Andrea E. Martin

Andrea E. Martin

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Andrea E. Martin

Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics

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Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 January 2021 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
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OGOlivia Guest
Olivia Guest
AMAndrea E. Martin
Andrea E. Martin
Psychology endeavors to develop theories of human capacities and behaviors on the basis of a variety of methodologies and dependent measures. We argue that one of the most divisive factors in psychological science is whether researchers choose to use computational modeling of theories (over and above data) during the scientific-inference process. Modeling is undervalued yet holds promise for advancing psychological science. The inherent demands of computational modeling guide us toward better science by forcing us to conceptually analyze, specify, and formalize intuitions that otherwise remain unexamined—what we dub open theory. Constraining our inference process through modeling enables us to build explanatory and predictive theories. Here, we present scientific inference in psychology as a path function in which each step shapes the next. Computational modeling can constrain these steps, thus advancing scientific inference over and above the stewardship of experimental practice (e.g., preregistration). If psychology continues to eschew computational modeling, we predict more replicability crises and persistent failure at coherent theory building. This is because without formal modeling we lack open and transparent theorizing. We also explain how to formalize, specify, and implement a computational model, emphasizing that the advantages of modeling can be achieved by anyone with benefit to all.

1 January 2016 in Journal of Memory and Language
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AIAine Ito
Aine Ito
MCMartin Corley
Martin Corley
MPMartin J. Pickering
Martin J. Pickering
AMAndrea E. Martin
Andrea E. Martin
MNMante S. Nieuwland
Mante S. Nieuwland

23 October 2020 in The Journal of Neuroscience
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GKGreta Kaufeld
Greta Kaufeld
HBHans Rutger Bosker
Hans Rutger Bosker
SOSanne Ten Oever
Sanne Ten Oever
PAPhillip M. Alday
Phillip M. Alday
AMAntje S. Meyer
Antje S. Meyer
AMAndrea E. Martin
Andrea E. Martin
Neural oscillations track linguistic information during speech comprehension (Ding et al., 2016; Keitel et al., 2018), and are known to be modulated by acoustic landmarks and speech intelligibility (Doelling et al., 2014; Zoefel and VanRullen, 2015). However, studies investigating linguistic tracking have either relied on non-naturalistic isochronous stimuli or failed to fully control for prosody. Therefore, it is still unclear whether low-frequency activity tracks linguistic structure during natural speech, where linguistic structure does not follow such a palpable temporal pattern. Here, we measured electroencephalography (EEG) and manipulated the presence of semantic and syntactic information apart from the timescale of their occurrence, while carefully controlling for the acoustic-prosodic and lexical-semantic information in the signal. EEG was recorded while 29 adult native speakers (22 women, 7 men) listened to naturally spoken Dutch sentences, jabberwocky controls with morphemes and sentential prosody, word lists with lexical content but no phrase structure, and backward acoustically matched controls. Mutual information (MI) analysis revealed sensitivity to linguistic content: MI was highest for sentences at the phrasal (0.8–1.1 Hz) and lexical (1.9–2.8 Hz) timescales, suggesting that the delta-band is modulated by lexically driven combinatorial processing beyond prosody, and that linguistic content (i.e., structure and meaning) organizes neural oscillations beyond the timescale and rhythmicity of the stimulus. This pattern is consistent with neurophysiologically inspired models of language comprehension (Martin, 2016, 2020; Martin and Doumas, 2017) where oscillations encode endogenously generated linguistic content over and above exogenous or stimulus-driven timing and rhythm information.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTBiological systems like the brain encode their environment not only by reacting in a series of stimulus-driven responses, but by combining stimulus-driven information with endogenous, internally generated, inferential knowledge and meaning. Understanding language from speech is the human benchmark for this. Much research focuses on the purely stimulus-driven response, but here, we focus on the goal of language behavior: conveying structure and meaning. To that end, we use naturalistic stimuli that contrast acoustic-prosodic and lexical-semantic information to show that, during spoken language comprehension, oscillatory modulations reflect computations related to inferring structure and meaning from the acoustic signal. Our experiment provides the first evidence to date that compositional structure and meaning organize the oscillatory response, above and beyond prosodic and lexical controls.

