Manish Jain

Manish Jain

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Manish Jain

University of Southern California

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 December 2011
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
CKChristopher Kiekintveld
Christopher Kiekintveld
MJManish Jain
Manish Jain
JTJason Tsai
Jason Tsai
JPJames Pita
James Pita
FOFernando Ordóñez
Fernando Ordóñez
MTMilind Tambe
Milind Tambe
Introduction Providing security for transportation systems, computer networks, and other critical infrastructure is a large and growing problem. Central to many of these security problems is a resource allocation task. For example, a police force may have limited personnel to conduct patrols, operate checkpoints, and conduct random searches. Other scarce resources including bomb-sniffing canines, vehicles, and security cameras. The key question is how to efficiently allocate these resources to protect against a wide variety of potential threats. The adversarial aspect of security domains poses unique challenges for resource allocation. A motivated attacker can gather information about security measures using surveillance and plan more effective attacks. Predictable resource allocations may be exploited by an attacker, greatly reducing resource effectiveness. A better approach for deploying security resources is to use randomization to increase the uncertainty of potential attackers. We develop new computational methods that use game-theoretic analysis to generate optimal randomized resource allocations for security domains. Game theory offers a more sophisticated approach to randomization than simply “rolling dice.” It allows the analyst to factor differential risks and values into the game model, and incorporates game-theoretic predictions of how the attacker will respond to a given security policy. Recent work by Paruchuri et al. uses a game-theoretic approach to create randomized security policies for traffic checkpoints and canine patrols at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), which are deployed in the daily airport-security operations (Paruchuri et al., 2008; Pita et al., 2008).

12 December 2011
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
MJManish Jain
Manish Jain
EKErim Kardeş
Erim Kardeş
CKChristopher Kiekintveld
Christopher Kiekintveld
MTMilind Tambe
Milind Tambe
FOFernando Ordóñez
Fernando Ordóñez


12 December 2011
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
MTMilind Tambe
Milind Tambe
MJManish Jain
Manish Jain
Introduction Game theory's popularity continues to increase in a whole variety of disciplines, including economics, biology, political science, computer science, electrical engineering, business, law, and public policy. In the arena of security, where game theory has always been popular, there now seems to be an exponential increase in interest. This increase is in part due to the new set of problems our societies face, from terrorism to drugs to crime. These problems are ubiquitous. Yet, limited security resources cannot be everywhere all the time, raising a crucial question of how to best utilize them. Game theory provides a sound mathematical approach for deploying limited security resources to maximize their effectiveness. While the connection between game theory and security has been studied for the last several decades, there has been a fundamental shift in the relationship due to the emergence of computational game theory. More specifically, with the development of new computational approaches to game theory over the past two decades, very large-scale problems can be cast in game-theoretic contexts, thus providing us computational tools to address problems of security allocations. My research group has been at the forefront of this effort to apply computational game theory techniques to security problems. We have led a wide range of actual deployed applications of game theory for security. Our first application, Assistant for Randomized Monitoring Over Routes (ARMOR), successfully deployed game-theoretic algorithms at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in 2007 and has been in use there ever since.

1 September 2012 in AI Magazine
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HAHarith Alani
Harith Alani
BABo An
Bo An
MJManish Jain
Manish Jain
TKTakashi Kido
Takashi Kido
GKGeorge Konidaris
George Konidaris
TVTomas Vitvar
Tomas Vitvar