Since environmental problems are becoming increasingly prominent, macro policies and social development have placed higher requirements on manufacturing enterprises to promote green transformation and upgrading (GTU) in China. Considering that different manufacturing enterprises choose different green technology innovation levels for GTU under environmental regulation, a game model between manufacturing enterprises and the government is constructed. The relationship between the green technology innovation level (GTIL) and the environmental regulation intensity is analyzed. Through numerical examples, the influences of environmental regulation and consumer preference on system decisions are further examined. Moreover, an econometric model is constructed to explore the influence that the environmental regulation exerts on the GTIL using panel data from the Chinese manufacturing industry. Our results show that the increase in environmental regulation intensity contributes to improving GTIL and promoting the GTU of manufacturing enterprises. Furthermore, as the environmental regulation is enhanced, the sales price decreases, benefiting consumers. Consumers’ preference for high-GTIL products is conducive to GTU under environmental regulation. Empirical analysis shows that there is a U-shaped relationship between environmental regulation and the GTIL. Only when the intensity reaches a threshold can the environmental regulation be beneficial to improve the GTIL and promote the GTU of Chinese manufacturing enterprises.

To achieve the goals of carbon peak and carbon neutrality, the low-carbon transformation (LCT) of high-carbon firms is inevitable. We construct game models of a supply chain with different dominant types under a mixed carbon policy that embraces carbon cap-and-trade and carbon tax. Solving each dominant model, we derive the effective area and optimal threshold of the mixed carbon policy to guide LCT. We find that the selling price, market demand, and profit of the supply chain system are equal in different dominant models due to the mixed carbon policy, but when a company dominates the supply chain, its profit is higher than when it is a subordinate. In addition, the high-carbon manufacturers (HCM) will pursue LCT only when the sum of the carbon tax rates and carbon trading prices is within a certain threshold, and the subordinate HCM are more likely to be driven to pursue LCT. Therefore, the government should adopt a differentiated hybrid carbon policy, setting a high (low) carbon tax rate for the HCM in a dominant (subordinate) position.

Considering the carbon trading mechanism and consumers’ preference for low-carbon products, a game decision-making model for the low-carbon e-commerce supply chain (LCE-SC) is constructed. The influences of commission and carbon trading on the optimal decisions of LCE-SC are discussed and then verified through numerical analysis. On this basis, the influence of carbon trading on regional sustainable development is empirically analyzed. The results show that the establishment of carbon trading pilots alleviates the negative impact of unfair profit distribution. Increasing the commission rate in a reasonable range improves the profitability of LCE-SC. Nevertheless, with the enhancement of consumers’ low-carbon preference, a lower commission rate is more beneficial to carbon emission reduction. The total carbon emission is positively related to the commission rate. However, the unit carbon emission decreases first and then increases with the commission rate. The influence of the carbon price sensitivity coefficient on the service level is first positive and then negative, while the influence on the manufacturer’s profit goes the opposite. The empirical analysis confirms that the implementation of carbon trading is conducive to regional sustainable development and controlling environmental governance intensity promotes carbon productivity.

This paper reviews the decisions, coordination contract, and altruistic preference of an e-commerce supply chain (eSC) composed of a manufacturer and a third-party e-commerce platform (platform). The research derives optimal decisions in a decentralized model with altruistic preference; it is indicated that altruistic preference can help increase the sales price and sales service level. Although the platform’s altruistic preference is not beneficial to its own profits, it can help increase the manufacturer’s profits. Moreover, when the degree of altruistic preference is kept within a limit, the profit of the decentralized system is higher in a model with altruistic preferences, which indicates that altruistic preference can contribute toward maintaining a friendly, harmonious, and cooperative a relationship between the platform and manufacturers. Contrary to a traditional offline supply chain, where the sales price is the lowest in the centralized model, the sales price is highest in a centralized eSC model. In the proposed coordination contract, the platform with a certain degree of altruistic preference offers zero-commission sales service and charges a certain amount for a fixed professional service fee. The proposed contract is more applicable to products whose market demands are less affected by sales prices and more affected by the sales service level.

Explosive enterprises’ immoral behaviors in the online shopping market are widespread and have not been effectively solved. Especially in developing countries, there is a direct relationship between massive immoral behaviors and the inefficiency of government supervision. Using an evolutionary game, this paper finds that immoral behavior is more likely to spread in online markets than in traditional markets. Only when government supervision and punishment are large enough and government’s punishment for the illegal enterprise exceeds extra supervision costs that government pays, explosive immoral behaviors can be curbed. Additionally, consumer support is an essential factor in improving the efficiency of government supervision. This study sorts out the interactions between e‐commerce market participants and the government, obtains a path to achieve efficient government regulation, and offers management insights. The findings can serve as a reference for ensuring order in the emerging online shopping market and can also provide theoretical references for future related research.

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.