Silvia Seghezzi

Silvia Seghezzi

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Silvia Seghezzi

Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 December 2019 in Cortex
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SSSilvia Seghezzi
Silvia Seghezzi
GGGianluigi Giannini
Gianluigi Giannini
LZLaura Zapparoli
Laura Zapparoli

17 May 2017 in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LZLaura Zapparoli
Laura Zapparoli
SSSilvia Seghezzi
Silvia Seghezzi
EPEraldo Paulesu
Eraldo Paulesu
In an attempt of fractionating the concept of intentionality in discrete subcomponents, Brass and Haggard (2008) proposed their What, When and Whether model (www-model) which postulates that the content, the timing and the possibility of generating an action can be partially independent both at the cognitive level and at the level of their neural implementation. The original proposal was based on a limited number of studies, which were reviewed with a discursive approach. To assess whether the model stands in front of the more recently published data, we performed a systematic review of 15 PET/fMRI studies with a meta-analytic method based on a hierarchical clustering algorithm. HC revealed the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the medial prefrontal cortex, with the more anterior regions (the anterior cingulum) involved in more abstract decisions of whether to execute an action and the more posterior ones (the middle cingulum or the SMA) recruited in specifying the content and the timing components of actions. However, in contrast with the original www-model, this dissociation involves also brain regions well outside the median wall of the frontal lobe, in a component specific manner: the supramarginal gyrus for the what component, the pallidum and the thalamus for the when component, the putamen and the insula for the whether component. We then calculated co-activation maps on the three component-specific www clusters of the medial wall of the frontal/limbic lobe: to this end, we used the activation likelihood approach that we applied on the imaging studies on action contained in the BrainMap.org database. This analysis confirmed the main findings of the HC analyses. However, the BrainMap.org data analyses also showed that the aforementioned segregations are generated by paradigms in which subjects act in response to conditional stimuli rather than while driven by their own intentions. We conclude that the available data confirm that the neural underpinnings of intentionality can be fractionated in discrete components that are partially independent. We also suggest that intentionality manifests itself in discrete components through the boosting of general purpose action-related regions specialized for different aspects of action selection and inhibition.

12 April 2019 in Frontiers in Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SSSilvia Seghezzi
Silvia Seghezzi
EZEleonora Zirone
Eleonora Zirone
EPEraldo Paulesu
Eraldo Paulesu
LZLaura Zapparoli
Laura Zapparoli
Voluntary actions can be fractionated in different phenomena: from the emergence of intentions and the ensuing motor plans and actions, to the anticipation and monitoring of their outcomes, to the appreciation of their congruency with intentions and to the eventual emergence of a sense of agency. It follows that motor intention and the sense of agency should occur at different stages in the normal generation of willed actions. Both these processes have been associated with a fronto-parietal motor network, but no study has investigated to what extent the two experiences can be dissociated for the brain regions involved. To this end, we assessed the PET/fMRI literature on agency and intentionality using a meta-analytic technique based on a hierarchical clustering algorithm. Beside a shared brain network involving the meso-frontal and prefrontal regions, the middle insula and subcortical structures, we found that motor intention and the sense of agency are functionally underpinned by separable sets of brain regions: an “intentionality network,” involving the rostral area of the mesial frontal cortex (middle cingulum and pre-supplementary motor area), the anterior insula and the parietal lobules, and a “self-agency network,” which involves the posterior areas of the mesial frontal cortex (the SMA proper), the posterior insula, the occipital lobe and the cerebellum. We were then able to confirm this functional organization by a subsequent seed-based fMRI resting-state functional connectivity analysis, with seeds derived from the intentionality/sense of agency specific clusters of the medial wall of the frontal lobe. Our results suggest the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the mesial frontal cortex, with the more anterior regions linked to the concept of motor intentionality and the brain areas located more posteriorly associated with the direct monitoring between the action and its outcome. This suggestion is reinforced by the association between the sense of agency and the activation of the occipital lobes, to suggest a direct comparison between the movement and its external (e.g., visual) consequences. The shared network may be important for the integration of intentionality and agency in a coherent appreciation of self-generated actions.

