Although suppliers can sell their goods on e-retailers’ e-platforms through either a wholesale or agency contract, suppliers that produce complementary goods and have different channel roles have been confused as to how to choose an optimal distribution contract. This paper aims to study this problem by considering the combined impacts of suppliers’ channel roles, e-retailer’s referral fees, goods’ differences in the level of complementarity and goods’ differences in potential demand. Our results show that, regardless of one supplier’s distribution contract choice, the other supplier always prefers agency contract, which is independent of two suppliers’ channel roles, the e-retailer’s referral fees, two goods’ differences in the level of complementarity and two goods’ differences in the potential demand. Moreover, when two suppliers use different distribution contracts to sell goods with different levels of complementarity on the same e-retailer’s e-platform, low-complementarity goods have a larger optimal retail price only if the two goods’ differences in the level of complementarity are sufficiently high, and the supplier can obtain more profits by producing low-complementarity goods regardless of the supplier’s distribution contract and channel role.
This paper investigates the green supply chain pricing problem when two manufacturers sell complementary products to one retailer. Considering the manufacturers’ cooperation or noncooperation strategies, we first give the centralized pricing model as a benchmark. According to market power among the supply chain, we analyze two types of supply chains: supplier-led type where the green driving factor comes from the suppliers and retailer-led type where the core member retailer leads the green supply chain. We then give two decentralized pricing models through considering strategic cooperation between two manufacturers and different structures. Corresponding closed-form expressions for equilibrium pricing strategies are established. Finally, many valuable managerial results are acquired through comparing the profits and equilibrium decisions of these models. Our paper shows that consumers are indifferent as to who is the leader of the two echelons when the manufacturers adopt non-cooperative action; the two complementary products get the same optimal wholesale/retail prices, maximum retail margins, and maximum demands regardless of the manufacturers’ cooperation or noncooperation strategies.
1 January 2023 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
Many traditional retailers become multi-channel retailers by establishing self-operated online channel or employing e-retailer's e-marketplace, and some multi-channel retailers adopt price self-matching to mitigate intense price competition in multi-channel retailing. Our goal in this research is to examine how the multi-channel retailer's online channel design interacts with its price self-matching strategy in a supply chain including a multi-channel retailer and an e-retailer. Our study demonstrates that adopting price self-matching does not necessarily benefit the multi-channel retailer. Moreover, price self-matching can greatly impact the performance of the multi-channel retailer's online channel design, for example, under some market conditions where the multi-channel retailer can benefit from price self-matching only if it employs the e-retailer's e-marketplace, the multi-channel retailer should design online channel according to the e-marketplace's commission rate; but under other market conditions, it should always establish self-operated online channel. Overall, only the strategy of establishing self-operated online channel and adopting price self-matching and the strategy of employing the e-retailer's e-marketplace and adopting price self-matching can help the two retailers achieve a win-win situation. Furthermore, we show that, interestingly, a more prominent disadvantage of the self-operated online channel's potential demand benefits not only the e-retailer but also the multi-channel retailer.
The rapid development of e-commerce platforms leads many competing manufacturers to sell asymmetrical quality national brands (NBs) via a common platform retailer (p-retailer) with agency-selling contract or reselling contract. Meanwhile, some p-retailers introduce store brands (SBs) to further improve profitability. We use the game-theoretic models to examine the combined performances of SB introduction and distribution contract in a co-opetition supply chain with a high-quality NB (HNB) manufacturer, a low-quality NB (LNB) manufacturer, and a p-retailer through considering SB spillover. Results indicate that the p-retailer always benefits from introducing SB when the LNB manufacturer uses reselling contract regardless of the HNB manufacturer's distribution contract, but when the LNB manufacturer uses agency-selling contract, whether the p-retailer benefits from introducing SB depends on the HNB manufacturer's distribution contract and certain market conditions. Additionally, SB introduction does not alter each manufacturer's optimal distribution contract choice. Interestingly, the HNB manufacturer cannot always gain a higher performance than the LNB manufacturer.
Remanufactured and refurbished products have posed challenges to new products in many developing countries. In these countries, remanufactured products are required to meet the quality standards of new products, while the quality of refurbished products is usually lower than that of new and remanufactured products due to the lack of government regulation. Motivated by these observations, this paper develops a game-theoretic model in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) offers new products, while a third-party refurbisher (TPF) and a third-party remanufacturer (TPM) provide refurbished and remanufactured products, respectively. The model investigates the TPF’s entry decision and optimal quality level by considering the OEM’s dominant position, and also explores the TPM’s entry decision by considering different channel powers between the TPF and the TPM. Moreover, we examine the effect of channel powers on entry barriers for both the TPF and the TPM, and the optimal pricing decisions and maximum profits of channel members when the new, refurbished and remanufactured products coexist in the market. We find that channel powers between the TPF and the TPM do not influence the TPM’s entry barrier. Moreover, although the entry barrier for the TPM is not lower than that for the TPF, whereas if the TPM enters the market, the TPF’s maximum profit never exceeds the TPM’s maximum profit regardless of channel powers between the TPF and TPM. In addition, when the OEM competes with the TPF who sets a low quality in the market, the effect of the TPM’s entry on the demand for the OEM’s new products depends on channel powers between the TPF and the TPM; specifically, only if the TPF has more channel power than the TPM, the TPM’s remanufactured products completely cannibalize the demand for the OEM’s new products.