The consumer price index (CPI) is one of the most important macroeconomic indicators for determining inflation, and accurate predictions of CPI changes are important for a country's economic development. This study uses multivariate linear regression (MLR), support vector regression (SVR), autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL), and multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) to predict the CPI of the United States. Data from January 2017 to February 2022 were randomly selected and divided into two stages: 80 % for training and 20% for testing. The US CPI was modeled for the observed period and relied on a mix of elements, including crude oil price, world gold price, and federal fund effective rate. Evaluation metrics—mean absolute percentage value, mean absolute error, root mean square error, R-squared, and correlation of determination—were employed to estimate forecasted values. The MLR, SVR, ARDL, and MARS models attained high accuracy parameters, while the MARS algorithm generated higher accuracy in US CPI forecasts than the others in the testing phase. These outputs could support the US government in overseeing economic policies, sectors, and social security, thereby boosting national economic development.

By designing credit contracts with inversely related interest rates and collateral, banks can overcome the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard when there is an informational asymmetry in competitive credit markets. One salient result points out that, if borrowers’ insufficient endowments of wealth cause a binding collateral constraint, a credit rationing equilibrium arises because of collateral’s inability to achieve perfect sorting. The purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of government loan guarantees on equilibrium credit contracts and economic welfare. More specifically, the effects of loan guarantees on interest rates, collateral, and credit rationing were studied. Our results suggest that government loan guarantees should target high-risk entrepreneurs. Loan guarantees targeting high-risk entrepreneurs reduce a pledge of collateral in credit contracts, drop social cost, and increase economic welfare. Under the circumstances that borrowers’ insufficient wealth causes a binding collateral constraint, loan guarantees targeting high-risk entrepreneurs alleviate the problem of credit rationing and improve economic welfare.

In this study, under the existence of unilateral cross-border environmental pollution in two regions, a complete information dynamic game theory is constructed to discuss the environmental policy (recycling fee and treatment subsidy) formulation of the central government by two local governments. As a result, it was found that the spillover effect will reduce the level of social welfare. At the same time, the intervention of the central government and the adoption of policies tailored to local conditions will be conducive to the improvement of social welfare.

This paper compares the performance of inflation and welfare loss between exchange‐rate‐targeting and monetary‐aggregate‐targeting regimes for a small‐open economy characterized by a rational expectations model of the Phillips curve. We also consider rules‐versus‐discretion in policy. We obtain three interesting results. First, both regimes result in the same target rate of inflation and the smallest long‐run welfare loss, if an active contingent rule is credibly followed. Second, when discretion is undertaken, an exchange‐rate‐targeting policy is always superior to a monetary‐aggregate‐targeting one. Third, for a simple fixed rule, Friedman‐type’s monetary‐aggregate‐targeting policy works better than exchange‐rate‐targeting only under specific circumstances.

Past research indicates that a licensor tends to adopt the fixed fee, in order to obtain higher profit rather than secure royalty when he participates in zero production in the market. This study instead finds that the patentee’s optimum strategy may vary. In addition to the fixed-fee strategy, royalty or mixed licensing, or fixed fee plus royalty may be potential choices for the patentee as well which is depend on the market scale, incidence of market scale, and magnitude of cost-saving. The patentee may choose to only authorize a type of high market size based on self-interested motives. The technology licensing market is not sustainable.