15 February 2019 in Journal of Peace Research
This article presents ViEWS – a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives. ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread of violence in Cameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated.
2 March 2021 in Journal of Peace Research
This article presents an update to the ViEWS political Violence Early-Warning System. This update introduces (1) a new infrastructure for training, evaluating, and weighting models that allows us to more optimally combine constituent models into ensembles, and (2) a number of new forecasting models that contribute to improve overall performance, in particular with respect to effectively classifying high- and low-risk cases. Our improved evaluation procedures allow us to develop models that specialize in either the immediate or the more distant future. We also present a formal, ‘retrospective’ evaluation of how well ViEWS has done since we started publishing our forecasts from July 2018 up to December 2019. Our metrics show that ViEWS is performing well when compared to previous out-of-sample forecasts for the 2015–17 period. Finally, we present our new forecasts for the January 2020–December 2022 period. We continue to predict a near-constant situation of conflict in Nigeria, Somalia, and DRC, but see some signs of decreased risk in Cameroon and Mozambique.
6 May 2025 in Journal of Peace Research
Governmental and nongovernmental organizations have increasingly relied on early-warning systems of conflict to support their decisionmaking. Predictions of war intensity as probability distributions prove closer to what policymakers need than point estimates, as they encompass useful representations of both the most likely outcome and the lower-probability risk that conflicts escalate catastrophically. Point-estimate predictions, by contrast, fail to represent the inherent uncertainty in the distribution of conflict fatalities. Yet, current early warning systems are preponderantly focused on providing point estimates, while efforts to forecast conflict fatalities as a probability distribution remain sparse. Building on the predecessor VIEWS competition, we organize a prediction challenge to encourage endeavours in this direction. We invite researchers across multiple disciplinary fields, from conflict studies to computer science, to forecast the number of fatalities in state-based armed conflicts, in the form of the UCDP ‘best’ estimates aggregated to two units of analysis (country-months and PRIO-GRID-months), with estimates of uncertainty. This article introduces the goal and motivation behind the prediction challenge, presents a set of evaluation metrics to assess the performance of the forecasting models, describes the benchmark models which the contributions are evaluated against, and summarizes the salient features of the submitted contributions.
4 May 2016 in Terrorism and Political Violence
This article uses a large-n dataset to investigate the effect of terrorist attacks with American victims on the popularity of the U.S. president. The study uses two broad theoretical frameworks to analyze this effect, the score-keeping framework and the rally-effect framework. The findings of the study show that, when excluding the effect from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, actual terrorist attacks have no generalizable short-term impact on the popularity of the U.S. president. This indicates that even though the topics of national security, terrorism, and the president’s ability to handle these issues are important in the political debate in the United States, actual terrorism has little or no short-term impact on presidential approval ratings.
17 March 2022 in International Interactions
This contribution to the ViEWS prediction competition 2020 proposes using Markov modeling to model the change in the logarithm of battle-related deaths between two points in time in a country. The predictions are made using two ensembles of observed and hidden Markov models, where the covariate sets for the ensembles are drawn from the ViEWS country month constituent models. The weights for the individual models in the ensembles were obtained using a genetic algorithm optimizing the fit on the TADDA-score in a calibration set. The weighted ensembles of visible and hidden Markov models outperform the ViEWS prediction competition benchmark models on the TADDA score in the test period of January 2017 to December 2019 for all time steps. Forecasts until March 2021 predict increased violence primarily in Algeria, Libya, Tchad, Niger, and Angola, and decreased or unchanged levels of violence in most of the remaining countries in Africa. An analysis of the model weights in the ensembles shows that the conflict history constituent model provided by ViEWS was dominant in the ensembles. Esta contribución a la competencia de predicciones 2020 del Sistema de Alerta Temprana de Violencia (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS) propone utilizar la modelización de Márkov para elaborar un modelo del cambio en el logaritmo de las muertes relacionadas con batallas entre dos puntos temporales en un país. Las predicciones se elaboran con dos conjuntos de modelos observados y ocultos de Márkov, en los que los grupos de covariables de los conjuntos se obtienen de los modelos constituyentes mensuales de los países del ViEWS. La relevancia de los modelos individuales en los conjuntos se obtuvo mediante un algoritmo genético que optimiza el ajuste de la puntuación TADDA en un grupo de calibración. Los conjuntos ponderados de los modelos visibles y ocultos de Márkov superan los modelos de referencia de la competencia de predicciones del ViEWS en relación con la puntuación TADDA (Distancia absoluta orientada con aumento de dirección) en el período de prueba de enero de 2017 a diciembre de 2019 para todos los intervalos de tiempo. Las predicciones hasta marzo de 2021 pronostican un aumento en la violencia principalmente en Argelia, Libia, Chad, Níger y Angola, y niveles de violencia disminuidos o sin variaciones en la mayoría de los países restantes en África. Un análisis de la relevancia de los modelos en los conjuntos demuestra que los modelos constituyentes de la historia de conflictos que proporciona el ViEWS fueron dominantes en dichos conjuntos. Cette contribution au concours de prévision ViEWS (Violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence) 2020 propose d’utiliser la modélisation de Markov pour modéliser l’évolution du logarithme des décès liés aux conflits entre deux moments de l’histoire d’un pays. Les prédictions sont effectuées à l’aide de deux ensembles de modèles de Markov cachés et de modèles de Markov observés, et les jeux de covariables de ces ensembles sont tirés des modèles constituants par mois et pays du système ViEWS. Les pondérations des modèles individuels des ensembles ont été obtenues en utilisant un algorithme génétique optimisant l’ajustement sur le score TADDA (Distance absolue ciblée avec augmentation de direction) dans un jeu de calibration. Les ensembles pondérés de modèles de Markov visibles et cachés sont plus performants que les modèles de référence du concours de prédiction ViEWS pour ce qui est du score TADDA de la période de test de janvier 2017 à décembre 2019, et ce pour tous les pas de temps. Les prévisions jusqu’à mars 2021 ont permis de prédire une augmentation de la violence principalement en Algérie, en Libye, au Tchad, au Niger et en Angola, et une diminution ou un maintien des niveaux de violence dans la plupart des autres pays d’Afrique. Une analyse des pondérations des modèles dans les ensembles montre que le modèle constituant basé sur l’histoire des conflits fourni par ViEWS serait dominant dans les ensembles.
27 September 2023 in Quality & Quantity
List experiments encourage survey respondents to report sensitive opinions they may prefer not to reveal. But, studies sometimes find that respondents admit more readily to sensitive opinions when asked directly. Often this over-reporting is viewed as a design failure, attributable to inattentiveness or other nonstrategic error. This paper conducts an exploratory analysis of such a ‘failed’ list experiment measuring vote buying in the 2019 Nigerian presidential election. We take this opportunity to explore our assumptions about vote buying. Although vote buying is illegal and stigmatized in many countries, a significant literature links such exchanges to patron-client networks that are imbued with trust, reciprocity and long-standing benefits, which might create incentives for individuals to claim having been offered to participate in vote buying. Submitting our data to a series of tests of design, we find that over-reporting is strategic: respondents intentionally reveal vote buying and it’s likely that those who reveal vote buying have in fact being offered to participate in vote buying. Considering reasons for over-reporting such as social desirability and network benefits, and the strategic nature of over-reporting, we suggest that “design failure" is not the only possible conclusion from unexpected list experiment results. With this paper we show that our theoretical assumptions about sensitivity bias affect the conclusions we can draw from a list experiment.