27 June 2018 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
LZLaura Zapparoli
Laura Zapparoli
SSSilvia Seghezzi
Silvia Seghezzi
PSPaola Scifo
Paola Scifo
AZAlberto Zerbi
Alberto Zerbi
Giuseppe BanfiGiuseppe Banfi
Giuseppe Banfi
EPEraldo Paulesu
Eraldo Paulesu
Here we challenge and present evidence that expands the what, when, and whether anatomical model of intentional action, which states that internally driven decisions about the content and timing of our actions and about whether to act at all depend on separable neural systems, anatomically segregated along the medial wall of the frontal lobe. In our fMRI event-related paradigm, subjects acted following conditional cues or following their intentions. The content of the actions, their timing, or their very occurrence were the variables investigated, together with the modulating factor of intentionality. Besides a shared activation of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for all components and the SMA proper for the when component, we found specific activations beyond the mesial prefrontal wall involving the parietal cortex for the what component or subcortical gray structures for the when component. Moreover, we found behavioral, functional, anatomical, and brain connectivity evidence that the self-driven decisions on whether to act require a higher interhemispheric cooperation: This was indexed by a specific activation of the corpus callosum whereby the less the callosal activation, the greater was the decision cost at the time of the action in the whether trials. Furthermore, tractography confirmed that the fibers passing through the callosal focus of activation connect the two sides of the frontal lobes involved in intentional trials. This is evidence of non-unitary neural foundations for the processes involved in intentional actions with the pre-SMA/ACC operating as an intentional hub. These findings may guide the exploration of specific instances of disturbed intentionality. Significance We provide evidence that our intentions can be fragmented in various components subserved by partially dissociable neural circuits. We found that the decision of what to do, when to do it, and whether to do it depends on separable systems that go beyond the mesial prefrontal wall of previous proposals, involving cortical and subcortical brain regions in a component-specific manner. In addition, we found that deciding whether to act or not requires strong interhemispheric interactions of the frontal lobes. This explicit evidence of dissociable neural foundations of intentional actions will guide the exploration of brain disorders of specific components of intentionality.

3 July 2020 in Science Advances
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LZLaura Zapparoli
Laura Zapparoli
SSS. Seghezzi
S. Seghezzi
EZEleonora Zirone
Eleonora Zirone
Giacomo GuidaliGiacomo Guidali
Giacomo Guidali
MTM. Tettamanti
M. Tettamanti
EPE. Paulesu
E. Paulesu
The feeling that physical events are caused by us is tied to our action planning rather than being a mere post hoc deduction.

7 November 2020 in Brain Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SSSilvia Seghezzi
Silvia Seghezzi
LZLaura Zapparoli
Laura Zapparoli
Sense of agency refers to the feeling that one’s self-generated action caused an external environment event. In a previous study, we suggested that the supplementary motor area (SMA), in its anterior portion (pre-SMA), is a key structure for attributing the sense of agency for the visual consequences of self-generated movements. However, real-life actions can lead to outcomes in different sensory modalities, raising the question of whether SMA represents a supra-modal hub for the sense of agency. Here, we compared the agency experience for visual and auditory outcomes by taking advantage of the intentional binding effect (IB). We observed discrete time-windows for the agency manifestation across different sensory modalities: While there was an IB at 200 ms delay between the action and the visual outcome, a time compression was observed when the auditory outcome followed the action by 400 ms. The magnitude of the IB was mirrored by meaningful brain activity in the pre-SMA but only at the specific delay when a sizeable IB was seen. We conclude that attributing consequences of self-generated movements to one’s action is based on similar mechanisms across sensory modalities and that those mechanisms are related to the functioning of the motor system.