Felix Munoz-Garcia

Dr. Felix Munoz-Garcia


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 April 2020 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
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Dolores GarridoDolores Garrido
Dolores Garrido
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia

1 August 2018 in Resource and Energy Economics
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Journal Article
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JSJohn Strandholm
John Strandholm
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia

1 November 2018 in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
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Journal Article
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PCPak-Sing Choi
Pak-Sing Choi
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia

20 January 2011 in Journal of Theoretical Politics
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AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia
This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and, second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ non-compliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own non-compliance costs through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that countries’ probability of joining the IEA is increasing in the free-riding benefits they can obtain from other countries’ compliance, and decreasing in the cost of not complying with the initial terms of the agreement. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough, there is no equilibrium in which all countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, however, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common observations in international negotiations.

1 January 2013 in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
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AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia

13 July 2016 in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
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Journal Article
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FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia
SASherzod B. Akhundjanov
Sherzod B. Akhundjanov
This paper investigates the production decisions of firms with asymmetric environmental damages, and how their profits are affected by environmental regulation. We demonstrate that emission fees entail a negative effect on firms’ profits, since they increase unit production costs. However, fees can also produce a positive effect for a relatively inefficient firm, given that environmental regulation mitigates its cost disadvantage. If such a disadvantage is sufficiently large, we show that the positive effect dominates, thus leading this firm to actually favor the introduction of environmental policy, while the relatively efficient firm opposes regulation. Furthermore, we show that such support can originate from polluting companies.