Anubhab Baksi

Dr. Anubhab Baksi

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 March 2024 in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PRPrasanna Ravi
Prasanna Ravi
ACAnupam Chattopadhyay
Anupam Chattopadhyay
JDJan Pieter D’anvers
Jan Pieter D’anvers
ABAnubhab Baksi
Anubhab Baksi
In this work, we present a systematic study of Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) and Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) on structured lattice-based schemes, with main focus on Kyber Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Dilithium signature scheme, which are leading candidates in the NIST standardization process for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Through our study, we attempt to understand the underlying similarities and differences between the existing attacks while classifying them into different categories. Given the wide variety of reported attacks, simultaneous protection against all the attacks requires to implement customized protections/countermeasures for both Kyber and Dilithium. We therefore present a range of customized countermeasures, capable of providing defenses/mitigations against existing SCA/FIA, and incorporate several SCA and FIA countermeasures within a single design of Kyber and Dilithium. Among the several countermeasures discussed in this work, we present novel countermeasures that offer simultaneous protection against several SCA- and FIA-based chosen-ciphertext attacks for Kyber KEM. We implement the presented countermeasures within two well-known public software libraries for PQC: (1) pqm4 library for the ARM Cortex-M4-based microcontroller and (2) liboqs library for the Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Plus based on the ARM Cortex-A53 processor. Our performance evaluation reveals that the presented custom countermeasures incur reasonable performance overheads on both the evaluated embedded platforms. We therefore believe our work argues for usage of custom countermeasures within real-world implementations of lattice-based schemes, either in a standalone manner or as reinforcements to generic countermeasures such as masking.

21 November 2022 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ABAnubhab Baksi
Anubhab Baksi
SBShivam Bhasin
Shivam Bhasin
JBJakub Breier
Jakub Breier
DJDirmanto Jap
Dirmanto Jap
DSDhiman Saha
Dhiman Saha
Fault attacks are among the well-studied topics in the area of cryptography. These attacks constitute a powerful tool to recover the secret key used in the encryption process. Fault attacks work by forcing a device to work under non-ideal environmental conditions (such as high temperature) or external disturbances (such as glitch in the power supply) while performing a cryptographic operation. The recent trend shows that the amount of research in this direction—which ranges from attacking a particular primitive, proposing a fault countermeasure, to attacking countermeasures—has grown up substantially and is going to stay as an active research interest for the foreseeable future. Hence, it becomes apparent to have a comprehensive yet compact study of the (major) works. This work, which covers a wide spectrum in the present-day research on fault attacks that fall under the purview of the symmetric key cryptography, aims at fulfilling the absence of an up-to-date survey. We present mostly all aspects of the topic in a way that is not only understandable for a non-expert reader, but also helpful for an expert as a reference.


8 April 2025 in IACR Communications in Cryptology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
ABAnubhab Baksi
Anubhab Baksi
HKHyunji Kim
Hyunji Kim
GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
ACAnupam Chattopadhyay
Anupam Chattopadhyay
Our work explores the key recovery attack using the Grover's search on the three variants of AES (-128, -192, -256). In total, we develop a pool of 26 implementations per AES variant (totaling 78), by taking the state-of-the-art advancements in the relevant fields into account. We present the least Toffoli depth and full depth implementations of AES, thereby improving from Zou et al.'s Asiacrypt'20 paper by more than 97 percent for each variant of AES. We show that the qubit count - Toffoli depth product is reduced from theirs by more than 87 percent. Furthermore, we analyze the Jaques et al.'s Eurocrypt'20 implementations in detail, fix the bugs (arising from some problem of the quantum computing tool used), and report corrected benchmarks (which seem to improve from the authors' own bug-fixing, thanks to our architecture consideration). To the best of our finding, our work improves from all the previous works (including the Asiacrypt'22 paper by Huang and Sun, the Asiacrypt'23 paper by Liu et al. and the Asiacrypt'24 paper by Shi and Feng) in terms of various quantum circuit complexity metrics. To be more precise, we estimate the currently best-known quantum attack complexities for AES-128 ( 2 156.2630 ), AES-192 ( 2 221.5801 ) and AES-256 ( 2 286.0731 ). Additionally, we achieve the least Toffoli depth - qubit count product for AES-128 ( 121920 , improving from 130720 by Shi and Feng in Asiacrypt'24), AES-192 ( 161664 , improving from 188880 by Liu et al. in Asiacrypt'23) and AES-256 ( 206528 , improving from 248024 by Liu et al. in Asiacrypt'23) so far. We further investigate the prospect of the Grover's search. We propose four new implementations of the S-box, one new implementation of the MixColumn; as well as five new architecture (one is motivated by the architecture by Jaques et al. in Eurocrypt'20, and the rest four are entirely our innovation). Under the MAXDEPTH constraint (specified by NIST), the circuit depth metrics (Toffoli depth, T -depth and full depth) become crucial factors and parallelization for often becomes necessary. We provide the least depth implementation in this respect that offers the best performance in terms of metrics like depth-squared - qubit count product, depth - gate count product.

22 November 2021 in Quantum Information Processing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ABAnubhab Baksi
Anubhab Baksi
KJKyungbae Jang
Kyungbae Jang
GSGyeongju Song
Gyeongju Song
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
Z-Zejun Xiang ---
Zejun Xiang ---

1 December 2021
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
ABAnubhab Baksi
Anubhab Baksi
SBShivam Bhasin
Shivam Bhasin
JBJakub Breier
Jakub Breier
MKMustafa Khairallah
Mustafa Khairallah
TPThomas Peyrin
Thomas Peyrin
SSSiang Meng Sim
Siang Meng Sim