The aim of this article is to investigate the determinants of attendance at French football Ligue 1 matches over the period 2008–2011 with an emphasis on examining the effects of both competitive balance and intensity before a match. Competitive balance is measured by the point difference between the two teams concerned by a match in the championship. Competitive intensity is measured by the point difference for the home team in relation to ranks with sporting stakes. Results show that competitive balance has an insignificant impact whereas competitive intensity has a significantly positive impact. Implications are drawn.

Esports is a rapidly growing industry. However, the unidentifiable governance structure of the industry has contributed to a number of integrity-eroding activities. By exploring esports stakeholder dynamics, this paper answers the question, “Is the esports governance model sustainable?” Data were sourced from documentation, focus groups (N = 3) and semi-structured interviews (N = 6). Thematic analysis was conducted using Nvivo. The findings suggest that (1) the current esports governance framework features some attributes of the “lead organisation-governed network”, with the power residing mainly in game publishers; (2) the rising power of other stakeholders in the network seeking to address integrity issues has caused fragmentation of the esports governance framework; (3) esports governance is evolving towards a network administration organisation (NAO) model. Such evolution has a few challenges—most notably, the compliance of game publishers. Given the social impact of the integrity issues, governments should play a main role in facilitating a NAO model.

The aim of this article is to investigate the determinants of television audience for English Premier League (EPL) football matches during the 2013–2014 season (n = 154). The model is adapted from Buraimo and Simmons (2015) who concluded that star quality was an important determinant of television audiences for the EPL over the 2000–2008 period, whereas uncertainty of outcome and championship, Europe and relegation contention were not. Their measures for contention are replaced by indicators based on Scelles et al.’s (2013b, 2016) competitive intensity. Results show a significant positive impact of star quality but also championship and Champions League intensity and no significant impact of Europa League, potential Europa League and relegation intensity. Based on these results, the article suggests that the EPL should encourage both star quality and competitive balance so that all teams can be competitive in terms of the title or qualification for the UEFA Champions League. Given the differences in revenue generation between English teams, the best way to achieve both star quality and competitive balance would be through the introduction of a European Super League. However, this conclusion based on television audience contradicts that of Scelles et al. (2016) based on stadium attendance.

This article examines insolvency (payment failure) in the top three divisions of French soccer. Between 1970 and 2014, we observed 79 cases of insolvency arising from participation in the top two or three (since 1993) divisions. We find that demand (attendance) shocks can account for insolvency to a significant degree. We also find that insolvency can be explained by club status and ownership structure, with professional status and the association structure being more likely to lead to insolvency. We also examine the postinsolvency performance of soccer clubs and find that the adverse consequences of insolvency are long lasting.

In 1964, Neale suggested, in addition to competitive balance, a league standing effect that was never tested per se with empirical data. A model that explains fan attendance in the French football Ligue 1 over 2008-2011 is presented. It takes on-board point difference with the closest competitor chasing a different sporting stake, and positive and negative changes regarding the different sporting stakes. Econometric testing exhibits a negative impact of point difference (i.e., a positive impact of the possibilities of changes), a positive impact of positive changes, and no significant impact of negative changes.