This paper utilized a three-stage dynamic game to analyze the conflicts of interest between stakeholders caused by firm heterogeneity. We show that the higher the degree of heterogeneity, the higher the sales delegation incentive given. The firm’s heterogeneity scale will cause industry profit, union utility, consumer surplus and manager bonus conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the intensity of conflict is lower between the industry and the union than between the industry and consumer and between the industry and manager if the degree of heterogeneity is relatively small.

In the information age, typically buyers bear costs when they change their shopping habits. Therefore, it is indispensable that manufacturers know these costs during transitioning technology and brand for success in the current information economy. Previous research about switching costs emphasized corporate behavioral tactics and corporate competitiveness in the market. However, in these models, customers do not indeed change the account of the business, being charged the same price, and the switching cost is higher enough to prevent conversion. In reality, customers’ brand changes. This research hypothesizes that commodity’s consumption utility with externality increase with an increase of disposable income and externality but decreases with increasing of reservation utility’s shadow price when concerning consumption’s switching cost and endogenizing costumers behavior. When a product announcement makes a consumer group’s preference for externalities greater than that of another consumer group, the externality of its brand announcement inevitably increases. However, to increase the externality, it is necessary to attract more users to join the purchase of the brand, which naturally increases the manufacturer’s request for the creation of forenotice and the switching cost also increases.

We investigated the determinants of absenteeism in the Principles of Microeconomics at a rural state university in Pennsylvania. We apply Poisson statistics and a negative binomial of both Type 1 and 2 models to estimate absenteeism behavior. All cases have GPA as a significant factor. A higher GPA reduces the absence rate by 3.2574 times in the NB1 model. It was found that business majors cut classes significantly less (26.24%) than education majors.

We construct a dynamic bilateral monopoly game to analyze the bargaining between a foreign manufacturer and a domestic retailer regarding the wholesale price and explain the foreign upstream firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative and its economic impacts on the domestic market. Under free trade, the foreign upstream firm’s CSR initiative realizes improvements in consumer surplus and social welfare in the home country. A “win–win–win” strategy exists, as the foreign manufacturer has more of an incentive to implement CSR when the government implements a strategic trade policy. The consumer-friendly action implemented by the foreign upstream firm leads to adequate consumer welfare and social welfare, which mitigates the government’s political hostility. With the high bargaining power of the foreign upstream firm and the low weight of the consumer-friendly upstream firm, the government should set a higher tariff rate for the foreign upstream firm to extract rent and enhance social welfare.

This paper incorporates more general cases with a new class of constantly adjusted concavity demand curves and includes three types of taxes. To verify the output symmetry under various forms of taxation, we simulate both linear and constant elasticity demand functions under the unit, demand ad valorem, and cost ad valorem taxes. If all the demand functions in the submarkets are linear, the total outputs are identical under both uniform pricing and third-degree price discrimination. Furthermore, if all the weak market demand curves are strictly “Robinson-concave” and all the strong market demand curves are strictly “Robinson-convex” or linear, then the total output under price discrimination exceeds that under uniform pricing, and vice versa. While different taxes lead to higher costs, the cost pass-through changes the prices of the products, and the change of total output still depends on the curvature of the demand curve. Therefore, the curvature of the demand curve remains the main determinant of changes in output. Our study provides a theoretical basis for market intervention in price discrimination.