This contribution discusses the issue of approaching safety issues for newly introduced autonomous rail vehicle operation systems with the GoA3/GoA4 automation level. In particular, the paper discusses the issue of normative requirements for e...

Autonomous train operation (defined by the on - board part of the ATO - Automatic Train Operation) is a key innovation in rail transport, bringing increased efficiency and safety. Ensuring ATO safety is a key challenge that can be addressed by integrat ion wi th the European Train Control System (ETCS). This paper focuses on using ETCS safety mechanisms to ensure the safety of autonomous train control. The following paper analyses the possibility of taking over the ETCS safety guarantees into the ATO . It focuse s on the different types of data provided by the ETCS, including static train data, dynamic data (movement authority, speed profile, gradient, localization, ETCS modes and traction) and information about the braking capabilities of the train. The ke y quest ion is whether this information can be relied upon to implement autonomous control without additional redundant mechanisms. According to the RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety) analysis, existing safety features can be adop ted if the risks corresponding to the subsystem are sufficiently reduced and there is a secure link between the ATO and the ETCS systems . The specific physical interconnection via Ethernet plays an important role here. This link is described directly in the Europ ean Railway Agency specifications. Twelve packets of information are transmitted through this link. The aim is to verify whether it is po ssible to take over the safety guarantees of the ETCS for the ATO and to find the interface requirements between these systems. The main requirements of the ATO functions that process the ETCS information are to stop safely at a defined location, to keep to the schedule within the conditions specified by the ETCS, to optimize the speed for efficient traction energy consump tion and to start the station check - in sequence only after all safety conditions have been met. The methodology includes the analysis of the common interface between the ATO and the ETCS and applying RAMS procedures to identify and mitigate risks. The foll owing paper describes that the ETCS provides robust safety barriers during standard train operation at GoA 1 (Grade of Automation), allowing the ATO sys tem to rely on its safety features and focus on the additional risks associated with autonomous control at higher GoA levels. However, the key factor is to ensure a secure connection between the ATO and the ETCS in accordance with the applicable standards. Thi s paper should contribute to a better understanding of the links between the ATO and the ETCS. It al so provides important information for the further development of autonomous railway systems.

The article describes the practical experience of testing a specific ticketing system for public transport based on blockchain technology. The testing aimed to verify the overall functionality of the complex system as well as the correct execution of the functions of its selected parts, which consist of several separately developed but closely cooperating subsystems: blockchain, clearing, and mobile application subsystem with support of bank payment system.Communication between the different parts was implemented through APIs developed for this purpose. The availability of API documentation and the implementation on Linux OS allowed the use of sophisticated tools for testing and performing both manual and automated tests. Performed tests made it possible to detect errors in the program code of the respective components and to provide the basis for their elimination. Applied approaches and tools can be used to test similar complex information-handling systems.