Suman Rath

Dr. Suman Rath

Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 July 2022 in IEEE Systems Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ATAbdulrahman Takiddin
Abdulrahman Takiddin
SRSuman Rath
Suman Rath
Muhammad IsmailMuhammad Ismail
Muhammad Ismail
Subham SahooSubham Sahoo
Subham Sahoo
Cyber-physical systems such as microgrids contain numerous attack surfaces in communication links, sensors, and actuators forms. Manipulating the communication links and sensors is done to inject anomalous data that can be transmitted through the cyber layer along with the original data stream. The presence of malicious, anomalous data packets in the cyber layer of a dc microgrid can create hindrances in fulfilling the control objectives, leading to voltage instability and affecting load dispatch patterns. Hence, detecting anomalous data is essential for the restoration of system stability. This article answers two important research questions: 1) Which data-driven detection scheme offers the best detection performance against stealth cyber-attacks in dc microgrids? 2) What is the detection performance improvement when fusing two features (i.e., current and voltage data) for training compared with using a single feature (i.e., current)? Our investigations revealed that 1) adopting an unsupervised deep recurrent autoencoder anomaly detection scheme in dc microgrids offers superior detection performance compared with other benchmarks. The autoencoder is trained on benign data generated from a multisource dc microgrid model. 2) Fusing current and voltage data for training offers a 14.7% improvement. The efficacy of the results is verified using experimental data collected from a dc microgrid testbed when subjected to stealth cyber-attacks.

14 September 2020 in IEEE Systems Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SRSuman Rath
Suman Rath
DPDiptak Pal
Diptak Pal
PSParth Sarthi Sharma
Parth Sarthi Sharma
BPBijaya Ketan Panigrahi
Bijaya Ketan Panigrahi
Security of various cyber–physical systems is a major concern for researchers worldwide. Nowadays, microgrids also form such cyber–physical system to achieve a number of objectives such as enhanced frequency regulation, economic active power sharing, proper reactive power sharing, etc. Communication links are essential in such microgrids to ensure bilateral flow of data to be fed to the secondary controllers of the distributed generators integrated to the power network. This article, therefore, studies the impact of various kinds of cyberattacks viz., false data injection, denial-of-service, and replay attack on the performance of these communication enabled secondary controllers having potential vulnerabilities. Additionally, it presents a unique framework to ensure system stability when communication links are subjected to such attacks. The analysis has been carried out in a microgrid operating in islanded mode where the controller area network (CAN) bus communication network is utilized to form the cyber–physical system. Simulations are performed in MATLAB/Simulink platform and real-time evaluation of the proposed framework has been carried out in a test bed having OPAL-RT (OP5600) simulator and physical CAN devices to form the communication links.

20 January 2026 in ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZZZikai Zhang
Zikai Zhang
SRSuman Rath
Suman Rath
JXJiahao Xu
Jiahao Xu
TXTingsong Xiao
Tingsong Xiao
The Smart Grid (SG) is a critical energy infrastructure that collects real-time electricity usage data to forecast future energy demands using information and communication technologies (ICT). Due to growing concerns about data security and privacy in SGs, federated learning (FL) has emerged as a promising training framework. FL offers a balance between privacy, efficiency, and accuracy in SGs by enabling collaborative model training without sharing private data from IoT devices. In this survey, we thoroughly review recent advancements in designing FL-based SG systems across three stages: generation, transmission and distribution, and consumption. Additionally, we explore potential vulnerabilities that may arise when implementing FL in these stages. Furthermore, we discuss the gap between state-of-the-art (SOTA) FL research and its practical applications in SGs, and we propose future research directions. Unlike traditional surveys addressing security issues in centralized machine learning methods for SG systems, this survey is the first to specifically examine the applications and security concerns unique to FL-based SG systems. We also introduce FedGridShield, an open source framework featuring implementations of SOTA attack and defense methods. Our aim is to inspire further research into applications and improvements in the robustness of FL-based SG systems.

