Usutu virus (USUV) is a Culex-associated mosquito-borne flavivirus of the Flaviviridae family. Since its discovery in 1959, the virus has been isolated from birds, arthropods and humans in Europe and Africa. An increasing number of Usutu virus infections in humans with neurological presentations have been reported. Recently, the virus has been detected in bats and horses, which deviates from the currently proposed enzootic cycle of USUV involving several different avian and mosquito species. Despite this increasing number of viral detections in different mammalian hosts, the existence of a non-avian reservoir remains unresolved. In Kedougou, a tropical region in the southeast corner of Senegal, Usutu virus was detected, isolated and sequenced from five asymptomatic small mammals: Two different rodent species and a single species of shrew. Additional molecular characterization and in vivo growth dynamics showed that these rodents/shrew-derived viruses are closely related to the reference strain (accession number: AF013412) and are as pathogenic as other characterized strains associated with neurological invasions in human. This is the first evidence of Usutu virus isolation from rodents or shrews. Our findings emphasize the need to consider a closer monitoring of terrestrial small mammals in future active surveillance, public health, and epidemiological efforts in response to USUV in both Africa and Europe.

This Review initiates a wide-ranging discussion over 2023 by selecting and exploring core themes to be investigated more deeply in papers submitted to the Vaccines Special Issue on the “Future of Epidemic and Pandemic Vaccines to Serve Global Public Health Needs”. To tackle the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, an acceleration of vaccine development across different technology platforms resulted in the emergency use authorization of multiple vaccines in less than a year. Despite this record speed, many limitations surfaced including unequal access to products and technologies, regulatory hurdles, restrictions on the flow of intellectual property needed to develop and manufacture vaccines, clinical trials challenges, development of vaccines that did not curtail or prevent transmission, unsustainable strategies for dealing with variants, and the distorted allocation of funding to favour dominant companies in affluent countries. Key to future epidemic and pandemic responses will be sustainable, global-public-health-driven vaccine development and manufacturing based on equitable access to platform technologies, decentralised and localised innovation, and multiple developers and manufacturers, especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). There is talk of flexible, modular pandemic preparedness, of technology access pools based on non-exclusive global licensing agreements in exchange for fair compensation, of WHO-supported vaccine technology transfer hubs and spokes, and of the creation of vaccine prototypes ready for phase I/II trials, etc. However, all these concepts face extraordinary challenges shaped by current commercial incentives, the unwillingness of pharmaceutical companies and governments to share intellectual property and know-how, the precariousness of building capacity based solely on COVID-19 vaccines, the focus on large-scale manufacturing capacity rather than small-scale rapid-response innovation to stop outbreaks when and where they occur, and the inability of many resource-limited countries to afford next-generation vaccines for their national vaccine programmes. Once the current high subsidies are gone and interest has waned, sustaining vaccine innovation and manufacturing capability in interpandemic periods will require equitable access to vaccine innovation and manufacturing capabilities in all regions of the world based on many vaccines, not just “pandemic vaccines”. Public and philanthropic investments will need to leverage enforceable commitments to share vaccines and critical technology so that countries everywhere can establish and scale up vaccine development and manufacturing capability. This will only happen if we question all prior assumptions and learn the lessons offered by the current pandemic. We invite submissions to the special issue, which we hope will help guide the world towards a global vaccine research, development, and manufacturing ecosystem that better balances and integrates scientific, clinical trial, regulatory, and commercial interests and puts global public health needs first.

Dengue virus (DENV) is the most widespread arthropod-borne virus, with the number and severity of outbreaks increasing worldwide in recent decades. Dengue is caused by genetically distinct serotypes, DENV-1–4. Here, we present data on DENV-1, isolated from patients with dengue fever during an outbreak in Senegal and Mali (Western Africa) in 2015–2019, that were analyzed by sequencing the envelope (E) gene. The emergence and the dynamics of DENV-1 in Western Africa were inferred by using maximum likelihood and Bayesian methods. The DENV-1 grouped into a monophyletic cluster that was closely related to those from Southeast Asia. The virus appears to have been introduced directly into Medina Gounass (Suburb of Dakar), Senegal (location probability = 0.301, posterior = 0.76). The introduction of the virus in Senegal occurred around 2014 (95% HPD = 2012.88–2014.84), and subsequently, the virus moved to regions within Senegal (e.g., Louga and Fatick), causing intense outbreaks in the subsequent years. The virus appears to have been introduced in Mali (a neighboring country) after its introduction in Senegal. In conclusion, we present evidence that the outbreak caused by DENV-1 in urban environments in Senegal and Mali after 2015 was caused by a single viral introduction from Asia.

West Nile virus (WNV) is a virus of the Japanese encephalitis antigenic complex and belongs to the family Flaviviridae of the genus flavivirus. The virus can cause infection in humans which in most cases is asymptomatic, however symptomatic cases exist and the disease can be severe causing encephalitis and meningoencephalitis. The virus is maintained in an enzootic cycle involving mosquitoes and birds, humans and other mammals such as horses can be accidental hosts. A mosquito-based arbovirus surveillance system and the sentinel syndromic surveillance network (4S) have been in place since 1988 and 2015 respectively, to better understand the transmission dynamics of arboviruses including WNV in Senegal. Arthropod and human samples have been collected from the field and analysed at Institut Pasteur de Dakar using different methods including RT-PCR, ELISA, plaque reduction neutralization test and viral isolation. RT-PCR positive samples have been analysed by Next Generation Sequencing. From 2012 to 2021, 7912 samples have been analysed and WNV positive cases have been detected, 20 human cases (19 IgM and 1 RT-PCR positive cases) and 41 mosquito pools. Phylogenetic analyzes of the sequences of complete genomes obtained showed the circulation of lineage 1a, with all these recent strains from Senegal identical to each other and very close to strains isolated from horse in France in 2015, Italy and Spain. Our data showed lineage 1a endemicity in Senegal as previously described, with circulation of WNV in humans and mosquitoes. Phylogenetic analyzes carried out with the genome sequences obtained also revealed exchanges of WNV strains between Europe and Senegal which could be possible via migratory birds. The surveillance systems that have enabled the detection of WNV in humans and arthropods should be extended to animals in a one-health approach to better prepare for global health threats.