1 January 2022 in Marketing Science
This paper studies a marketplace design problem with asymmetric information where the platform jointly considers leveraging information revealed in ad auctions and setting sales commissions to maximize the joint profit from ad revenues and sales commissions.
1 September 2024 in Marketing Science
We study when and why a platform may seek to give preference to its private label in sponsored advertising.
1 January 2024 in Marketing Science
We study an online retail marketplace’s incentive to manipulate sellers’ product attractiveness to consumers (e.g., through fake sales, fake reviews, or dishonest endorsement) and sellers’ placement ranking.
5 April 2018 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Manufacturers and the retailers through which they sell their products often advertise against the same keywords in search advertising. This implies that these retailers increase advertising costs for manufacturers while also appropriating a part of their channel margins. In spite of this, it is observed that manufacturers directly or indirectly subsidize retailers' advertising expenditures; this practice is known as ``digital co-op'' and essentially induces the retailers to advertise more against the manufacturers themselves. In this paper, we use a game theory model with two competing manufacturers and a common retailer to study the incentives of manufacturers to participate in digital co-op in search advertising, and provide guidance on how to manage it. A main insight that we obtain is that, because competing manufacturers are non-independent bidders, if they both have a strong incentive to win an ad slot, subsidizing the retailer to win the ad slot instead is a viable strategy to moderate their competition. We determine the subsidy rates and bids that manufacturers should use for different types of keywords reflecting different brand preferences of consumers, and the competitive responses and outcomes that they can expect. For instance, a manufacturer should subsidize the retailer's ad spend for category keywords at moderate levels and for the competitor's brand keywords at high levels, enabling the retailer to win in both cases. We also consider the case when the manufacturers cannot specify keyword-level subsidy rates and find that they may subsidize the retailer only if the relative search volume of category keywords is sufficiently high.
1 May 2026 in Marketing Science
This paper studies an e-commerce platform’s two intertwined decisions when offering marketplace analytics: the data access policy and the algorithm design.
1 January 2023 in SSRN Electronic Journal
We examine the intersection of two major trends at online retail platforms: the emergence of retail media, which allows sellers to advertise on retail platforms alongside selling their products, and the platforms' switch away from reselling towards marketplace formats. We study whether and when a retail platform benefits from introducing sponsored advertising, and how the effects change with the platform's selling format. We consider two sellers with different qualities selling through a retail platform. We find that counter to our intuitions, offering sponsored advertising may not always benefit the platform, depending on its selling format. Specifically, sponsored advertising benefits the platform under the reselling format but may hurt its revenue under the marketplace format. Furthermore, we find that when considering the effect of selling formats, the platform should offer retail media when the quality difference between the sellers is either significant or negligible, rather than moderate. Finally, consumers benefit from retail media in a larger parameter space than the platform does, suggesting that retail platforms may be incentivized to offer too “little”, rather than too “much” advertising. Our research provides timely guidance for online platforms to finetune their strategies and for regulators to evaluate the ever-changing landscape of retail media.