7 March 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SRSuman Rath
Suman Rath
LNLam Duc Nguyen
Lam Duc Nguyen
Subham SahooSubham Sahoo
Subham Sahoo
PPPetar Popovski
Petar Popovski
Blockchain has recently been depicted as a secure protocol for information exchange in cyber-physical microgrids. However, it is still found vulnerable to consensus manipulation attacks. These stealth attacks are often difficult to detect as they use kernel-level access to mask their actions. In this paper, we firstly build a trusted and secured peer-to-peer network mechanism for physical DC microgrids’ validation of transactions over Distributed Ledger. Secondly, we leverage from a physics-informed approach for detecting malware-infected nodes and then recovering from stealth attacks using a self-healing recovery scheme augmented into the microgrid Blockchain network. This scheme allows compromised nodes to adapt to a reconstructed trustworthy signal in a multi-hop manner using corresponding measurements from the reliable nodes in the network. Additionally, recognizing the possible threat of denial-of-service attacks and random time delays (where information sharing via communication channels is blocked), we also integrate a model-free predictive controller with the proposed system that can locally reconstruct an expected version of the attacked/delayed signals. This supplements the capabilities of Blockchain, enabling it to detect and mitigate consensus manipulation attempts, and network latencies.

4 March 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SRSuman Rath
Suman Rath
TDTapadhir Das
Tapadhir Das
SSShamik Sengupta
Shamik Sengupta
Cyber-physical microgrids are vulnerable to rootkit attacks that manipulate system dynamics to create instabilities in the network. Rootkits tend to hide their access level within microgrid system components to launch sudden attacks that prey on the slow response time of defenders to manipulate system trajectory. This problem can be formulated as a multi-stage, non-cooperative, zero-sum, Markov game with the attacker and the defender modeled as opposing players. To maximize defender utilities at all stages of the game, this paper proposes a deep reinforcement learning-based strategy that dynamically identifies rootkit access levels and isolates incoming manipulations by incorporating changes in the defense plan. Our proposed approach introduces a novel reward formulation mechanism that quantifies the level of microgrid instability in real time. This allows us to detect the presence of rootkits in the microgrid. The developed reward formulation also allows us to achieve scalability of the proposed solution to different grid sizes and configurations. A major advantage of the proposed strategy is its ability to establish resiliency without altering the physical transmission/distribution network topology, thereby diminishing potential instability issues. The paper presents several simulations and case studies to demonstrate the operating mechanism and robustness of the proposed strategy.

17 July 2022
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SRSuman Rath
Suman Rath
IZIoannis Zografopoulos
Ioannis Zografopoulos
Pedro P. VergaraPedro P. Vergara
Pedro P. Vergara
VNVassilis Nikolaidis
Vassilis Nikolaidis
CKCharalambos Konstantinou
Charalambos Konstantinou
Embedded controllers, sensors, actuators, advanced metering infrastructure, etc. are cornerstone components of cyber-physical energy systems such as microgrids (MGs). Harnessing their monitoring and control functionalities, sophisticated schemes enhancing MG stability can be deployed. However, the deployment of ‘smart’ assets increases the threat surface. Power systems possess mechanisms capable of detecting abnormal operations. Furthermore, the lack of sophistication in attack strategies can render them detectable since they blindly violate power system semantics. On the other hand, the recent increase of process-aware rootkits that can attain persistence and compromise operations in undetectable ways requires special attention. In this work, we investigate the steps followed by stealthy rootkits at the process level of control systems pre- and post-compromise. We investigate the rootkits' precompromise stage involving the deployment to multiple system locations and aggregation of system-specific information to build a neural network-based virtual data-driven model (VDDM) of the system. Then, during the weaponization phase, we demonstrate how the VDDM measurement predictions are paramount, first to orchestrate crippling attacks from multiple system standpoints, maximizing the impact, and second, impede detection blinding system operator situational awareness.