Women are increasing in number among corporations' boards of directors, yet their representation is far from uniform across firms. In this study, we adopted a resource dependence theory lens to identify organizational predictors of women on boards. We tested our hypotheses using panel data from the 1,000 U.S. firms that were largest in terms of sales between 1990 and 2003. We found that organizational size, industry type, firm diversification strategy, and network effects (linkages to other boards with women directors) significantly impact the likelihood of female representation on boards of directors.
As a new perspective for understanding firm responsiveness to stakeholder concerns, we propose a strategic cognition view of issue salience—that is, the degree to which a stakeholder issue resonates with and is prioritized by management. Specifically, we explain how a firm's cognitive structures of organizational identity and strategic frames use different core logics to influence managerial interpretation of an issue as salient. We then present a typology of firm responsiveness and suggest that firms will respond more substantially to those issues perceived as salient to both cognitive logics and more symbolically to those issues perceived as salient to only one logic. This article fills key gaps in our understanding of how firms manage and respond to stakeholders by focusing on the salience of the issue and incorporating strategic cognition as a key mediating mechanism.
Scholars and practitioners are interested in board effectiveness, yet we know relatively little about directors' engagement in the boardroom. We integrate identity theory and social identity theory research with literature on board monitoring and resource provision to model how directors' multiple identities affect their behavior. We propose that directors' strength of identification with multiple identities affects the extent to which they engage in monitoring and resource provision. We discuss implications for corporate governance research and practice.
Each year shareholders, via exercise of their proxy votes, have the opportunity to voice their support or displeasure with firms and director nominees. Examining over 2,000 Fortune 500 director nominees, we explore those indicators available to shareholders at the time of directors' (re)election to provide insight into shareholder discontent with director monitoring. By studying actual voting behaviors, we provide new perspective to understanding director elections as a governance process. Employing a multilevel approach, we find support for agency-theoretic relationships between several firm and director characteristics and shareholder opposition to directors seeking (re)election to the board. At the firm level, we find that CEO compensation level and board size are positively related to the withholding of shareholder votes in director elections, a behavior indicative of shareholder discontent. Complementing these findings, at the director level, we find that affiliated director status, tenure, and number of outside directorships are positively related, and director block ownership is negatively related to shareholder discontent with director monitoring.