Embedded system technologies are increasingly being incorporated into manufacturing, smart grid, industrial control systems, and transportation systems. However, the vast majority of today’s embedded platforms lack the support of built-in security features which makes such systems highly vulnerable to a wide range of cyber-attacks. Specifically, they are vulnerable to malware injection code that targets the power distribution system of an ARM Cortex-M-based microcontroller chipset (ARM, Cambridge, UK). Through hardware exploitation of the clock-gating distribution system, an attacker is capable of disabling/activating various subsystems on the chip, compromising the reliability of the system during normal operation. This paper proposes the development of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) capable of detecting clock-gating malware deployed on ARM Cortex-M-based embedded systems. To enhance the robustness and effectiveness of our approach, we fully implemented, tested, and compared six IDSs, each employing different methodologies. These include IDSs based on K-Nearest Classifier, Random Forest, Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, Naive Bayes, and Stochastic Gradient Descent. Each of these IDSs was designed to identify and categorize various variants of clock-gating malware deployed on the system. We have analyzed the performance of these IDSs in terms of detection accuracy against various types of clock-gating malware injection code. Power consumption data collected from the chipset during normal operation and malware code injection attacks were used for models’ training and validation. Our simulation results showed that the proposed IDSs, particularly those based on K-Nearest Classifier and Logistic Regression, were capable of achieving high detection rates, with some reaching a detection rate of 0.99. These results underscore the effectiveness of our IDSs in protecting ARM Cortex-M-based embedded systems against clock-gating malware.
The transition to AI-driven Cyber–Physical Systems has fundamentally reshaped transportation, introducing systemic risks that transcend traditional physical boundaries. Unlike prior reviews focused on isolated technological domains, this survey proposes a novel “End-to-End” analytical framework that models the causal propagation of vulnerabilities from physical sensing hardware to human cognitive responses. Synthesizing 140 research contributions (2017–2025), we evaluate the paradigm shift from deterministic control to Generative AI and Large Language Models (Transportation 5.0). To substantiate our framework, we introduce a structured cross-layer threat matrix and mathematically formalize the technology–cognition cascade, explicitly mapping how physical layer perturbations, such as optical jamming, bypass digital edge security to trigger hazardous behavioral reactions in human drivers. We conclude that ensuring the resilience of next-generation infrastructure requires a unified analytical architecture that formally bounds hardware constraints, algorithmic safety, and human trust.
As Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) become integral to critical infrastructure, ranging from precision agriculture to emergency disaster recovery, their security becomes a matter of systemic resilience. This paper provides a comprehensive thematic survey of the security landscape for unmanned devices, bridging the gap between low-level hardware vulnerabilities and high-level mission failures. We propose a multidimensional taxonomy that categorizes challenges into hardware roots of trust, swarm intelligence threats, and domain-specific applications. A primary focus is placed on the Resource–Security Paradox, where the energy cost of heavy cryptographic or AI defenses directly reduces flight endurance, creating a trade-off that adversaries exploit through battery-exhaustion attacks. Beyond standard threats, we analyze emerging risks in additive manufacturing supply chains, the “Sim-to-Real” gap in AI-driven perception, and the legal necessity of Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) for post-incident attribution. Through a systematic review of defensive frameworks, including lightweight encryption, Mamba-KAN anomaly detection, and blockchain-anchored logging, we evaluate the effectiveness of current solutions against complex adversarial models. Finally, we identify critical research gaps, providing a roadmap for security-by-design in the next generation of critical infrastructure swarms.
As the industrial automation landscape advances, the integration of sophisticated perception and manipulation technologies into robotic systems has become crucial for enhancing operational efficiency and precision. This paper presents a significant enhancement to a robotic system by incorporating the Mask R-CNN deep learning algorithm and the Intel® RealSense™ D435 camera with the UFactory xArm 5 robotic arm. The Mask R-CNN algorithm, known for its powerful object detection and segmentation capabilities, combined with the depth-sensing features of the D435, enables the robotic system to perform complex tasks with high accuracy. This integration facilitates the detection, manipulation, and precise placement of single objects, achieving 98% detection accuracy, 98% gripping accuracy, and 100% transport accuracy, resulting in a peak manipulation accuracy of 99%. Experimental evaluations demonstrate a 20% improvement in manipulation success rates with the incorporation of depth data, reflecting significant enhancements in operational flexibility and efficiency. Additionally, the system was evaluated under adversarial conditions where structured noise was introduced to test its stability, leading to only a minor reduction in performance. Furthermore, this study delves into cybersecurity concerns pertinent to robotic systems, addressing vulnerabilities such as physical attacks, network breaches, and operating system exploits. The study also addresses specific threats, including sabotage and service disruptions, and emphasizes the importance of implementing comprehensive cybersecurity measures to protect advanced robotic systems in manufacturing environments. To ensure truly robust, secure, and reliable robotic operations in industrial environments, this paper highlights the critical role of international cybersecurity standards and safety standards for the physical protection of industrial robot applications and their human operators.
This paper presents a comprehensive UAV testbed that establishes quantitative baselines for hardware vulnerability diagnosis and cyber–physical security validation by leveraging comparative flight logs from PX4-based Software-In-The-Loop (SITL) simulations and multiple real-world quadrotor missions. The testbed utilizes a unified data pipeline centered on the uORB message bus and ULog format, enabling the extraction of high-resolution telemetry, including raw Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) data, state-estimation, and actuator control signals. Evaluated across varying environmental conditions, side-by-side time-series and statistical analyses reveal critical sim-to-real discrepancies in sensor fidelity, GPS interference, and onboard resource behavior that are often overlooked in virtual environments. Real-world data exposes hardware-induced noise, mechanical vibrations, and electromagnetic disturbances that significantly impact flight stability and system reliability. By mathematically quantifying these discrepancies (e.g., via variance and probability distribution shifts), the proposed testbed establishes a rigorous baseline for distinguishing natural physical variability from anomalous or adversarial behavior. Ultimately, this work provides a foundational framework for developing robust anomaly detection models and validating the cyber–physical security of autonomous UAV systems in safety-critical environments.