Philip Garland Gayle

Philip Garland Gayle

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Philip Garland Gayle

Kansas State Univ, Dept Econ, 322 Waters Hall, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 April 2007 in Journal of Regulatory Economics
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Journal Article
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PGPhilip G. Gayle
Philip G. Gayle
DWDennis L. Weisman
Dennis L. Weisman

19 October 2020 in Economic Inquiry
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Journal Article
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PGPhilip G. Gayle
Philip G. Gayle
YLYING LIN
YING LIN

1 February 2008 in Applied Economics
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IJInung Jung
Inung Jung
PGPhilip G. Gayle
Philip G. Gayle
DLDale E. Lehman
Dale E. Lehman
This study examines the relationship between competition and investment by Incumbert Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) in US telecommunications markets. A panel data model and a dynamic panel data model that have not been used in previous studies are applied in this analysis. Results of the panel data model suggest that investment by ILECs is positively related to the market share of Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs), and negatively to the absolute number of CLECs. However, once the persistence in ILECs’ investment behaviour is controlled for using the dynamic model, our measures of the existing competition from CLECs, at best, have a weak effect on ILECs’ investment. Therefore, while strengthening competition in the telecom sector may be key to restoring telecom investment, it is uncertain that competition spurred by the mandatory sharing policy in this sector stimulates ILECs’ incentives to invest in new infrastructure.

1 January 2015 in Review of Network Economics
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PGPhilip G. Gayle
Philip G. Gayle
TTTyson Thomas
Tyson Thomas
Much of the literature on airline cooperation focuses on the price effects of cooperation. A key contribution of our paper is to empirically examine the product quality effects of airline cooperation. Two common types of cooperation among airlines involve international alliances and antitrust immunity (ATI), where ATI allows for more extensive cooperation. Additionally, this paper examines the extent to which domestic mergers affect the quality of international air travel products. The results suggest that increases in the membership of a carrier’s alliance or ATI partners and domestic mergers are associated with the carrier’s own products having more travel-convenient routing quality. Therefore, a complete welfare evaluation of airline cooperation and mergers should not ignore product quality effects.

1 January 2007 in Review of Network Economics
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PGPhilip G. Gayle
Philip G. Gayle
DWDennis L. Weisman
Dennis L. Weisman
Trade-offs between imitation and innovation create natural tensions in the design of competition policy for the telecommunications industry. We explore the relationship between the prices of unbundled network elements (UNEs) and static/dynamic efficiency. We find that even when UNEs are priced to induce efficient make-or-buy decisions from a static perspective, mandatory unbundling reduces the incumbent's incentive to invest from a dynamic perspective. Moreover, while the literature focuses on disincentives for investment in innovation associated with low UNE prices, we find that raising prices for UNEs, when such prices preserve the efficient make-or-buy decision, can discourage investment in process innovation.

16 February 2018 in Economic Inquiry
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PGPhilip G. Gayle
Philip G. Gayle
XXXin Xie
Xin Xie