The most recent forest-type map of the Korean Peninsula was produced in 1910. That of South Korea alone was produced since 1972; however, the forest type information of North Korea, which is an inaccessible region, is not known due to the separation after the Korean War. In this study, we developed a model to classify the five dominant tree species in North Korea (Korean red pine, Korean pine, Japanese larch, needle fir, and Oak) using satellite data and machine-learning techniques. The model was applied to the Gwangneung Forest area in South Korea; the Mt. Baekdu area of China, which borders North Korea; and to Goseong-gun, at the border of South Korea and North Korea, to evaluate the model’s applicability to North Korea. Eighty-three percent accuracy was achieved in the classification of the Gwangneung Forest area. In classifying forest types in the Mt. Baekdu area and Goseong-gun, even higher accuracies of 91% and 90% were achieved, respectively. These results confirm the model’s regional applicability. To expand the model for application to North Korea, a new model was developed by integrating training data from the three study areas. The integrated model’s classification of forest types in Goseong-gun (South Korea) was relatively accurate (80%); thus, the model was utilized to produce a map of the predicted dominant tree species in Goseong-gun (North Korea).

This study examined the development, direction, and characteristics of the North Korean forest restoration policy when compared to similar restoration policies established in South Korea. The success factors of South Korea’s Forest Conservation and Afforestation Project were classified into four forest policy categories: (a) policy and system improvement, (b) evaluation and capacity building, (c) people’s participation encouragement, and (d) restoration foundation creation. Similarities in terms of these aspects were found when compared with the Forest Restoration Battle of North Korea. For policy and system improvement, South Korea established the 1st and 2nd Forest Conservation and Afforestation Plans and transferred the control of the Korea Forest Service to its Ministry of Home Affairs. Similarly, North Korea established a forest development plan and a command unit for the Forest Restoration Battle. For evaluation and capacity building, South Korea utilized a tree monitoring and forestry association. North Korea is obtaining these effects through both a socialist competition movement and agroforestry. Further, South Korea aimed to promote people’s participation through a nursery project, a tree planting movement, and a responsible afforestation system, whereas North Korea adopted agroforestry, a patriotic forest movement, and a responsible forest system. Finally, South Korea succeeded in replacing forest fuels with fossil fuels, clearing slash-and-burn fields, and performing erosion control. By comparison, North Korea is promoting the development of replacement fuels, such as ultra-high-grade anthracite coal and the formation of separate firewood forests. North Korea has revised its forest law to strengthen penalties for deforestation activities, such as anthropogenic forest fires, and replaced erosion control works with agroforestry, which allows for slope management. Among the four aspects, the largest difference was found for restoration foundation creation. Therefore, this area can provide a guideline for future inter-Korean forest cooperation.

This paper presents three aspects of the REDD+ mechanism, considering North Korea’s potential for acceptance. First, it shows that North Korea is highly likely to accept REDD+ projects from international organizations and funds. Since 2015, North Korea has expressed interest and willingness to aid in alleviating climate change by setting greenhouse gas reduction targets for the international community. Furthermore, North Korea’s previous experience with visits and investigations by international organizations suggests that there would be little resistance to activities by these organizations aimed at creating conditions for participation in REDD+ projects. The presence of international organizations’ resident offices in North Korea could also facilitate smooth project implementation. Second, it is considered highly likely that North Korea could pursue REDD+ projects for the purpose of carbon credit trading. The potential for small-scale projects, along with the advantage of not having to adhere to the standards and procedures set by the UNFCCC, increases the likelihood of North Korean acceptance of these projects. Additionally, recent trends in marketization in North Korea contribute to its potential for acceptance. Third, a multilateral cooperation framework involving a third country is also feasible, based on which REDD+ projects under the framework of the 6.2 Agreement were considered a useful approach. Prior to climate cooperation agreements, memoranda of understanding for specific sectors or projects could be signed to allow such projects to proceed, allowing conceptualization and examination of North Korea’s REDD+ projects from various angles.