21 August 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
With the adoption of a globalized and distributed IC design flow, IP piracy, reverse engineering, and counterfeiting threats are becoming more prevalent. Logic obfuscation techniques including logic locking and IC camouflaging have been developed to address these emergent challenges. A major challenge for logic locking and camouflaging techniques is to resist Boolean satisfiability (SAT) based attacks that can circumvent state-of-the-art solutions within minutes. Over the past year, multiple SAT attack resilient solutions such as Anti-SAT and AND-tree insertion (ATI) have been presented. In this paper, we perform a security analysis of these countermeasures and show that they leave structural traces behind in their attempts to thwart the SAT attack. We present three attacks, namely “signal probability skew” (SPS) attack, “AppSAT guided removal (AGR) attack, and “sensitization guided SAT” (SGS) attack”, that can break Anti-SAT and ATI, within minutes.
5 February 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
16 October 2020 in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
22 February 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Scan-based Design-for-testability (DfT) is the de facto standard in the semiconductor testing industry to guarantee the functional and structural correctness of chips. It provides improved observability and controllability, leading to enhanced fault coverage. However, owing to widespread usage, attackers devise techniques to misuse this method to steal secret keys embedded in a security-critical chip. A vast majority of off-the-shelf defense mechanisms are based on either randomizing the scan output or restricting access to the scan. However, none of these defense mechanisms leverage the fundamental properties of the scan attack; thus, they tend to be complex and incur high area and computation overhead. In this paper, we propose a defense mechanism by preventing the vulnerabilities of fundamental properties from being exploited in scan attacks. The paper first pinpoints the ultimate condition of the scan attack on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This attack condition is inherent to the cryptographic property of the cipher, which, when violated, thwarts the attack. To implement our defense, we interchange the AES round outputs by applying pre-computed masks. The designer chooses inputs with a fixed difference to swap the outputs. A modified incorrect key is recovered instead of an actual key if a scan-based attack is launched. To show the generality of the proposed defense, it is extended to another AES-like cipher, Light Encryption Device (LED). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first defense against a scan attack wherein the complete testing process, including structural and functional tests, can be outsourced to untrusted third parties without compromising the actual key. In comparison, logic locking techniques limaye2020thwarting can outsource only structural testing to untrusted third parties.
9 February 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
In this article, we present a formal model of entropy reduction across the rounds when a fault is injected in SIMON and SIMECK family of lightweight ciphers. The model helps to pinpoint a range of intermediate rounds in a cipher of the same family, which when subjected to a fault injection requires minimal number of such attempts to reveal the secret key. The range of such rounds depict increased vulnerability to fault analysis attacks and, thus, require a stronger countermeasure for such rounds. We demonstrate the proposed entropy-reduction model for all versions of SIMON and SIMECK. The comparisons with existing fault analysis attacks depict that our proposed model requires least number of faults and smaller attack time in almost all versions of SIMON and SIMECK. The proposed entropy-reduction model can be used as a tool for the designers for any generic lightweight Feistel cipher to identify the vulnerable rounds in the encryption/decryption algorithms.