Yaroslav Rosokha

Yaroslav Rosokha

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Yaroslav Rosokha

Purdue University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2018 in European Economic Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JRJulian Romero
Julian Romero
YRYaroslav Rosokha
Yaroslav Rosokha

1 December 2016 in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
OMOthon M. Moreno
Othon M. Moreno
YRYaroslav Rosokha
Yaroslav Rosokha

27 January 2024 in Economic Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YRYaroslav Rosokha
Yaroslav Rosokha
XLXinxin Lyu
Xinxin Lyu
DTDenis Tverskoi
Denis Tverskoi
SGSergey Gavrilets
Sergey Gavrilets
Social and political inequality among individuals is a common driving force behind the breakdown in cooperation. In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally study cooperation among individuals facing a sequence of collective-action problems in which the benefits of cooperation are divided according to political power that is obtained through a contest. We have three main results. First, we find that cooperation predictably responds to the fundamental parameters of the collective-action problem. Specifically, it is increasing in the benefit to cooperation and how much benefit is gained from partial group cooperation, and decreasing in the number of players. Second, we find that when players are unrestricted in their expenditures in the contest, cooperation is much lower than when expenditures are set to a specific proportion of earnings. Finally, we find that individual norms and beliefs account for a substantial proportion of explained variance in individuals’ decisions to cooperate.

1 April 2021 in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JBJames Bland
James Bland
YRYaroslav Rosokha
Yaroslav Rosokha

1 January 2020 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Preprint
Open access
DGDavid Gill
David Gill
YRYaroslav Rosokha
Yaroslav Rosokha
The indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (IRPD) captures the trade-off between the short-term payoff from exploiting economic partners and the long-term gain from building successful relationships. We aim to understand more about how people form and use beliefs about others in the IRPD. To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find that initial beliefs match behavior quite well and that most subjects choose strategies that perform well given their beliefs. Motivated by belief clustering, we use beliefs to estimate a level-k model of boundedly rational thinking. We analyze how beliefs and behavior evolve with experience: beliefs become more accurate over time, and we use beliefs to provide new evidence about the mechanism that underlies learning from experience. Finally, we find that a survey measure of trust predicts cooperative behavior and optimism about others' cooperation, which helps to explain how trust underpins successful economic exchanges.

1 November 2024 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YRYaroslav Rosokha
Yaroslav Rosokha
CWChen Wei
Chen Wei
We study a social dilemma in a single-queue system in which human servers have discretion over the effort with which to process orders that arrive stochastically. We show theoretically that the efficient outcome in the form of high effort can be sustained in the subgame-perfect equilibrium if the interactions are long term (even when each server has a short-term incentive to free-ride and provide low effort). In addition, we show that queue visibility plays an important role in the type of strategies that can sustain a high-effort equilibrium. In particular, we show that limiting feedback about the current state of the queue may be beneficial if the expected duration of interaction is long. We conduct two controlled laboratory experiments to test the theoretical predictions and find that effort increases with the expected duration of an interaction. We also find that visibility has a strong impact on the strategies that human subjects use to provide effort in a dynamic setting. We discuss implications for managers and firms that are trying to improve service systems. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.00603 .