Justin Cappos

Justin Cappos

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Justin Cappos

New York University, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
8 November 2020
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DGDan Gopstein
Dan Gopstein
AFAnne-Laure Fayard
Anne-Laure Fayard
SASven Apel
Sven Apel
JCJustin Cappos
Justin Cappos
Atoms of confusion are small patterns of code that have been empirically validated to be difficult to hand-evaluate by programmers. Previous research focused on defining and quantifying this phenomenon, but not on explaining or critiquing it. In this work, we address core omissions to the body of work on atoms of confusion, focusing on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of programmer misunderstanding. We performed a think-aloud study in which we observed programmers, both professionals and students, as they hand-evaluated confusing code. We performed a qualitative analysis of the data and found several surprising results, which explain previous results, outline avenues of further research, and suggest improvements of the research methodology. A notable observation is that correct hand-evaluations do not imply understanding, and incorrect evaluations not misunderstanding. We believe this and other observations may be used to improve future studies and models of program comprehension. We argue that thinking of confusion as an atomic construct may pose challenges to formulating new candidates for atoms of confusion. Ultimately, we question whether hand-evaluation correctness is, itself, a sufficient instrument to study program comprehension.

18 December 2023 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BŞBerat Can Şenel
Berat Can Şenel
MMMaxime Mouchet
Maxime Mouchet
JCJustin Cappos
Justin Cappos
TFTimur Friedman
Timur Friedman
OFOlivier Fourmaux
Olivier Fourmaux
RMRick McGeer
Rick McGeer
In recent years, along with containers, the cloud community has rapidly taken up Kubernetes, the de facto industry standard container orchestration system. All major cloud providers currently offer Kubernetes-based Containers as a Service (CaaS). However, when CaaS is offered to multiple independent consumers, or tenants, a multi-instance approach is used, in which each tenant receives its own separate cluster, which imposes significant overhead due to employing virtual machines for isolation. If CaaS is to be offered not only in the cloud, but also in the edge cloud, where resources are limited, another solution is required. In this paper, drawing upon the scientific literature, we provide a novel classification of Kubernetes multitenancy into three approaches: multi-instance through multiple clusters, multi-instance through multiple control planes, and single-instance native. We propose a single-instance multitenancy framework, meaning tenants are served out of a shared control plane in a single cluster. Our empirical findings show that the single-instance approach imposes a markedly decreased overhead than the other two. However, it entails a tradeoff in workload isolation owing to tenants sharing the compute nodes. There are still means to compensate for such weakened isolation, and we describe how our framework does it. The framework is publicly available as liberally-licensed, free, open-source software that extends Kubernetes. It is in production use within the EdgeNet testbed for researchers.

1 March 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
IKIgor Khokhlov
Igor Khokhlov
LRLeon Reznik
Leon Reznik
JCJustin Cappos
Justin Cappos
RBRohit Bhaskar
Rohit Bhaskar

24 February 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SHSara Hooshangi
Sara Hooshangi
RWRichard Weiss
Richard Weiss
JCJustin Cappos
Justin Cappos
Writing secure code requires a programmer to think both as a defender and an attacker. One can draw a parallel between this model of thinking and techniques used in test-driven development, where students learn by thinking about how to effectively test their code and anticipate possible bugs. In this study, we analyzed the quality of both attack and defense code that students wrote for an assignment given in an introductory security class of 75 (both graduate and senior undergraduate levels) at NYU. We made several observations regarding students' behaviors and the quality of both their defensive and offensive code. We saw that student defensive programs (i.e., assignments) are highly unique and that their attack programs (i.e., test cases) are also relatively unique. In addition, we examined how student behaviors in writing defense programs correlated with their attack program's effectiveness. We found evidence that students who learn to write good defensive programs can write effective attack programs, but the converse is not true. While further exploration of causality is needed, our results indicate that a greater pedagogical emphasis on defensive security may benefit students more than one that emphasizes offense.

4 December 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MMMarina Moore
Marina Moore
TKTrishank Karthik Kuppusamy
Trishank Karthik Kuppusamy
JCJustin Cappos
Justin Cappos
Modern software installation tools often use packages from more than one repository, presenting a unique set of security challenges. Such a configuration increases the risk of repository compromise and introduces attacks like dependency confusion and repository fallback. In this paper, we offer the first exploration of attacks that specifically target multiple repository update systems, and propose a unique defensive strategy we call articulated trust. Articulated trust is a principle that allows software installation tools to specify trusted developers and repositories for each package. To implement articulated trust, we built Artemis, a framework that introduces several new security techniques, such as per-package prioritization of repositories, multi-role delegations, multiple-repository consensus, and key pinning. These techniques allow for a greater diversity of trust relationships while eliminating the security risk of single points of failure. To evaluate Artemis, we examine attacks on software update systems from the Cloud Native Computing Foundation’s Catalog of Supply Chain Compromises, and find that the most secure configuration of Artemis can prevent all of them, compared to 14-59% for the best existing system. We also cite real-world deployments of Artemis that highlight its practicality. These include the JDF/Linux Foundation Uptane Standard that secures over-the-air updates for millions of automobiles, and TUF, which is used by many companies for secure software distribution.

6 April 2020 in Journal of Computer Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
HAHammad Afzali
Hammad Afzali
STSantiago Torres-Arias
Santiago Torres-Arias
RCReza Curtmola
Reza Curtmola
JCJustin Cappos
Justin Cappos
Web-based Git hosting services such as GitHub and GitLab are popular choices to manage and interact with Git repositories. However, they lack an important security feature – the ability to sign Git commits. Users instruct the server to perform repository operations on their behalf and have to trust that the server will execute their requests faithfully. Such trust may be unwarranted though because a malicious or a compromised server may execute the requested actions in an incorrect manner, leading to a different state of the repository than what the user intended. In this paper, we show a range of high-impact attacks that can be executed stealthily when developers use the web UI of a Git hosting service to perform common actions such as editing files or merging branches. We then propose le-git-imate , a defense against these attacks, which enables users to protect their commits using Git’s standard commit signing mechanism. We implement le-git-imate as a Chrome browser extension. le-git-imate does not require changes on the server side and can thus be used immediately. It also preserves current workflows used in Github/GitLab and does not require the user to leave the browser, and it allows anyone to verify that the server’s actions faithfully follow the user’s requested actions. Moreover, experimental evaluation using the browser extension shows that le-git-imate has comparable performance with Git’s standard commit signature mechanism. With our solution in place, users can take advantage of GitHub/GitLab’s web-based features without sacrificing security, thus paving the way towards verifiable web-based Git repositories.