In 2011, Japan was hit by a tsunami that was generated by the greatest earthquake in its history. The first tsunami warning was announced 3 min after the earthquake, as is normal, but failed to estimate the actual tsunami height. Most of the structural countermeasures were not designed for the huge tsunami that was generated by the magnitude M = 9.0 earthquake; as a result, many were destroyed and did not stop the tsunami. These structures included breakwaters, seawalls, water gates, and control forests. In this paper we discuss the performance of these countermeasures, and the mechanisms by which they were damaged; we also discuss damage to residential houses, commercial and public buildings, and evacuation buildings. Some topics regarding tsunami awareness and mitigation are discussed. The failures of structural defenses are a reminder that structural (hard) measures alone were not sufficient to protect people and buildings from a major disaster such as this. These defenses might be able to reduce the impact but should be designed so that they can survive even if the tsunami flows over them. Coastal residents should also understand the function and limit of the hard measures. For this purpose, non-structural (soft) measures, for example experience and awareness, are very important for promoting rapid evacuation in the event of a tsunami. An adequate communication system for tsunami warning messages and more evacuation shelters with evacuation routes in good condition might support a safe evacuation process. The combination of both hard and soft measures is very important for reducing the loss caused by a major tsunami. This tsunami has taught us that natural disasters can occur repeatedly and that their scale is sometimes larger than expected.

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami damaged and destroyed numerous buildings and houses in Thailand. Estimation of tsunami impact to buildings from this event and evaluation of the potential risks are important but still in progress. The tsunami fragility curve is a function used to estimate the structural fragility against tsunami hazards. This study was undertaken to develop fragility curves using visual inspection of high-resolution satellite images (IKONOS) taken before and after tsunami events to classify whether the buildings were destroyed or not based on the remaining roof. Then, a tsunami inundation model is created to reconstruct the tsunami features such as inundation depth, current velocity, and hydrodynamic force of the event. It is assumed that the fragility curves are expressed as normal or lognormal distribution functions and the estimation of the median and log-standard deviation is performed using least square fitting. From the results, the developed fragility curves for different types of building materials (mixed type, reinforced concrete and wood) show consistent performance in damage probability and when compared to the existing curves for other locations.

We revisited the lessons of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Tsunami disaster specifically on the response and impact, and discussed the paradigm shift of Japan's tsunami disaster management policies and the perspectives for reconstruction. Revisiting the modern histories of Tohoku tsunami disasters and pre-2011 tsunami countermeasures, we clarified how Japan's coastal communities have prepared for tsunamis. The discussion mainly focuses on structural measures such as seawalls and breakwaters and non-structural measures of hazard map and evacuation. The responses to the 2011 event are discussed specifically on the tsunami warning system and efforts to identify the tsunami impacts. The nation-wide post-tsunami survey results shed light on the mechanisms of structural destruction, tsunami loads and structural vulnerability to inform structural rehabilitation measures and land-use planning. Remarkable paradigm shifts in designing coastal protection and disaster mitigation measures were introduced, leading with a new concept of potential tsunami levels: Prevention (Level 1) and Mitigation (Level 2) levels according to the level of ‘protection’. The seawall is designed with reference to Level 1 tsunami scenario, while comprehensive disaster management measures should refer to Level 2 tsunami for protection of human lives and reducing potential losses and damage. Throughout the case study in Sendai city, the proposed reconstruction plan was evaluated from the tsunami engineering point of view to discuss how the post 2011 paradigm was implemented in coastal communities for future disaster mitigation. The analysis revealed that Sendai city's multiple protection measures for Level 2 tsunami will contribute to a substantial reduction of the tsunami inundation zone and potential losses, combined with an effective tsunami evacuation plan.