Zeling Xu

Dr. Zeling Xu

Hebei University of Technology, School of economics and management, Tianjin, China
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
23 November 2022 in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JWJie Wei
Jie Wei
ZXZeling Xu
Zeling Xu

JWJie Wei
Jie Wei
JLJinghui Lu
Jinghui Lu
WCWeiyu Chen
Weiyu Chen
ZXZeling Xu
Zeling Xu
Although suppliers can sell their goods on e-retailers’ e-platforms through either a wholesale or agency contract, suppliers that produce complementary goods and have different channel roles have been confused as to how to choose an optimal distribution contract. This paper aims to study this problem by considering the combined impacts of suppliers’ channel roles, e-retailer’s referral fees, goods’ differences in the level of complementarity and goods’ differences in potential demand. Our results show that, regardless of one supplier’s distribution contract choice, the other supplier always prefers agency contract, which is independent of two suppliers’ channel roles, the e-retailer’s referral fees, two goods’ differences in the level of complementarity and two goods’ differences in the potential demand. Moreover, when two suppliers use different distribution contracts to sell goods with different levels of complementarity on the same e-retailer’s e-platform, low-complementarity goods have a larger optimal retail price only if the two goods’ differences in the level of complementarity are sufficiently high, and the supplier can obtain more profits by producing low-complementarity goods regardless of the supplier’s distribution contract and channel role.

13 January 2025 in Electronic Commerce Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ZXZeling Xu
Zeling Xu
JWJie Wei
Jie Wei

1 November 2025 in RAIRO - Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZXZeling Xu
Zeling Xu
JWJie Wei
Jie Wei
Many e-marketplaces have introduced e-commerce brands (EBs) simultaneously displayed on the same platform with national brands (NBs), resulting in direct competition with NBs. This work uses game theory to study the underlying mechanisms of strategy interaction between the e-marketplace’s brand promotion and the NB seller’s sales channel strategies. We find that the e-marketplace should not blindly promote the EB since its optimal brand-promotion strategy depends on the market factors. Interestingly, when faced with the NB seller’s agency channel or dual-channel strategy, the e-marketplace which engages in EB promotion attempts to mitigate NB seller’s resistance and make up for the partial loss brought to the NB seller by reducing the commission fee. The NB seller should use the dual-channel regardless of the e-marketplace’s brand-promotion strategy. Moreover, when the competition intensity between the two brands is moderate, the brand promotion conversion rate is relatively low, and consumers’ recognition of the EB is relatively high, using the dual-channel and promoting the NB could lead to a “win–win–win” outcome for the NB seller, e-marketplace, and consumers, and further advance the sustainable development of the supply chain.

25 October 2025 in Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ZXZeling Xu
Zeling Xu
LLLi Liu
Li Liu
FGFeiyu Guo
Feiyu Guo