Jennifer Sheldon

Jennifer Sheldon

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Jennifer Sheldon

University of Florida, Gainesville, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 May 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SBSri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju
Sri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju
JSJennifer Sheldon
Jennifer Sheldon
LBLuke A. Bauer
Luke A. Bauer
VBVincent Bindschaedler
Vincent Bindschaedler
TSTakeshi Sugawara
Takeshi Sugawara
SRSara Rampazzi
Sara Rampazzi
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) using LiDAR-based object detection systems are rapidly improving and becoming an increasingly viable method of transportation. While effective at perceiving the surrounding environment, these detection systems are shown to be vulnerable to attacks using lasers which can cause obstacle misclassifications or removal. These laser attacks, however, are challenging to perform, requiring precise aiming and accuracy. Our research exposes a new threat in the form of Intentional Electro-Magnetic-Interference (IEMI), which affects the time-of-flight (TOF) circuits that make up modern LiDARs. We show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited to force the AV Perception system to misdetect, misclassify objects, and perceive non-existent obstacles. We evaluate the vulnerability in three AV perception modules (PointPillars, PointRCNN, and Apollo) and show how the classification rate drops below 50%. We also analyze the impact of the IEMI injection on two fusion models (AVOD and Frustum-ConvNet) and in real-world scenarios. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures and propose two strategies to detect signal injection.

9 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JSJennifer Sheldon
Jennifer Sheldon
WZWeidong Zhu
Weidong Zhu
AAAdnan Abdullah
Adnan Abdullah
KBKevin Butler
Kevin Butler
JIJahidul Islam
Jahidul Islam
SRSara Rampazzi
Sara Rampazzi
The growing worldwide attention toward large-scale subsea data centers has garnered substantial interest from commercial entities which have built and deployed underwater prototypes since 2015. These data centers utilize hard disk drives (HDDs) as a cost-effective method of data storage. However, researchers have demonstrated that acoustic waves can affect the availability and integrity of HDDs and applications that rely on them. These studies are all conducted in air on commercial laptops, hence their applicability and implications in submerged environments remain unexplored. In this position paper, we investigate potential vulnerabilities of storage devices deployed in underwater data centers and subsea storage platforms against targeted acoustic attacks. Based on our initial investigation of a simplified scenario, a victim HDD deployed in an enclosed submerged container is especially vulnerable to those acoustic attacks, which at frequencies ranging from 300 Hz 1300 Hz can result in up to 100% throughput loss and application crashes. Based on these findings, we argue that further study is necessary to assess underwater storage system security and develop effective defenses against overlooked acoustic attacks.

30 June 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JSJennifer Sheldon
Jennifer Sheldon
YKYungwoo Ko
Yungwoo Ko
SBSri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju
Sri Hrushikesh Varma Bhupathiraju
SOSara Osmanovic
Sara Osmanovic
WZWeidong Zhu
Weidong Zhu
SRSara Rampazzi
Sara Rampazzi