Abhrajit Sengupta

Dr. Abhrajit Sengupta


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 September 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LALilas Alrahis
Lilas Alrahis
ASAbhrajit Sengupta
Abhrajit Sengupta
JKJohann Knechtel
Johann Knechtel
SPSatwik Patnaik
Satwik Patnaik
HSHani Saleh
Hani Saleh
OSOzgur Sinanoglu
Ozgur Sinanoglu
This work introduces a generic, machine learning (ML)-based platform for functional reverse engineering (RE) of circuits. Our proposed platform GNN-RE leverages the notion of graph neural networks (GNNs) to: 1) represent and analyze flattened/unstructured gate-level netlists; 2) automatically identify the boundaries between the modules or subcircuits implemented in such netlists; and 3) classify the subcircuits based on their functionalities. For GNNs in general, each graph node is tailored to learn about its own features and its neighboring nodes, which is a powerful approach for the detection of any kind of subgraphs of interest. For GNN-RE , in particular, each node represents a gate and is initialized with a feature vector that reflects on the functional and structural properties of its neighboring gates. GNN-RE also learns the global structure of the circuit, which facilitates identifying the boundaries between subcircuits in a flattened netlist. Initially, to provide high-quality data for training of GNN-RE , we deploy a comprehensive dataset of foundational designs/components with differing functionalities, implementation styles, bit widths, and interconnections. GNN-RE is then tested on the unseen shares of this custom dataset, as well as the EPFL benchmarks, the ISCAS-85 benchmarks, and the 74X series benchmarks. GNN-RE achieves an average accuracy of 98.82% in terms of mapping individual gates to modules, all without any manual intervention or postprocessing. We also release our code and source data.

23 January 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAbhrajit Sengupta
Abhrajit Sengupta
MNMohammed Nabeel
Mohammed Nabeel
NLNimisha Limaye
Nimisha Limaye
MAMohammed Ashraf
Mohammed Ashraf
OSOzgur Sinanoglu
Ozgur Sinanoglu
Logic locking is a holistic solution to counter manufacturing threats, such as intellectual property (IP) piracy and overbuilding at the hardware level. However, years of research has exposed various flaws in locking, including a Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based attack. Consequently, several SAT-resilient locking techniques, such as SARLock, Anti-SAT, and SFLL have been proposed, although certain instances of them have also been broken by a class of attacks, called removal attack. In this article, we approach logic locking by leveraging well-known principles from very large-scale integration (VLSI) testing and elicit logic locking properties that dictate the resilience of a locking technique against different attacks. We present a revised version of SFLL, namely SFLL-rem, that not only retains all security properties of SFLL, delivering resilience to all the state-of-the-art attacks SFLL can thwart, but also to the latest removal attacks that broke some SFLL instances. Further, we develop a security-aware CAD framework integrated with industry tools that incurs only -1.5%, 0%, and 4.13% overhead for power, performance, and area, respectively. We demonstrate a silicon implementation of SFLL-rem on ARM Cortex-M0 microprocessor in 65 nm. Moreover, we provide a framework for an SoC designer to customize logic locking based on the SoC blocks and their threat models; this is illustrated by locking a multimillion-gate SoC provided by DARPA, and taking the SoC all the way to GDSII layout.

5 February 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAbhrajit Sengupta
Abhrajit Sengupta
BMBodhisatwa Mazumdar
Bodhisatwa Mazumdar
MYMuhammad Yasin
Muhammad Yasin
OSOzgur Sinanoglu
Ozgur Sinanoglu

5 January 2024
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
LALilas Alrahis
Lilas Alrahis
LMLikhitha Mankali
Likhitha Mankali
SPSatwik Patnaik
Satwik Patnaik
ASAbhrajit Sengupta
Abhrajit Sengupta
JKJohann Knechtel
Johann Knechtel
OSOzgur Sinanoglu
Ozgur Sinanoglu

5 May 2022 in Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ASAbhrajit Sengupta
Abhrajit Sengupta
MNMohammed Nabeel
Mohammed Nabeel
MAMohammed Ashraf
Mohammed Ashraf
JKJohann Knechtel
Johann Knechtel
OSOzgur Sinanoglu
Ozgur Sinanoglu
Split manufacturing was introduced as a countermeasure against hardware-level security threats such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of hardware Trojans. However, the security promise of split manufacturing has been challenged by various attacks which exploit the well-known working principles of design tools to infer the missing back-end-of-line (BEOL) interconnects. In this work, we define the security of split manufacturing formally and provide the associated proof, and we advocate accordingly for a novel, formally secure paradigm. Inspired by the notion of logic locking, we protect the front-end-of-line (FEOL) layout by embedding secret keys which are implemented through the BEOL in such a way that they become indecipherable to foundry-based attacks. At the same time, our technique is competitive with prior art in terms of layout overhead, especially for large-scale designs (ITC’99 benchmarks). Furthermore, another concern for split manufacturing is its practicality (despite successful prototyping). Therefore, we promote an alternative implementation strategy, based on package-level routing, which enables formally secure IP protection without splitting at all, and thus, without the need for a dedicated BEOL facility. We refer to this as “poor man’s split manufacturing” and we study the practicality of this approach by means of physical-design exploration.