Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos

Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos

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Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos

Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Delaware, Newark, United States

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2023 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CGCharles Gouert
Charles Gouert
DMDimitris Mouris
Dimitris Mouris
NTNektarios Tsoutsos
Nektarios Tsoutsos
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables arbitrary computation on encrypted data, allowing users to upload ciphertexts to cloud servers for computation while mitigating privacy risks. Many cryptographic schemes fall under the umbrella of FHE, and each scheme has several open-source implementations with its own strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, developers have no straightforward way to choose which FHE scheme and implementation is best suited for their application needs, especially considering that each scheme offers different security, performance, and usability guarantees. To allow programmers to effectively utilize the power of FHE, we employ a series of benchmarks called the Terminator 2 Benchmark Suite and present new insights gained from running these algorithms with a variety of FHE back - ends. Contrary to generic benchmarks that do not take into consideration the inherent challenges of encrypted computation, our methodology is tailored to the secure computational primitives of each target FHE implementation. To ensure fair comparisons, we developed a versatile compiler(called T2) that converts arbitrary benchmarks written in a domain - specific language into identical encrypted programs running on different popular FHE libraries as a backend.Our analysis exposes for the first time the advantages and disadvantages of each FHE library as well as the types of applications most suited for each computational domain(i.e., binary, integer, and floating - point).

22 April 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DMDimitris Mouris
Dimitris Mouris
NTNektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
As cloud computing becomes more popular, research has focused on usable solutions to the problem of verifiable computation (VC), where a computationally weak device (Verifier) outsources a program execution to a powerful server (Prover) and receives guarantees that the execution was performed faithfully. A Prover can further demonstrate knowledge of a secret input that causes the Verifier's program to satisfy certain assertions, without ever revealing which input was used. State-of-the-art Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge (ZKPK) methods encode a computation using arithmetic circuits and preserve the privacy of Prover's inputs while attesting the integrity of program execution. Nevertheless, developing, debugging, and optimizing programs as circuits remains a daunting task, as most users are unfamiliar with this programming paradigm. In this work, we present Zilch, a framework that accelerates and simplifies the deployment of VC and ZKPK for any application transparently, i.e., without the need of trusted setup. Zilch uses traditional instruction sequences rather than static arithmetic circuits that would need to be regenerated for each different computation. Towards that end, we have implemented Z MIPS: a MIPS-like processor model that allows verifying each instruction independently and compose a proof for the execution of the target application. To foster usability, Zilch incorporates a novel cross-compiler from an object-oriented Java-like language tailored to ZKPK and optimized our Z MIPS model, as well as a powerful API that enables integration of ZKPK within existing C/C++ programs. In our experiments, we demonstrate the flexibility of Zilch using two real-life applications, and evaluate Prover and Verifier performance on a variety of benchmarks.

13 May 2016 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
OMOleg Mazonka
Oleg Mazonka
NTNektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
MMMichail Maniatakos
Michail Maniatakos
The rapid expansion and increased popularity of cloud computing comes with no shortage of privacy concerns about outsourcing computation to semi-trusted parties. Leveraging the power of encryption, in this paper, we introduce Cryptoleq: an abstract machine based on the concept of one instruction set computer, capable of performing general-purpose computation on encrypted programs. The program operands are protected using the Paillier partially homomorphic cryptosystem, which supports addition on the encrypted domain. Full homomorphism over addition and multiplication, which is necessary for enabling general-purpose computation, is achieved by inventing a heuristically obfuscated software re-encryption module written using Cryptoleq instructions and blended into the executing program. Cryptoleq is heterogeneous, allowing mixing encrypted and unencrypted instruction operands in the same program memory space. Programming with Cryptoleq is facilitated using an enhanced assembly language that allows the development of any advanced algorithm on encrypted data sets. In our evaluation, we compare Cryptoleq's performance against a popular fully homomorphic encryption library, and demonstrate correctness using a typical private information retrieval problem.

1 April 2022 in IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DMDimitris Mouris
Dimitris Mouris
NTNektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
Digital manufacturing (DM) is actively adopted to the production lifecycles of a variety of critical industries, and this rapid growth has resulted in exponential increase of 3D computer-aided design (CAD) models. Unfortunately, counterfeiting of intellectual property becomes a prominent threat as many 3D designs are accessible online, combined with the proliferation of cheap consumer 3D printers that enable malicious actors to produce non-authentic parts. State-of-the-art techniques to secure manufacturing processes mostly rely on watermarking, which embeds hidden information inside CAD models to prove ownership and authenticity. Nevertheless, such techniques tamper with the model itself, while existing attacks allow removing such watermarks altogether. To address these shortcomings, we integrate signal processing and cryptographic techniques and describe a tailored solution for CAD model ownership and supply chain management. Our approach generates unique identifiers for 3D designs using frequency-domain transforms and employs non-fungible tokens (NFTs) that persist on public distributed ledgers. Our NFTs are implemented on the Ethereum blockchain using smart contracts and their functionality is twofold: (a) authenticate the owner of a CAD model, and (b) enable ownership transfer. To validate our technique, we deployed our smart contract on Ethereum's proof-of-work Ropsten network and demonstrated the applicability of our methodology.

24 April 2018 in IEEE Embedded Systems Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NTNektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
MMMichail Maniatakos
Michail Maniatakos
For more than two decades, memory safety violations and control-flow integrity attacks have been a prominent threat to the security of computer systems. Contrary to regular systems that are updated regularly, application-constrained devices typically run monolithic firmware that may not be updated in the lifetime of the device after being deployed in the field. Hence, the need for protections against memory corruption becomes even more prominent. In this article, we survey memory safety in the context of embedded processors, and describe different attacks that can subvert the legitimate control flow, with a special focus on Return Oriented Programming. Based on common attack trends, we formulate the anatomy of typical memory corruption attacks and discuss powerful mitigation techniques that have been reported in the literature.

1 December 2020 in Additive Manufacturing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WLWenjin Li
Wenjin Li
GMGary Mac
Gary Mac
NTNektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
NGNikhil Gupta
Nikhil Gupta
RKRamesh Karri
Ramesh Karri