Vincenzo Crupi

Vincenzo Crupi

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Vincenzo Crupi

University of Turin

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

24Years (2003-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2007 in Philosophy of Science
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VCVincenzo Crupi
Vincenzo Crupi
KTKatya Tentori
Katya Tentori
MGMichel Gonzalez
Michel Gonzalez
Epistemologists and philosophers of science have often attempted to express formally the impact of a piece of evidence on the credibility of a hypothesis. In this paper we will focus on the Bayesian approach to evidential support. We will propose a new formal treatment of the notion of degree of confirmation and we will argue that it overcomes some limitations of the currently available approaches on two grounds: (i) a theoretical analysis of the confirmation relation seen as an extension of logical deduction and (ii) an empirical comparison of competing measures in an experimental inquiry concerning inductive reasoning in a probabilistic setting.

1 February 2013 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
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KTKatya Tentori
Katya Tentori
VCVincenzo Crupi
Vincenzo Crupi
SRSelena Russo
Selena Russo
Major recent interpretations of the conjunction fallacy postulate that people assess the probability of a conjunction according to (non-normative) averaging rules as applied to the constituents' probabilities or represent the conjunction fallacy as an effect of random error in the judgment process. In the present contribution, we contrast such accounts with a different reading of the phenomenon based on the notion of inductive confirmation as defined by contemporary Bayesian theorists. Averaging rule hypotheses along with the random error model and many other existing proposals are shown to all imply that conjunction fallacy rates would rise as the perceived probability of the added conjunct does. By contrast, our account predicts that the conjunction fallacy depends on the added conjunct being perceived as inductively confirmed. Four studies are reported in which the judged probability versus confirmation of the added conjunct have been systematically manipulated and dissociated. The results consistently favor a confirmation-theoretic account of the conjunction fallacy against competing views. Our proposal is also discussed in connection with related issues in the study of human inductive reasoning.

29 April 2008 in Thinking & Reasoning
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VCVincenzo Crupi
Vincenzo Crupi
BFBranden Fitelson
Branden Fitelson
KTKatya Tentori
Katya Tentori
The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002 Sides, A. , Osherson, D. , Bonini, N. and Viale, R. 2002. On the reality of the conjunction fallacy. Memory & Cognition, 30: 191–198. [Crossref] [Google Scholar] ) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgements observed experimentally are typically guided by sound assessments of confirmation relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Our main formal result is a confirmation-theoretic account of the conjunction fallacy, which is proven robust (i.e., not depending on various alternative ways of measuring degrees of confirmation). The proposed analysis is shown distinct from contentions that the conjunction effect is in fact not a fallacy, and is compared with major competing explanations of the phenomenon, including earlier references to a confirmation-theoretic account.

17 June 2018 in Cognitive Science
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VCVincenzo Crupi
Vincenzo Crupi
JNJonathan D. Nelson
Jonathan D. Nelson
BMBjörn Meder
Björn Meder
GCGustavo Cevolani
Gustavo Cevolani
KTKatya Tentori
Katya Tentori

1 April 2007 in Cognition
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KTKatya Tentori
Katya Tentori
VCVincenzo Crupi
Vincenzo Crupi
NBNicolao Bonini
Nicolao Bonini
DODaniel Osherson
Daniel Osherson

1 July 2012 in Philosophy of Science
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VCVincenzo Crupi
Vincenzo Crupi
KTKatya Tentori
Katya Tentori
We discuss the probabilistic analysis of explanatory power and prove a representation theorem for posterior ratio measures recently advocated by Schupbach and Sprenger. We then prove a representation theorem for an alternative class of measures that rely on the notion of relative probability distance. We end up endorsing the latter, as relative distance measures share the properties of posterior ratio measures that are genuinely appealing, while overcoming a feature that we consider undesirable. They also yield a telling result concerning formal accounts of explanatory power versus inductive confirmation, thereby bridging our discussion to a so-called no-miracle argument.