Christoph Baumann

Christoph Baumann

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Christoph Baumann

Ericsson Research Security

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 June 2023 in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
GSGianluca Scopelliti
Gianluca Scopelliti
SPSepideh Pouyanrad
Sepideh Pouyanrad
JNJob Noorman
Job Noorman
FAFritz Alder
Fritz Alder
CBChristoph Baumann
Christoph Baumann
JMJan Tobias Mühlberg
Jan Tobias Mühlberg
This article presents an approach to provide strong assurance of the secure execution of distributed event-driven applications on shared infrastructures, while relying on a small Trusted Computing Base. We build upon and extend security primitives provided by Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to guarantee authenticity and integrity properties of applications, and to secure control of input and output devices. More specifically, we guarantee that if an output is produced by the application, it was allowed to be produced by the application’s source code based on an authentic trace of inputs. We present an integrated open-source framework to develop, deploy, and use such applications across heterogeneous TEEs. Beyond authenticity and integrity, our framework optionally provides confidentiality and a notion of availability, and facilitates software development at a high level of abstraction over the platform-specific TEE layer. We support event-driven programming to develop distributed enclave applications in Rust and C for heterogeneous TEE, including Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone, and Sancus. In this article we discuss the workings of our approach, the extensions we made to the Sancus processor, and the integration of our development model with commercial TEEs. Our evaluation of security and performance aspects show that TEEs, together with our programming model, form a basis for powerful security architectures for dependable systems in domains such as Industrial Control Systems and the Internet of Things, illustrating our framework’s unique suitability for a broad range of use cases which combine cloud processing, mobile and edge devices, and lightweight sensing and actuation.

17 January 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GBGerald Budigiri
Gerald Budigiri
CBChristoph Baumann
Christoph Baumann
ETEddy Truyen
Eddy Truyen
WJWouter Joosen
Wouter Joosen
Packaging applications in Containers, dynamically managed using a cluster orchestrator, is the de-facto approach for deployment of cloud-native applications. When Containers run inside Virtual Machines (VMs) to protect infrastructural assets, Network Policies at the Container layer and Security Groups at the VM layer provide complementary firewall mechanisms that strengthen defenses against lateral movement of attackers. However, least-privilege network policies at the Container layer may not always be consistent with statically defined, over-permissive Security Groups at the VM layer. This is especially a problem with low-latency configuration of Container networking solutions that requires every opened Container protocol, port and traffic direction also to be opened at the VM layer. In any post-exploitation scenario where attackers escape from within an already compromised or infected Container, such over-permissive Security Groups do not prevent the attacker from spreading across VMs to find powerful tokens for accessing the cluster orchestrator. In this paper, we introduce GrassHopper, a fast and dynamic cross-layer enforcement approach for Network Policies, which automatically generates Security Group configurations from dynamically verified Network Policies and Container scheduling decisions. Given the low-latency context, the design of GrassHopper must ensure that dynamically generated Security Group rules come in a timely manner to effect before the newly scheduled Containers become ready to serve traffic. We evaluate the performance of GrassHopper on a Kubernetes cluster running on OpenStack at the network and application level. In comparison to a Security Group management approach that is not scheduling-aware, our findings show that for low-latency applications GrassHopper can reduce the network attack surface between VMs at a ratio of 78-to-99%, while causing no network performance overhead at the application level with respect to latency and throughput.

25 May 2019 in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CBChristoph Baumann
Christoph Baumann
OSOliver Schwarz
Oliver Schwarz
MDMads Dam
Mads Dam
The security of embedded systems can be dramatically improved through the use of formally verified isolation mechanisms such as separation kernels, hypervisors, or microkernels. For trustworthiness, particularly for system-level behavior, the verifications need precise models of the underlying hardware. Such models are hard to attain, highly complex, and proofs of their security properties may not easily apply to similar but different platforms. This may render verification economically infeasible. To address these issues, we propose a compositional top-down approach to embedded system specification and verification, where the system-on-chip is modeled as a network of distributed automata communicating via paired synchronous message passing. Using abstract specifications for each component allows to delay the development of detailed models for cores, devices, etc., while still being able to verify high-level security properties like integrity and confidentiality, and soundly refine the result for different instantiations of the abstract components at a later stage. As a case study, we apply this methodology to the verification of information flow security for an industry-scale security-oriented hypervisor on the ARMv8-A platform and report on the complete verification of guest mode security properties in the HOL4 theorem prover.

3 June 2023 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
MGMerve Gülmez
Merve Gülmez
TNThomas Nyman
Thomas Nyman
CBChristoph Baumann
Christoph Baumann
JMJan Tobias Mühlberg
Jan Tobias Mühlberg
Memory-related errors remain an important cause of software vulnerabilities. While mitigation techniques such as using memory-safe languages are promising solutions, these do not address software resilience and availability. In this paper, we propose a solution to build resilience against memory attacks into software, which contributes to environmental sustainability and security.

21 April 2023 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
MGMerve Gülmez
Merve Gülmez
TNThomas Nyman
Thomas Nyman
CBChristoph Baumann
Christoph Baumann
JMJan Tobias Mühlberg
Jan Tobias Mühlberg
The use of unsafe programming languages still remains one of the major root causes of software vulnerabilities. Although well-known defenses that detect and mitigate memory-safety related issues exist, they don't address the challenge of software resilience, i.e., whether a system under attack can continue to carry out its function when subjected to malicious input. We propose secure rollback of isolated domains as an efficient and secure method of improving the resilience of software targeted by run-time attacks. We show the practicability of our methodology by realizing a software library for Secure Domain Rollback (SDRoB) and demonstrate how SDRoB can be applied to real-world software.

4 July 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
RGRoberto Guanciale
Roberto Guanciale
CBChristoph Baumann
Christoph Baumann
PBPablo Buiras
Pablo Buiras
MDMads Dam
Mads Dam
HNHamed Nemati
Hamed Nemati