24 September 2019 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
At present, the proliferation of the online connected devices conceives the Internet of Things (IoT), in which many wireless sensors, smart devices are implemented. However, the nature of openness rooted in IoT makes itself vulnerable to be attacked. One of the pioneer countermeasures is the moving target defense (MTD), which encourages an active and dynamic defense in IoT. In this paper, a macroscopic research in MTD is carried out. Existing macroscopic studies take advantage of traditional game theory. Consequently, protected IoT devices need extra operations to dominate the game. In this paper, we take a dramatically different approach where a player can dominate the game without extra operation. Our approach benefits from the power of the Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategy, in which the player who adopts ZD can unilaterally set the expected payoff of the adversary or itself. Aware of such a powerful strategy, both players may want to employ it for dominating the confrontation. In this case, two fundamental questions need to be answered: who should take the ZD strategy? and to what extent can the ZD player dominate the game? To solve these problems, we model the interactions between the IoT devices and the malicious attackers as a Markov game. Besides, we obtain the conditions to adopt ZD, based on which we deduce the effectiveness of the ZD player. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to employ the ZD strategy theory to enhance a better counterattack performance in IoT.
22 May 2020 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
There is evidence that blockchain plays a crucial role in IoT-based implementation due to its transparency, traceability, and immutability, in which the participants are incentivized to behave authentically and precisely for rewards. Despite the domination of subsidy in reward, the decrease of mining rate and the imperativeness of fees make the fee market become a pivotal role to motivate miners in blockchain. However, the current mechanism for selecting transactions into a block poses risk to the stability of the system, which stems from the vicious competition of users and the insufficient incentives of miners. In this paper, we propose a novel transaction selection mechanism by leveraging Lyapunov optimization and large deviation theory. Our study is 1) fair, because the proposed mechanism is not single-factor dominated, both personal utility of the miner and overall utility of the system are taken into account; 2) sustainable since miners are incentivized greatly to guarantee the mining behavior and 3) robust. The analysis based on large deviation theory enhances the robustness of blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider both miner’s benefit as well as system benefit to establish a better fee market in blockchain for IoT enhancement. Our theoretical analyses and simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.
4 September 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
The pool-hopping attack casts down the expected profits of both the mining pool and honest miners in Blockchain. The mainstream countermeasures, namely PPS (pay-per-share) and PPLNS (pay-per-last-N-share), can hedge pool hopping but need to charge miners some fees when they join in a pool. Obviously, the higher fee charged, the higher cost of joining the pool, the less motivation of a miner to mine in the pool. In this study, we apply the zero-determinant (ZD) theory to design a novel pooled mining which offers an incentive mechanism for motivating miners not to switch in pools strategically by economic means without fee charged. In short, the proposed pooled mining has three unique features: 1) fee-free. No fee is charged if the miner does not hop. 2) wide applicability. It can be employed in both prepaid and postpaid mechanisms. 3) fairness. Even can dominate the game with any miner, a pool has to cooperate when a miner does not hop among pools, implying that the pool cannot squeeze the honest miners financially. The fairness of our scheme makes it have long-term sustainability. Both theoretical analyses and numerical simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme.
4 November 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Natural forking is tantamount to the “black swan” event in blockchain since it emerges unexpectedly with a small probability, and may incur low resource utilization and costly economic loss. The ongoing literature analyzes natural forking mainly from the macroscopic perspective, which is insufficient to further understand this phenomenon since it roots in the instantaneous difference between block creation and propagation microscopically. Hence, in this paper, we fill this gap by leveraging the large deviation theory to conduct the first micro study of natural forking, aiming to reveal its inherent mechanism substantially. Our work is featured by 1) conceptual innovation . We creatively abstract the blockchain overlay network as a “service system”. This allows us to investigate natural forking from the perspective of “supply and demand”. Based on this, we can identify the competitive dynamics of blockchain and construct a queuing model to characterize natural forking; 2) progressiveness . We scrutinize the natural forking probability as well as its decay rate via a three-step scheme from simple to complex, which are the single-source i.i.d. scheme, the single-source non-i.i.d. scheme, and the many-source non-i.i.d. scheme. By doing so, we can answer when and how fast should we take actions and what actions should we take against natural forking. Our valuable findings can not only put forward decisive guidelines theoretically from the top level, but also engineer optimal countermeasures operationally on a practical level to thwart natural forking.
1 December 2021 in Computer Networks
27 December 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
The natural forking severely compromises the security and wastes resources of Blockchain. Current analyses of the natural forking are carried out from microscale and macroscale perspectives, each facing challenges in generality and accuracy respectively. This results in dire straits that the forking arising from the network layer cannot be solved within the same layer, and existing defense schemes concentrate on the consensus layer, unfortunately coming at the expense of diminishing decentralized trust. Hence, to overcome these shortcomings, we propose the first reconnaissance-strike solution to the natural forking where the issue is recognized at the network layer and further struck on-site. Specifically, our endeavors encompass 1) analyzing the spatial-temporal transmission dynamics of the main chain . We exert mesoscale perspective by transforming the behavioral analysis of the transmitters (i.e., the nodes) into the movement analysis of the transmitted object (i.e., the main chain) which mitigates following L´evy mobility. Based on this, we quantify the dynamics of long-range leaping and short-range diffusion of the main chain transmission; 2) proposing a cost-effective anti-forking mechanism . This mechanism combats the forking with low cost by configuring logical connections at the network management level, based on the quantitative relationship between Blockchain network topology and the natural forking rate we have derived. Both theoretical analysis and extensive experiments verify that our scheme can maintain the natural forking rate not more than the given threshold in most cases.