This paper proposes a decision support process for incomplete hesitant fuzzy preference relations (HF-PRs). First, we present a revised definition of HFPRs, in which the values are not ordered for the hesitant fuzzy element. Second, we propose a method to normalize the HFPRs and estimate the missing elements in incomplete HFPRs based on multiplicative consistency. Based on this, a consensus model with incomplete HFPR is developed. A feedback mechanism is proposed to obtain a best choice with desired consensus level. Multiplicative consistency induced ordered weighted averaging (MC-IOWA) operator is used to aggregate the individual HFPRs into a collective one. A score HFPR is proposed for collective HFPR, and then the hesitant quantifier-guided non-dominance degrees (HQGNDD) of alternatives by using an OWA operator are obtained to rank the alternatives. Finally, a case study for evaluate the qualification of supply chain enterprises is provided to illustrate its application.

Food safety risk communication has attracted widespread attention in China. The government is the leader in food risk communication. It has even more impact on consumers’ willingness to communicate food risk. Thus, this paper constructs a risk communication game model composed of the central government, local government, and consumers under food safety regulatory agencies in China. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we achieved the evolutionary stable equilibrium points under complying different constraint conditions by solving the replicator dynamic equations of parties in the dynamic system. In the end, some numerical examples have been displayed to simulate the agents’ choices. The results show that penalty cost, governance intensity, communication cost, and reputation of the government have an essential impact on consumers’ enthusiasm for food safety risk communication decision‐making behavior. Furthermore, the choice of food safety risk communication strategies is performed with a dynamic process, which is constantly adjusted and optimized. The evolutionary game system can converge on an ideal state under certain conditions. Moreover, this study proposes suggestions and measures conducive to the tripartite game, which can offer valuable guidance on food risk communication practice and improve government efficiency in China. This research can provide the evolutionary mechanism and broaden our understanding of the relationship between food safety risk governance and food risk communication strategies.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the responsibility that should be taken by different pork supply chain participants to ensure pork quality and safety, with the aim of providing some guidance for strengthening the supervision of pork quality and safety. Design/methodology/approach: The pig farmer survey and the pork consumer survey were conducted in Funing County, Jiangsu Province, using the best-worst scaling (BWS) and a mixed logit model. Findings: The results showed that the designation of responsibility for ensuring pork quality and safety was of, in descending order, feed producers and suppliers, backyard farmers and farms of designated size, pork processing workshops and companies of and above designated size, slaughterhouses, supermarkets, farmer’s markets, pig transporters, and consumers. Both pig farmers and pork consumers believed that those involved in the initial pork supply chain should take greater responsibility for pork quality and safety. Originality/value: Allocation of responsibilities across the entire pork industry chain was investigated from the perspective of pig farmers and pork consumers using the BWS and a mixed logit model. The results of this study might explain the unique problems that occur in pork supply chain management in large developing countries like China.

In practical group decision making (GDM) problems, decision maker (DM) may have to tackle with incomplete information and uncertain linguistic preference relation (ULPR ). Consequently, the DMs may provide incomplete ULPR s . In this paper, the prope