25 January 2023 in Ecological Modelling
19 September 2023 in Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology
B. anthracis is one of the most often weaponized pathogens. States had it in their bioweapons programs and criminals and terrorists have used or attempted to use it. This study is motivated by the narrative that emerging and developing technologies today contribute to the amplification of danger through greater easiness, accessibility and affordability of steps in the making of an anthrax weapon. As states would have way better preconditions if they would decide for an offensive bioweapons program, we focus on bioterrorism. This paper analyzes and assesses the possible bioterrorism threat arising from advances in synthetic biology, genome editing, information availability, and other emerging, and converging sciences and enabling technologies. Methodologically we apply foresight methods to encourage the analysis of contemporary technological advances. We have developed a conceptual six-step foresight science framework approach. It represents a synthesis of various foresight methodologies including literature review, elements of horizon scanning, trend impact analysis, red team exercise, and free flow open-ended discussions. Our results show a significant shift in the threat landscape. Increasing affordability, widespread distribution, efficiency, as well as ease of use of DNA synthesis, and rapid advances in genome-editing and synthetic genomic technologies lead to an ever-growing number and types of actors who could potentially weaponize B. anthracis. Understanding the current and future capabilities of these technologies and their potential for misuse critically shapes the current and future threat landscape and underlines the necessary adaptation of biosecurity measures in the spheres of multi-level political decision making and in the science community.
4 February 2022 in Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management
The DARPA program Insect Allies has already sparked scientific debate concerning technology assessment-related issues, among which the most prevalent is that of dual use potential. As apart from the issues concerning peaceful applications, the technology also provides the blueprint for a potential bioweapon as further evidenced by a recent publication. However, the combination of a virus-induced genetic modification of crop plants in the field using genetically modified insect vectors poses an increased risk potential in comparison to the hitherto existing use of genetically modified organisms. The technology’s high depth of intervention enables a number of sources for hazard and a by trend high exposure, but it is also encumbered with notable deficits in knowledge. These issues call for a thorough technology assessment. This article aims to provide an initial characterization from a technology assessment perspective, focusing on potential sources of risk for this novel invasive environmental biotechnology at an early stage of research and development. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.© 2022 The Authors. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Society of Environmental Toxicology & Chemistry (SETAC).
1 July 2015 in Mutation Research - Fundamental and Molecular Mechanisms of Mutagenesis
23 November 2023 in Agriculture and Human Values
If genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are approved in the EU for experimental release or marketing authorization (placing on the market), a risk assessment (RA) is carried out beforehand to determine whether this may be associated with negative effects on human health, nature or the environment. Applications are reviewed by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the national Competent Authorities of the Member States. However, the potential ramifications of the GMOs that are systematically addressed in the current RA context are limited. Broader consideration can include environmental and health aspects beyond the scope of the statutory RA, as well as societal, ethical and cultural impacts. These other levels of impact may be considered during the comitology process of authorisation, but how this is done is typically not made explicit in a systematic way. However, with the dynamic developments of new kinds of GMOs, these considerations as well as transparency regarding the role of broader considerations in political decision-making become more and more relevant. Against this backdrop, we identified the requirements and suggest the main elements for such a broader assessment. We use insights from the field of Technology Assessment (TA) to explore the requirements for operationalising a rapid but still systematic, transparent and broad case-by-case GMO assessment compatible with the existing legislative framework.