact on the clean example classification. Last but not least, they are impotent against the unconstrained attacks. In this paper, we propose GRIP-GAN to learn a general robust inverse perturbation (GRIP), which is not only able to offset any potential adversarial perturbations but also strengthen the target class-related features, purely from the clean images via a generative adversarial network (GAN). By feeding a random noise, GRIP-GAN is able to generate a dynamic GRIP for each input image to defend against the unconstrained attacks. To further improve the defense performance, we also enable GRIP-GAN to generate a GRIP tailored to each input image. Extensive experiments are carried out on MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet datasets against 17 adversarial attacks. The results show that GRIP-GAN outperforms all the baselines. We further share insights on the success of GRIP-GAN and provide visualized proofs.
18 March 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Federated Learning (FL) is nowadays one of the most promising paradigms for privacy-preserving distributed learning. Without revealing its local private data to outsiders, a client in FL systems collaborates to build a global Deep Neural Network (DNN) by submitting its local model parameter update to a central server for iterative aggregation. With secure multi-party computation protocols, the submitted update of any client is also by design invisible to the server. Seemingly, this standard design is a win-win for client privacy and service provider utility. Ironically, any attacker may also use manipulated or impersonated client to submit almost any attack payloads under the umbrella of the FL protocol itself. In this work, we craft a practical backdoor attack on FL systems that is proved to be simultaneously effective and stealthy on diverse use cases of FL systems and leading commercial FL platforms in the real world. Basically, we first identify a small number of redundant neurons which tend to be rarely or slightly updated in the model, and then inject backdoor into these redundant neurons instead of the whole model. In this way, our backdoor attack can achieve a high attack success rate with a minor impact on the accuracy of the original task. As countermeasures, we further consider several common technical choices including robust aggregation mechanisms, differential privacy mechanism,s and network pruning. However, none of the defenses show desirable defense capability against our backdoor attack. Our results strongly highlight the vulnerability of existing FL systems against backdoor attacks and the urgent need to develop more effective defense mechanisms.