John Strandholm

Dr. John Strandholm

University of South Carolina Upstate
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 August 2018 in Resource and Energy Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JSJohn Strandholm
John Strandholm
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia

23 April 2023 in Economics Letters
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Journal Article
Closed access
JSJohn Strandholm
John Strandholm
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia

1 February 2020 in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
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Journal Article
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JSJohn Strandholm
John Strandholm
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
This paper analyzes an entry-deterrence model in which the incumbent decides whether to invest in research and development (R&D) that promotes clean technology. We consider the case in which the entrant could benefit from a technology spillover and analyze the conditions that facilitate the incumbent’s entry-deterrence behavior. We show that higher levels of the spillover make entry more attractive compared to a standard entry game. In addition, regulator and incumbent prefer entry when the spillover from clean technology is sufficiently high and the cost of investing in R&D is relatively low. However, preferences are misaligned when the spillover and cost of R&D are low.

9 August 2020 in Games
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JSJohn Strandholm
John Strandholm
In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm’s decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely emission fees and quotas. Tradeable permits result in identical outcomes to emission fees. Within each policy regime, the conditions for Nash equilibria are identified where both firms invest in the green technology, neither firm invests in the technology, or only one firm invests. The following extensions are also analyzed: asymmetric adoption costs, increase in the marginal cost of production from adoption, and a type-dependent fee where adoption reduces the emission fee. Social welfare under an emission fee is identical to that under a quota. However, when policy is (not) stringent, firms are more willing to adopt expensive technology under a fee (quota) than under a quota (fee, respectively).

8 August 2023 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
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JSJohn Strandholm
John Strandholm
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz‐Garcia
Felix Munoz‐Garcia
We investigate privatization decisions in a mixed oligopoly market, with and without environmental regulation. We consider three agents: the manager of the public firm, the environmental agency, and the regulator choosing privatization levels; allowing them to assign different weights to pollution. When environmental policy is absent, we find that privatization decisions in equilibrium suffer from agency problems, yielding potentially inefficient privatizations. When environmental regulation is present and privatization decisions precede this regulation, privatizations have no impact on equilibrium output; while the opposite holds when environmental policy is chosen first. Our results, then, identify the presence of a second‐mover advantage when asymmetric government agencies act sequentially.

25 April 2022 in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
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Journal Article
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JSJohn Strandholm
John Strandholm
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia