Ana Espinola-Arredondo

Dr. Ana Espinola-Arredondo


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 April 2020 in Journal of Public Economic Theory
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Dolores GarridoDolores Garrido
Dolores Garrido
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia

1 August 2018 in Resource and Energy Economics
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Journal Article
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JSJohn Strandholm
John Strandholm
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia

1 March 2012 in Environment and Development Economics
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AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
HZHuan Zhao
Huan Zhao
This paper analyzes how a tax/subsidy policy affects consumers' behavior when choosing between green (pollution-free goods) and conventional products, and its effects on welfare when a proportion of consumers have strong preferences for green goods. We analyze a Hotelling's linear city model where final products by two firms are symmetric in all dimensions except for the externality their production process generates. Our efficiency comparisons suggest that, under a setting of horizontal product differentiation, an environmental regulation (either on polluting firms or consumers buying their products) yields higher social welfare than the absence of policy. Moreover, the proportion of consumers who prefer green products affects the welfare gains from a subsidy or tax policy.

1 November 2018 in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
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PCPak-Sing Choi
Pak-Sing Choi
AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia

20 January 2011 in Journal of Theoretical Politics
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AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia
This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and, second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ non-compliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own non-compliance costs through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that countries’ probability of joining the IEA is increasing in the free-riding benefits they can obtain from other countries’ compliance, and decreasing in the cost of not complying with the initial terms of the agreement. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough, there is no equilibrium in which all countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, however, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common observations in international negotiations.

1 January 2013 in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
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Journal Article
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AEAna Espinola-Arredondo
Ana Espinola-Arredondo
FMFelix Munoz-Garcia
Felix Munoz-Garcia