11 December 2019 in Language, Cognition and Neuroscience
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LMLars Meyer
Lars Meyer
YSYue Sun
Yue Sun
AMAndrea E. Martin
Andrea E. Martin
Research on speech processing is often focused on a phenomenon termed “entrainment”, whereby the cortex shadows rhythmic acoustic information with oscillatory activity. Entrainment has been observed to a range of rhythms present in speech; in addition, synchronicity with abstract information (e.g. syntactic structures) has been observed. Entrainment accounts face two challenges: First, speech is not exactly rhythmic; second, synchronicity with representations that lack a clear acoustic counterpart has been described. We propose that apparent entrainment does not always result from acoustic information. Rather, internal rhythms may have functionalities in the generation of abstract representations and predictions. While acoustics may often provide punctate opportunities for entrainment, internal rhythms may also live a life of their own to infer and predict information, leading to intrinsic synchronicity – not to be counted as entrainment. This possibility may open up new research avenues in the psycho– and neurolinguistic study of language processing and language development.

2 March 2017 in PLOS Biology
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AMAndrea E. Martin
Andrea E. Martin
LDLeonidas A. A. Doumas
Leonidas A. A. Doumas
Biological systems often detect species-specific signals in the environment. In humans, speech and language are species-specific signals of fundamental biological importance. To detect the linguistic signal, human brains must form hierarchical representations from a sequence of perceptual inputs distributed in time. What mechanism underlies this ability? One hypothesis is that the brain repurposed an available neurobiological mechanism when hierarchical linguistic representation became an efficient solution to a computational problem posed to the organism. Under such an account, a single mechanism must have the capacity to perform multiple, functionally related computations, e.g., detect the linguistic signal and perform other cognitive functions, while, ideally, oscillating like the human brain. We show that a computational model of analogy, built for an entirely different purpose—learning relational reasoning—processes sentences, represents their meaning, and, crucially, exhibits oscillatory activation patterns resembling cortical signals elicited by the same stimuli. Such redundancy in the cortical and machine signals is indicative of formal and mechanistic alignment between representational structure building and “cortical” oscillations. By inductive inference, this synergy suggests that the cortical signal reflects structure generation, just as the machine signal does. A single mechanism—using time to encode information across a layered network—generates the kind of (de)compositional representational hierarchy that is crucial for human language and offers a mechanistic linking hypothesis between linguistic representation and cortical computation. Human language is a fundamental biological signal with computational properties that differ from other perception-action systems: hierarchical relationships between sounds, words, phrases, and sentences and the unbounded ability to combine smaller units into larger ones, resulting in a "discrete infinity" of expressions. These properties have long made language hard to account for from a biological systems perspective and within models of cognition. We argue that a single computational mechanism—using time to encode hierarchy—can satisfy the computational requirements of language, in addition to those of other cognitive functions. We show that a well-supported neural network model of analogy oscillates like the human brain while processing sentences. Despite being built for an entirely different purpose (learning relational concepts), the model processes hierarchical representations of sentences and exhibits oscillatory patterns of activation that closely resemble the human cortical response to the same stimuli. From the model, we derive an explicit computational mechanism for how the human brain could convert perceptual features into hierarchical representations across multiple timescales, providing a linking hypothesis between linguistic and cortical computation. Our results suggest a formal and mechanistic alignment between representational structure building and cortical oscillations that has broad implications for discovering the computational first principles of cognition in the human brain.

1 August 2020 in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
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Journal Article
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AMAndrea E. Martin
Andrea E. Martin
Hierarchical structure and compositionality imbue human language with unparalleled expressive power and set it apart from other perception–action systems. However, neither formal nor neurobiological models account for how these defining computational properties might arise in a physiological system. I attempt to reconcile hierarchy and compositionality with principles from cell assembly computation in neuroscience; the result is an emerging theory of how the brain could convert distributed perceptual representations into hierarchical structures across multiple timescales while representing interpretable incremental stages of (de)compositional meaning. The model's architecture—a multidimensional coordinate system based on neurophysiological models of sensory processing—proposes that a manifold of neural trajectories encodes sensory, motor, and abstract linguistic states. Gain modulation, including inhibition, tunes the path in the manifold in accordance with behavior and is how latent structure is inferred. As a consequence, predictive information about upcoming sensory input during production and comprehension is available without a separate operation. The proposed processing mechanism is synthesized from current models of neural entrainment to speech, concepts from systems neuroscience and category theory, and a symbolic-connectionist computational model that uses time and rhythm to structure information. I build on evidence from cognitive neuroscience and computational modeling that suggests a formal and mechanistic alignment between structure building and neural oscillations, and moves toward unifying basic insights from linguistics and psycholinguistics with the currency of neural computation.