Weiyu Chen

Dr. Weiyu Chen

Hebei University of Technology, School of economics and management, Tianjin, China
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
12 May 2020 in International Journal of Production Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JWJie Wei
Jie Wei
WCWeiyu Chen
Weiyu Chen
GLGuoxin Liu
Guoxin Liu
This paper considers a manufacturer's optimal integration strategy in a three-level closed-loop supply chain including one manufacturer, one retailer and two competing collectors. We study how the manufacturer's integration strategies of retailing and collecting channels affect the closed-loop supply chain members' optimal decisions and maximum profits, and also investigate the interaction between the collection competition and the manufacturer's integration strategies. Through comparing various integration strategies, some new and interesting management insights are obtained: to improve collection rate of the whole closed-loop supply chain and maximise the surplus profit of integration strategy, the manufacturer's best opt is to integrate the retailer and only one collector when the collection competition is intense.

JWJie Wei
Jie Wei
JLJinghui Lu
Jinghui Lu
WCWeiyu Chen
Weiyu Chen
ZXZeling Xu
Zeling Xu
Although suppliers can sell their goods on e-retailers’ e-platforms through either a wholesale or agency contract, suppliers that produce complementary goods and have different channel roles have been confused as to how to choose an optimal distribution contract. This paper aims to study this problem by considering the combined impacts of suppliers’ channel roles, e-retailer’s referral fees, goods’ differences in the level of complementarity and goods’ differences in potential demand. Our results show that, regardless of one supplier’s distribution contract choice, the other supplier always prefers agency contract, which is independent of two suppliers’ channel roles, the e-retailer’s referral fees, two goods’ differences in the level of complementarity and two goods’ differences in the potential demand. Moreover, when two suppliers use different distribution contracts to sell goods with different levels of complementarity on the same e-retailer’s e-platform, low-complementarity goods have a larger optimal retail price only if the two goods’ differences in the level of complementarity are sufficiently high, and the supplier can obtain more profits by producing low-complementarity goods regardless of the supplier’s distribution contract and channel role.