Qi Li

Ms. Qi Li


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 January 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote Sensing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LCLi Chen
Li Chen
ZXZewei Xu
Zewei Xu
QLQi Li
Qi Li
JPJian Peng
Jian Peng
Shaowen WangShaowen Wang
Shaowen Wang
Haifeng LiHaifeng Li
Haifeng Li
Deep neural networks (DNNs), which learn a hierarchical representation of features, have shown remarkable performance in big data analytics of remote sensing. However, previous research indicates that DNNs are easily spoofed by adversarial examples, which are crafted images with artificial perturbations that fool DNN models toward wrong predictions. To comprehensively evaluate the impact of adversarial examples on the remote sensing image (RSI) scene classification, this study tests eight state-of-the-art classification DNNs on six RSI benchmarks. These data sets include both optical and synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) images of different spectral and spatial resolutions. In the experiment, we create 48 classification scenarios and use four cutting-edge attack algorithms to investigate the influence of the adversarial example on the classification of RSIs. The experimental result shows that the fooling rates of the attacks are all over 98% across the 48 scenarios. We also find that, for the optical data, the seriousness of the adversarial problem has a negative relationship with the richness of the feature information. Besides, adversarial examples generated from SAR images are used easily for fooling the models with an average fooling rate of 76.01%. By analyzing the class distribution of these adversarial examples, we find that the distribution of the misclassifications is not affected by the types of models and attack algorithms-adversarial examples of RSIs of the same class cluster on fixed several classes. The analysis of classes of adversarial examples not only helps us explore the relationships between data set classes but also provides insights for further designing defensive algorithms.

12 October 2021 in Remote Sensing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MLMingming Lu
Mingming Lu
QLQi Li
Qi Li
LCLi Chen
Li Chen
Haifeng LiHaifeng Li
Haifeng Li
With the adversarial attack of convolutional neural networks (CNNs), we are able to generate adversarial patches to make an aircraft undetectable by object detectors instead of covering the aircraft with large camouflage nets. However, aircraft in remote sensing images (RSIs) have the problem of large variations in scale, which can easily cause size mismatches between an adversarial patch and an aircraft. A small adversarial patch has no attack effect on large aircraft, and a large adversarial patch will completely cover small aircraft so that it is impossible to judge whether the adversarial patch has an attack effect. Therefore, we propose the adversarial attack method Patch-Noobj for the problem of large-scale variation in aircraft in RSIs. Patch-Noobj adaptively scales the width and height of the adversarial patch according to the size of the attacked aircraft and generates a universal adversarial patch that can attack aircraft of different sizes. In the experiment, we use the YOLOv3 detector to verify the effectiveness of Patch-Noobj on multiple datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that our universal adversarial patches are well adapted to aircraft of different sizes on multiple datasets and effectively reduce the Average Precision (AP) of the YOLOv3 detector on the DOTA, NWPU VHR-10, and RSOD datasets by 48.2%, 23.9%, and 20.2%, respectively. Moreover, the universal adversarial patch generated on one dataset is also effective in attacking aircraft on the remaining two datasets, while the adversarial patch generated on YOLOv3 is also effective in attacking YOLOv5 and Faster R-CNN, which demonstrates the attack transferability of the adversarial patch.

23 July 2020 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LCLi Chen
Li Chen
Haifeng LiHaifeng Li
Haifeng Li
GZGuowei Zhu
Guowei Zhu
QLQi Li
Qi Li
JZJiawei Zhu
Jiawei Zhu
LZLin Zhao
Lin Zhao
Remote sensing image (RSI) scene classification is the foundation and important technology of ground object detection, land use management and geographic analysis. During recent years, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have achieved significant success and are widely applied in RSI scene classification. However, crafted images that serve as adversarial examples can potentially fool CNNs with high confidence and are hard for human eyes to interpret. For the increasing security and robust requirements of RSI scene classification, the adversarial example problem poses a serious problem for the classification results derived from systems using CNN models, which has not been fully recognized by previous research. In this study, to explore the properties of adversarial examples of RSI scene classification, we create different scenarios by testing two major attack algorithms (i.e., the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) and basic iterative method (BIM)) trained on different RSI benchmark datasets to fool CNNs (i.e., InceptionV1, ResNet and a simple CNN). In the experiment, our results show that CNNs of RSI scene classification are also vulnerable to adversarial examples, and some of them have a fooling rate of over 80%. These adversarial examples are affected by the architecture of CNNs and the type of RSI dataset. InceptionV1 has a fooling rate of less than 5%, which is lower than the others. Adversarial examples generated on the UCM dataset are easier than other datasets. Importantly, we also find that the classes of adversarial examples have an attack selectivity property. Misclassifications of adversarial examples of RSIs are related to the similarity of the original classes in the CNN feature space. Attack selectivity reveals potential classes of adversarial examples and provides insights into the design of defensive algorithms in future research.

