Russell and Burch’s 1959 original definitions of the 3Rs (replacement, reduction and refinement) are widely used today as standards for the ethical use of non-human animals in research, although they have a number of limitations. Authors and institutions around the world have addressed some of these, coming up in certain cases with more accurate, functional, and up-to-date definitions. However, not only do there still remain limitations needing to be addressed, but some that have been addressed resulted in discrepancies, contradictions, and general confusion as to how best apply the 3Rs in practice. In order to clarify the meaning of the 3Rs and enable more optimal implementation of these principles in animal experimentation, this article provides a theoretical discussion for revised definitions of the original 3Rs via examination of some of their main limitations and inconsistencies. First, we offer up the original definitions as presented in the context of Russell and Burch’s book The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique. Then, we examine the main limitations and present clear specifications and requirements for such revised definitions. After presenting our revised definitions, we conclude with various implications for animal welfare within the context of experimentation.

Since Russell and Burch introduced and defined the 3Rs, i.e., the replacement, reduction, and refinement of animal use in research, in 1959, different definitions have emerged and been implemented in guidelines and policies. Switzerland is known for having some of the most restrictive legislation regarding the use of animals, in which the 3Rs are also defined and implemented. To our knowledge, the purpose and definitions of the 3Rs used in the Swiss Animal Welfare Act, Animal Protection Ordinance and Animal Experimentation Ordinance have never been compared with Russell and Burch's original purpose and definitions. In this paper we make this comparison with two aims: to reveal ethically relevant departures from the original purpose and definitions, and to provide an ethical evaluation of the current Swiss law regarding the 3Rs. In doing so, we first expose the similarity of purposes. We then identify one risky departure from the original definition of replacement in Swiss law, which shows a problematic focus on species. Finally, we address Swiss law's failure to apply the 3Rs in the most effective way. With respect to this last point, we discuss the need for 3R conflict resolution, the timing of application of the 3Rs, problematic prioritizations and choices of convenience as well as a solution to apply the 3Rs more effectively using Russell and Burch's concept of total sum of distress.

Changing relationships with nonhuman animals have led to important modifications in animal welfare legislations, including the protection of animal life. However, animal research regulations are largely based on welfarist assumptions, neglecting the idea that death can constitute a harm to animals. In this article, four different cases of killing animals in research contexts are identified and discussed against the background of philosophical, societal, and scientific-practical discourses: 1. Animals killed during experimentation, 2. Animals killed before research, 3. “Surplus” animals and 4. “Leftover” animals. The scientific community and, accordingly, animal research regulations such as the internationally acknowledged framework 3R (“Replace”, “Reduce”, “Refine”) tend to aim at the reduction of “surplus” and, to some extent, “leftover” animals, whereas the first two classes are rather neglected. However, the perspective that animal death matters morally is supported by both societal moral intuitions and certain theoretical accounts in animal ethics. Therefore, we suggest the implementation of the 3Rs in regulations, so that they: 1. Make their underlying philosophical position transparent; 2. Are based on a weighing account of animal death; 3. Are applicable to procedures on living and dead animals; 4. Apply the “reduction” principle to procedures on dead animals; 5. Entail that methods using (parts of) dead animals need to be replaced by animal free methods, if possible; 6. Do not suggest replacing research on living animals by research on killed animals; 7. Include all kinds of animals, depending on the respective harm of death; 8. Are applied to the broader context of experimentation, including breeding and the fate of the animals after the experiment.

This article captures and critiques a recurring and prominent political argument against animal welfare improvements in Switzerland which we term the “ranking argument”. This states that Swiss animal welfare law ranks among the strictest in the world, therefore no improvements are called for. This argument was advanced three times by Swiss government authorities in 2022 alone, but also in a case dating back to 1984, to advise the electorate on popular initiatives aiming at animal welfare improvements. We argue that, while the argument commits a fallacy of relative privation and is ethically dubious, it can be deployed to great effect by agents opposed to norm change in animal welfare regulation. We conclude with some thoughts on how the ranking argument can and should be challenged in public discourse.

In this article, we describe and analyse the Swiss legislation relating to animal dignity. We conclude that previous criticisms of the law do not go far enough: far from protecting animal dignity, the Swiss law not only undermines such dignity but itself serves as a means to ensure that animals can be used merely as a means, and not treated with respect. As such, the Swiss Animal Welfare Act is deeply unethical and undermines the constitutional requirement to treat animals with dignity.

Sacrificial dilemmas such as the trolley problem play an important role in experimental philosophy (x-phi). But it is increasingly argued that, since we are not likely to encounter runaway trolleys in our daily life, the usefulness of such thought experiments for understanding moral judgments in more ecologically valid contexts may be limited. However, similar sacrificial dilemmas are experienced in real life by animal research decision makers. As part of their job, they must make decisions about the suffering, and often the death, of many non-human animals. For this reason, a context-specific investigation of so-called “3R dilemmas” (i.e., dilemmas where there is a conflict between the principles of replacement, reduction, and refinement of the use of animals in research) is essential to improve the situation of both non-human animals and human stakeholders. An approach well suited for such investigation is experimental philosophical bioethics (“bioxphi”), which draws on methods similar to x-phi to probe more realistic, practical scenarios with an eye to informing normative debates and ethical policy. In this article, we argue for a need to investigate 3R dilemmas among professional decision-makers using the tools of bioxphi. In a first step, we define 3R dilemmas and discuss previous investigations of professionals’ attitudes in such cases. In a second step, we show how bioxphi is a promising method to investigate the whys and hows of professional decision-making in 3R dilemmas. In a last step, we provide a bioxphi template for 3R dilemmas, give recommendations on its use, explore the normative relevance of data collected by such means, and discuss important limitations.