The consumer price index (CPI) is one of the most important macroeconomic indicators for determining inflation, and accurate predictions of CPI changes are important for a country's economic development. This study uses multivariate linear regression (MLR), support vector regression (SVR), autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL), and multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) to predict the CPI of the United States. Data from January 2017 to February 2022 were randomly selected and divided into two stages: 80 % for training and 20% for testing. The US CPI was modeled for the observed period and relied on a mix of elements, including crude oil price, world gold price, and federal fund effective rate. Evaluation metrics—mean absolute percentage value, mean absolute error, root mean square error, R-squared, and correlation of determination—were employed to estimate forecasted values. The MLR, SVR, ARDL, and MARS models attained high accuracy parameters, while the MARS algorithm generated higher accuracy in US CPI forecasts than the others in the testing phase. These outputs could support the US government in overseeing economic policies, sectors, and social security, thereby boosting national economic development.
This paper establishes a cross-industry pollution externality model. To explain a benevolent government, it may be possible to tax part of the welfare gains and use the revenue to compensate the affected polluted industry for the damage cost, thereby improving welfare. We show that the social welfare under emission tax with production subsidy is higher than the results of emission tax without production subsidy. The welfare of the polluted sector under emissions trading will be lower than the results of unbalanced budget environmental policy with subsidy. The welfare of the polluted labor union under lobby for compensation will be higher than the results of environmental policy with subsidy if the pollution damage and the weight on political contributions are sufficiently high.
26 January 2024 in Managerial and Decision Economics
This paper utilized a three-stage dynamic game to analyze the conflicts of interest between stakeholders caused by firm heterogeneity. We show that the higher the degree of heterogeneity, the higher the sales delegation incentive given. The firm’s heterogeneity scale will cause industry profit, union utility, consumer surplus and manager bonus conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the intensity of conflict is lower between the industry and the union than between the industry and consumer and between the industry and manager if the degree of heterogeneity is relatively small.