Johannes Ludwig Frieß

Johannes Ludwig Frieß

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Johannes Ludwig Frieß

Institute of Safety and Risk Sciences, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences (BOKU), Vienna, Austria

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 January 2023 in Ecological Modelling
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JFJohannes L. Frieß
Johannes L. Frieß
CLCarina R. Lalyer
Carina R. Lalyer
BGBernd Giese
Bernd Giese
SSSamson Simon
Samson Simon
MOMathias Otto
Mathias Otto

19 September 2023 in Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DSDunja Manal Sabra
Dunja Manal Sabra
AKAnna Krin
Anna Krin
ARAna Belén Romeral
Ana Belén Romeral
JFJohannes Ludwig Frieß
Johannes Ludwig Frieß
GJGunnar Jeremias
Gunnar Jeremias
B. anthracis is one of the most often weaponized pathogens. States had it in their bioweapons programs and criminals and terrorists have used or attempted to use it. This study is motivated by the narrative that emerging and developing technologies today contribute to the amplification of danger through greater easiness, accessibility and affordability of steps in the making of an anthrax weapon. As states would have way better preconditions if they would decide for an offensive bioweapons program, we focus on bioterrorism. This paper analyzes and assesses the possible bioterrorism threat arising from advances in synthetic biology, genome editing, information availability, and other emerging, and converging sciences and enabling technologies. Methodologically we apply foresight methods to encourage the analysis of contemporary technological advances. We have developed a conceptual six-step foresight science framework approach. It represents a synthesis of various foresight methodologies including literature review, elements of horizon scanning, trend impact analysis, red team exercise, and free flow open-ended discussions. Our results show a significant shift in the threat landscape. Increasing affordability, widespread distribution, efficiency, as well as ease of use of DNA synthesis, and rapid advances in genome-editing and synthetic genomic technologies lead to an ever-growing number and types of actors who could potentially weaponize B. anthracis. Understanding the current and future capabilities of these technologies and their potential for misuse critically shapes the current and future threat landscape and underlines the necessary adaptation of biosecurity measures in the spheres of multi-level political decision making and in the science community.

4 February 2022 in Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KPKevin Pfeifer
Kevin Pfeifer
JFJohannes L. Frieß
Johannes L. Frieß
BGBernd Giese
Bernd Giese
The DARPA program Insect Allies has already sparked scientific debate concerning technology assessment-related issues, among which the most prevalent is that of dual use potential. As apart from the issues concerning peaceful applications, the technology also provides the blueprint for a potential bioweapon as further evidenced by a recent publication. However, the combination of a virus-induced genetic modification of crop plants in the field using genetically modified insect vectors poses an increased risk potential in comparison to the hitherto existing use of genetically modified organisms. The technology’s high depth of intervention enables a number of sources for hazard and a by trend high exposure, but it is also encumbered with notable deficits in knowledge. These issues call for a thorough technology assessment. This article aims to provide an initial characterization from a technology assessment perspective, focusing on potential sources of risk for this novel invasive environmental biotechnology at an early stage of research and development. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.© 2022 The Authors. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Society of Environmental Toxicology & Chemistry (SETAC).

1 July 2015 in Mutation Research - Fundamental and Molecular Mechanisms of Mutagenesis
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JFJohannes L. Frieß
Johannes L. Frieß
AHAnja Heselich
Anja Heselich
SRSylvia Ritter
Sylvia Ritter
AHAngelina Haber
Angelina Haber
NKNicole Kaiser
Nicole Kaiser
CTChristiane Thielemann
Christiane Thielemann

23 November 2023 in Agriculture and Human Values
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
TDTim Dassler
Tim Dassler
AMAnne Myhr
Anne Myhr
CLCarina R. Lalyer
Carina R. Lalyer
JFJohannes L. Frieß
Johannes L. Frieß
ASArmin Spök
Armin Spök
BGBernd Giese
Bernd Giese
If genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are approved in the EU for experimental release or marketing authorization (placing on the market), a risk assessment (RA) is carried out beforehand to determine whether this may be associated with negative effects on human health, nature or the environment. Applications are reviewed by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the national Competent Authorities of the Member States. However, the potential ramifications of the GMOs that are systematically addressed in the current RA context are limited. Broader consideration can include environmental and health aspects beyond the scope of the statutory RA, as well as societal, ethical and cultural impacts. These other levels of impact may be considered during the comitology process of authorisation, but how this is done is typically not made explicit in a systematic way. However, with the dynamic developments of new kinds of GMOs, these considerations as well as transparency regarding the role of broader considerations in political decision-making become more and more relevant. Against this backdrop, we identified the requirements and suggest the main elements for such a broader assessment. We use insights from the field of Technology Assessment (TA) to explore the requirements for operationalising a rapid but still systematic, transparent and broad case-by-case GMO assessment compatible with the existing legislative framework.

24 April 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
JFJohannes L. Frieß
Johannes L. Frieß
BGBernd Giese
Bernd Giese
AGArnim von Gleich
Arnim von Gleich
In recent years, innovation in genetic engineering brought forth a number of technologies to manipulate the fate of entire wild type populations. These technologies rely on the dissemination of synthetic genetic elements within a population of sexually reproducing species via the germline and are identified as Self-Propagating Artificial Genetic Elements (SPAGE). Some secure their dissemination passively so that only offspring carrying the SPAGE will survive or be fertile. Others overcome the limitations of the Mendelian inheritance pattern by a distortion of allelic segregation or a fragmentation of chromosomes, resulting in e.g. an altered sex ratio. Genetic elements may also promote their preferred inheritance by a molecular mechanism. If a SPAGE overcomes the Mendelian pattern of inheritance and is thereby enabled to spread and distribute a novel trait throughout a population – even defying natural selection – it is called a gene drive. If organisms have a comparably short generation time, as e.g. insects, then already after a few months, a large part of the population could express a new property transmitted by the gene drive. In particular, very invasive gene drives may be able to impose properties on entire populations that otherwise could not spread.