We analyze whether gender interactions at the top of the corporate hierarchy affect corporate performance. Using a comprehensive data set of family-controlled firms in Italy, we find that female directors significantly improve the operating profitability of female-led companies. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we assess executive transitions using a triple-difference approach complemented by propensity score matching and instrumental variables. Finally, we show that the positive effect of female interactions on profitability is reduced when the firm is located in geographic areas characterized by gender prejudices and when the firm is large. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.
Extant research shows that entrepreneurs are typically overly optimistic about their ventures’ prospects and that such optimism hampers performance. We analyze how dispositional optimism affects the adjustments to entrepreneurs’ expectations after they receive negative feedback on their task performance. We then explore the relationship between optimism and the effectiveness of innovation. Exploiting unique firm-level data and a laboratory experiment involving 205 entrepreneurs, we find that dispositional optimism is negatively associated with both the likelihood and extent of belief updating in response to negative feedback. Furthermore, dispositional optimism triggers a discrepancy—between innovation inputs and outputs—that reduces a firm’s innovation effectiveness.
1 November 2016 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
We use a lab experiment to examine whether and how leaders influence workers’ (un)ethical behavior through financial reporting choices. We randomly assign the role of leaders or workers to subjects, who can choose to report an outcome via automatic or self-reporting. Self-reporting allows for profitable and undetectable earnings manipulation. We vary the leaders’ ability to choose the reporting method and to punish workers. We show that workers are more likely to choose automatic reporting when their leader voluntarily does so and can assign punishment. Even workers who choose self-reporting tend to cheat less when their leader chooses automatic reporting. Nonetheless, most leaders do not opt for automatic reporting in the first place: they often choose self-reporting and punish workers who rather choose automatic reporting. Collectively, our results reveal a dual effect of leadership on ethical behaviors in organizations: workers behave more ethically if their leader makes ethical choices, but often leaders do not make ethical choices in the first place. Hence, leading by example can backfire.
1 June 2012 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Decision makers frequently have a spokesperson communicate their decisions. In this paper, we address two questions. First, does it matter who communicates an unfair decision? Second, does it matter how the unfair decision is communicated? We conduct a modified dictator game experiment in which either the decision maker or a spokesperson communicates the decided allocation to recipients, who then determine whether to punish either of them. We find that receivers punish both the decision maker and the spokesperson more often, and more heavily, for unfair allocations communicated by the spokesperson if there is room for shifting blame. The increased punishment results from the messenger’s style of delivery: spokespersons are more likely than decision makers to express emotional regret instead of rational need. Receivers seem to punish the former style of communication because they view it as an attempt to shift blame. Our results establish more generally that the design of communication schemes shapes relationships among organizational members. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2782 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.