Elena Katok

Elena Katok

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Elena Katok

University of Texas at Dallas

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 2014 in Production and Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
RCRachel Croson
Rachel Croson
KDKaren Donohue
Karen Donohue
EKElena Katok
Elena Katok
JSJohn Sterman
John Sterman
The bullwhip effect describes the tendency for the variance of orders in supply chains to increase as one moves upstream from consumer demand. We report on a set of laboratory experiments with a serial supply chain that tests behavioral causes of this phenomenon, in particular the possible influence of coordination risk. Coordination risk exists when individuals' decisions contribute to a collective outcome and the decision rules followed by each individual are not known with certainty, for example, where managers cannot be sure how their supply chain partners will behave. We conjecture that the existence of coordination risk may contribute to bullwhip behavior. We test this conjecture by controlling for environmental factors that lead to coordination risk and find these controls lead to a significant reduction in order oscillations and amplification. Next, we investigate a managerial intervention to reduce the bullwhip effect, inspired by our conjecture that coordination risk contributes to bullwhip behavior. Although the intervention, holding additional on‐hand inventory, does not change the existence of coordination risk, it reduces order oscillation and amplification by providing a buffer against the endogenous risk of coordination failure. We conclude that the magnitude of the bullwhip can be mitigated, but that its behavioral causes appear robust.

1 February 2014 in Production and Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
EKElena Katok
Elena Katok
TOTava Olsen
Tava Olsen
VPValery Pavlov
Valery Pavlov

1 March 2024 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MFMiloš Fišar
Miloš Fišar
BGBen Greiner
Ben Greiner
CHChristoph Huber
Christoph Huber
EKElena Katok
Elena Katok
AOAli I. Ozkes
Ali I. Ozkes
TCthe Management Science Reproducibility Collaboration
the Management Science Reproducibility Collaboration
With the help of more than 700 reviewers, we assess the reproducibility of nearly 500 articles published in the journal Management Science before and after the introduction of a new Data and Code Disclosure policy in 2019. When considering only articles for which data accessibility and hardware and software requirements were not an obstacle for reviewers, the results of more than 95% of articles under the new disclosure policy could be fully or largely computationally reproduced. However, for 29% of articles, at least part of the data set was not accessible to the reviewer. Considering all articles in our sample reduces the share of reproduced articles to 68%. These figures represent a significant increase compared with the period before the introduction of the disclosure policy, where only 12% of articles voluntarily provided replication materials, of which 55% could be (largely) reproduced. Substantial heterogeneity in reproducibility rates across different fields is mainly driven by differences in data set accessibility. Other reasons for unsuccessful reproduction attempts include missing code, unresolvable code errors, weak or missing documentation, and software and hardware requirements and code complexity. Our findings highlight the importance of journal code and data disclosure policies and suggest potential avenues for enhancing their effectiveness. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, behavioral economics and decision analysis–fast track. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03556 .

1 January 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
VPValery Pavlov
Valery Pavlov
EKElena Katok
Elena Katok
WZWen Zhang
Wen Zhang
Problem definition: To improve the poor performance of supply chains caused by misaligned incentives under the wholesale price contract, theory proposes coordinating contracts. However, a common finding of experimental studies testing such contracts is that they tend to yield only a marginal, if any, performance improvement over wholesale pricing. These studies identify several behavioral factors that are at play but none accounted for by the theory proposing coordinating contracts. Among them, identified as the single most detrimental for the supply chain performance, is incomplete information about preferences for fairness causing contract rejections. Can the supply chain performance be improved with a contract designed allowing for this type of information asymmetry? What does this contract (mechanism) look like? Academic/practical relevance: The extant research characterized the optimal contracting mechanisms for such important practical cases as the suppliers’ private information about production cost or the retailers’ private information about the end customer demand. The present study addresses the gap in another important practical case: when the source of information asymmetry is the private information about preferences for fairness. Methodology: The underlying research method is mechanism design. Results: We prove that the optimal mechanism consists of a single contract positioned on the Pareto frontier and characterize the optimal profit split between the supplier and the retailer. We show that, under a wide range of preferences for fairness, the efficiency loss because of private information is strictly positive, but exceptions are possible. We also show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented with a variety of commonly used in practice and widely studied in academic literature contracts, including the minimum order quantity and the two-part tariff ones. Managerial implications: We establish a direct link between a large volume of theoretical and empirical literature on social preferences with the research on supply chain contracts. Because rejections that are because of incomplete information are an important cause of contract inefficiency observed in the laboratory, managers should avoid take it or leave it offers when they negotiate contracts. Instead, the bargaining process should be geared toward discovering the extent of the fairness preferences of the contracting parties.

1 September 2023 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ADAndrew M. Davis
Andrew M. Davis
BFBlair Flicker
Blair Flicker
KHKyle Hyndman
Kyle Hyndman
EKElena Katok
Elena Katok
SKSamantha Keppler
Samantha Keppler
JTJordan D. Tong
Jordan D. Tong
Over the last two decades, researchers in operations management have increasingly leveraged laboratory experiments to identify key behavioral insights. These experiments inform behavioral theories of operations management, impacting domains including inventory, supply chain management, queuing, forecasting, and sourcing. Yet, until now, the replicability of most behavioral insights from these laboratory experiments has been untested. We remedy this with the first large-scale replication study in operations management. With the input of the wider operations management community, we identify 10 prominent experimental operations management papers published in Management Science, which span a variety of domains, to be the focus of our replication effort. For each paper, we conduct a high-powered replication study of the main results across multiple locations using original materials (when available and suitable). In addition, our study tests replicability in multiple modalities (in-person and online) due to laboratory closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our replication study contributes new knowledge about the robustness of several key behavioral theories in operations management and contributes more broadly to efforts in the operations management field to improve research transparency and reliability. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, operations management. Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from Cornell University, the University of South Carolina, the University of Texas at Dallas, the University of Michigan, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4866 .

1 November 2019 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NFNicolas Fugger
Nicolas Fugger
EKElena Katok
Elena Katok
AWAchim Wambach
Achim Wambach
When complex procurement projects are conducted, it is often not possible to write complete contracts. As a consequence, the relationship between buyer and supplier is important for the success of the project. In this paper we investigate the claim that auctions in procurement can be detrimental for the buyer–supplier relationship, which is in line with the observation that reverse auctions are less frequently conducted if projects are complex. A poor relationship can result in a decrease in trust on the part of the buyer during the sourcing process and an increase in the supplier’s opportunistic behavior following sourcing. We consider a setting in which the winning supplier decides on the level of quality to provide to the buyer, and we compare a standard reverse auction and a buyer-determined reverse auction, both analytically and in the laboratory. We find that the buyer-determined reverse auction can perform better than the standard reverse auction from both the buyer’s and the suppliers’ perspective. In a buyer-determined reverse auction, it may be optimal for the buyer to select the supplier who submitted a higher bid, which may in turn induce this supplier to deliver higher quality. Standard auctions, however, yield lower prices but reduce cooperation. The degree of trust, as reflected by a larger number of transactions and a higher average efficiency of trade, is significantly higher in buyer-determined reverse auctions. Theoretical reasoning based on other-regarding preferences organizes our data well. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.