1 April 2001 in Organization Science
Does owner management necessarily eliminate the agency costs of ownership? Drawing on agency literature and on the economic theory of the household, we argue that private ownership and owner management expose privately held, owner-managed firms to agency threats ignored by Jensen’s and Meckling’s (1976) agency model. Private ownership and owner management not only reduce the effectiveness of external control mechanisms, they also expose firms to a “self-control” problem created by incentives that cause owners to take actions which “harm themselves as well as those around them” (Jensen 1994, p. 43). Thus, shareholders have incentive to invest resources in curbing both managerial and owner opportunism. We extend this thesis to the domain of the family firm. After developing hypotheses which describe how family dynamics and, specifically, altruism, exacerbate agency problems experienced by these privately held, owner-managed firms, we use data obtained from a large-scale survey of family businesses to field test our hypotheses and find evidence which suggests support for our proposed theory. Finally, we discuss the implications of our theory for research on family and other types of privately held, owner-managed firms.
1 July 2013 in Academy of Management Review
As a new perspective for understanding firm responsiveness to stakeholder concerns, we propose a strategic cognition view of issue salience—that is, the degree to which a stakeholder issue resonates with and is prioritized by management. Specifically, we explain how a firm's cognitive structures of organizational identity and strategic frames use different core logics to influence managerial interpretation of an issue as salient. We then present a typology of firm responsiveness and suggest that firms will respond more substantially to those issues perceived as salient to both cognitive logics and more symbolically to those issues perceived as salient to only one logic. This article fills key gaps in our understanding of how firms manage and respond to stakeholders by focusing on the salience of the issue and incorporating strategic cognition as a key mediating mechanism.
1 June 2003 in Business & Society
Scholars and practitioners alike indicate a movement in corporate philanthropy toward “strategic” giving, for example, giving that improves the firm's strategic position (ultimately the “bottom line”) while it benefits the recipient of the philanthropic act. Although the existence of this trend is widely accepted, it is represented in the literature most often by anecdotal evidence. This article presents the findings of a survey of corporate giving managers of U.S. firms that have had an established giving program of at least 5 years, with annual giving totaling at least $200,000 each year. The data show that corporate giving managers believe their firms are becoming increasingly strategic in their philanthropic activities. The findings also indicate that institutional-, firm-, and individual-level influences combine to precipitate strategic philanthropy. These findings lend support to the belief that the nature of corporate philanthropy is evolving to fit a more competitive marketplace.
1 July 2004 in Journal of Business Venturing
1 June 1999 in Business & Society
Prior studies have advanced our knowledge of the individual determinants of corporate philanthropy; however, little empirical research has been conducted on how these determinants combine to influence giving. In this study, the authors develop and test an integrated model of the relationship between firm resources and corporate philanthropy as mediated by managerial discretion and managerial values. In addition, the authors offer organizational slack as an alternative measure of organizational resources. As predicted, the results show that firm resources have a positive effect on corporate philanthropy. This effect is fully mediated by managerial discretion and partially mediated by managerial values.
1 July 2009 in Academy of Management Review
With its focus on product-market rivalry, competitive dynamics research fails to tell the whole story. We develop a theory of factor-market rivalry to shed light on atypical rivals and competitive blind spots. Focusing on resource versatility and mobility, the theory introduces dynamic constructs—resource discontinuities, leapfrogging, and captivity—and explains their role in triggering cascading effects. To illustrate the theory's conceptual utility, we apply the concepts of factor-market rivalry to mutual forbearance in multimarket competition.