8 February 2022 in International Journal of Intelligent Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
LCLi Chen
Li Chen
QLQi Li
Qi Li
WCWeiye Chen
Weiye Chen
ZWZeyu Wang
Zeyu Wang
Haifeng LiHaifeng Li
Haifeng Li

1 December 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
YLYu Lu
Yu Lu
MLMin Li
Min Li
QLQi Li
Qi Li
YPYi Pan
Yi Pan
JWJianxin Wang
Jianxin Wang
Essential proteins are indispensable for cellular life. It is of great significance to identify essential proteins that can help us understand the minimal requirements for cellular life and is also very important for drug design. However, identification of essential proteins based on experimental approaches are always time-consuming and expensive. With the development of high-throughput technology in the post-genomic era, more and more protein-protein interaction data can be obtained, which make us study essential proteins from the network level become possible. There have been a series of computational approaches proposed for predicting essential proteins based on network topologies. Most of these topology based essential protein discovery methods were to use network centrality. In this paper, we investigate the essential proteins' topological characters from a completely new perspective. To our knowledge it is the first time that topology potential is used to identify essential proteins from protein-protein interaction network. The basic idea is that each protein in the network can be viewed as a material particle which creates a potential field around itself and the interaction of all proteins forms a topological field over the network. By defining and computing the value of each protein's topology potential, we can obtain a more precise ranking which reflects the importance of proteins from the protein-protein interaction network. The experiment results show that topology potential outperforms traditional topology measures: Degree Centrality (DC), Betweenness Centrality (BC), Closeness Centrality (CC), Subgraph Centrality(SC), Eigenvector Centrality(EC), Information Centrality(IC), and Sum of ECC (NC) for predicting essential proteins. In addition, these centrality measures are improved on their performance for identifying essential proteins in biological network when controlled by topology potential.

3 March 2020 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
LCLi Chen
Li Chen
GZGuowei Zhu
Guowei Zhu
QLQi Li
Qi Li
Haifeng LiHaifeng Li
Haifeng Li
With the wide application of remote sensing technology in various fields, the accuracy and security requirements for remote sensing images (RSIs) recognition are also increasing. In recent years, due to the rapid development of deep learning in the field of image recognition, RSI recognition models based on deep convolution neural networks (CNNs) outperform traditional hand-craft feature techniques. However, CNNs also pose security issues when they show their capability of accurate classification. By adding a very small variation of the adversarial perturbation to the input image, the CNN model can be caused to produce erroneous results with extremely high confidence, and the modification of the image is not perceived by the human eye. This added adversarial perturbation image is called an adversarial example, which poses a serious security problem for systems based on CNN model recognition results. This paper, for the first time, analyzes adversarial example problem of RSI recognition under CNN models. In the experiments, we used different attack algorithms to fool multiple high-accuracy RSI recognition models trained on multiple RSI datasets. The results show that RSI recognition models are also vulnerable to adversarial examples, and the models with different structures trained on the same RSI dataset also have different vulnerabilities. For each RSI dataset, the number of features also affects the vulnerability of the model. Many features are good for defensive adversarial examples. Further, we find that the attacked class of RSI has an attack selectivity property. The misclassification of adversarial examples of the RSIs are related to the similarity of the original classes in the CNN feature space. In addition, adversarial examples in RSI recognition are of great significance for the security of remote sensing applications, showing a huge potential for future research.