1 May 2018 in Management Science
We investigate the efficacy of monetary and relational incentives for managing the quality of a product in a two-tier supply chain. In our setting, a retailer offers a supplier contract terms for a product, where the product can be low or high quality. The supplier can choose to exert high effort, which is costly but guarantees high quality, or low effort, which does not assure high quality with certainty. We compare how monetary incentives, such as a bonus that is paid to the supplier when high quality is received by the retailer, and relational incentives, such as the two parties engaging in a long-term relationship where there is the threat of punishment, affect overall quality and supply chain efficiency. Two of our primary results suggest that (1) relational incentives improve both quality and supply chain efficiency, regardless of whether a monetary incentive is present, and (2) when relational incentives are present, the impact of adding monetary incentives is nonmonotonic: less efficient monetary incentives appear to crowd out the benefits of relational incentives leading even to a reduction in supply chain efficiency, whereas more efficient monetary incentives actually complement relational incentives and lead to significant increases in both quality and supply chain efficiency. We then proceed by demonstrating that a behavioral model of fairness can organize the data quite well. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2716 . This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
1 March 2019 in Management Science
We study the impact of multidimensional bargaining and the location of inventory risk on the performance of a two-stage supply chain. We conduct a controlled human subjects experiment where a retailer and supplier either interact through ultimatum offers or dynamically bargain over contract terms, including a wholesale price and, potentially, an order quantity. We also manipulate whether the risk associated with unsold inventory lies with the retailer or the supplier or is endogenously determined in the bargaining process. One key insight is that supply chain efficiency is significantly higher when the order quantity is included in the negotiation and that, contrary to the normative theory, this leads to a Pareto improvement whereby both the supplier and retailer earn higher profits. A second important result, also counter to the normative theory, is that the party incurring the cost of unsold inventory always earns a lower profit than its counterpart, regardless of the bargaining environment or inventory risk location. To explain these data, we posit that retailers and suppliers are affected by an anchoring bias and demonstrate that it can explain many of our results. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2985 . This paper was accepted by Gad Allon, operations management.
1 July 2018 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Suppliers are often reluctant to invest in capacity if they believe that they will be unable to recover their investment costs in subsequent transactions with buyers. In theory, a number of different contracts can solve this issue and induce first-best investment levels by the supplier. In this study, we investigate the performance of these contracts in a two-tier supply chain. We develop an experimental design where retailers and suppliers bargain over contract terms—and have the ability to make multiple back-and-forth offers—while also providing feedback on the offers they receive. One key result from our study is that an option contract and a service-level agreement are best at increasing first-best investment levels and overall supply chain profits. However, these same contracts also generate the largest inequity in expected profits between the two parties. We find that both of these results are driven by the bargaining tendencies of retailers and suppliers, which we refer to as “superficial fairness.” In particular, retailers and suppliers place more emphasis on negotiating the wholesale price, while partially overlooking any secondary parameter, such that final wholesale prices end up roughly halfway between the retailer’s selling price and the supplier’s production cost. We show that this bargaining behavior contributes to higher investment levels observed in the option contract and service-level agreement, along with the inequitable payoffs.The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0654 .
1 September 2023 in Management Science
Over the last two decades, researchers in operations management have increasingly leveraged laboratory experiments to identify key behavioral insights. These experiments inform behavioral theories of operations management, impacting domains including inventory, supply chain management, queuing, forecasting, and sourcing. Yet, until now, the replicability of most behavioral insights from these laboratory experiments has been untested. We remedy this with the first large-scale replication study in operations management. With the input of the wider operations management community, we identify 10 prominent experimental operations management papers published in Management Science, which span a variety of domains, to be the focus of our replication effort. For each paper, we conduct a high-powered replication study of the main results across multiple locations using original materials (when available and suitable). In addition, our study tests replicability in multiple modalities (in-person and online) due to laboratory closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our replication study contributes new knowledge about the robustness of several key behavioral theories in operations management and contributes more broadly to efforts in the operations management field to improve research transparency and reliability. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, operations management. Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from Cornell University, the University of South Carolina, the University of Texas at Dallas, the University of Michigan, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4866 .
1 October 2022 in Management Science
The growth of sharing economy marketplaces like Airbnb has generated discussions on their socioeconomic impact and lack of regulation. As a result, most major cities in the United States have started to collect an “occupancy tax” for Airbnb bookings. In this study, we investigate the heterogeneous treatment effects of the occupancy tax policy on Airbnb listings, using a combination of a generalized causal forest methodology and a difference-in-differences framework. While we find that the introduction of the tax significantly reduces both listing revenues and sales, more importantly, these effects are disproportionately more pronounced for residential hosts with single shared-space (nontarget) listings versus commercial hosts with multiple properties or entire-space (target) listings. We further show that this unintended consequence is caused by customers’ discriminatory tax aversion against nontarget listings. We then leverage these empirical results by prescribing how hosts should optimally set prices in response to the occupancy tax and identify the discriminatory tax rates that would equalize the tax’s effect across nontarget and target listings. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.
1 May 2021 in Management Science
We investigate how different types of social information affect the demand characteristics of firms competing through service quality. We first generate behavioral hypotheses around both consumers’ learning behavior and firms’ corresponding demand characteristics: market share, demand uncertainty, and rate of convergence. We then conduct a controlled human-subject experiment in which a consumer chooses to visit one of two firms, each with unknown service quality, in a repeated interaction and is exposed to different information treatments from a social network: (1) no social information; (2) share-based social information, which details the percentage of people who visited each firm; (3) quality-based social information, which illustrates the percentage of people who received a satisfactory experience from each firm; or (4) full social information, which contains both share- and quality-based social information. A key insight from our study is that different types of social information have different effects on firms’ demand. First, promoting quality-based social information leads to a significantly higher market share, lower demand variability, and faster rate of convergence for a firm with significantly better service quality. Second, when the higher quality firm has only a marginal advantage over the other firm, promoting only share-based information leads to significantly higher market share and lower demand variability. A third important result is that providing only one type of social information can actually be more helpful to the higher quality firm than providing full social information. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, operations management.