While studies on students’ ethnic identity, national identity and social mobility gained relatively good research development in Western societies, little attention has been given to other social contexts, particularly non-Western societies like China. A questionnaire (N = 570, aged 14 to 20) was conducted in a Xinjiang Class school in Southern China to examine the nexus of students’ ethnic identity, national identity and perception on social mobility. The Xinjiang Class is currently one of the most iconic preferential educational policies recruiting students from ethnic groups in Xinjiang (an ethnic minority-concentrated border region) and offering them senior secondary education in select Han-centric, senior-secondary schools in China’s central and east coast provinces. The results demonstrate that the strengthening effect of students’ ethnic identity on national identity is not obvious; students’ strong national identity contributes to their positive perception on upward social mobility. However, the widely accepted viewpoint that students’ ethnic identity has a negative influence on perception of social mobility cannot be fully supported in this case. This study enriches the extant literature by providing a combined model to explore the nuanced mechanisms between ethnic identity, national identity and students’ perception on social mobility in a multi-ethnic society and by helping to unveil the identity politics unfolded in current China’s educational sector.
This article explores how Muslim spaces in urban China have been regulated under the influence of transnational mobilities in the past few decades, based on a qualitative study. Our key findings demonstrate that the Chinese government applies distinctive strategies to control different types of Muslim spaces: The temporary religious places for foreign Muslims are significantly visible for market-driven purposes, and the Sinicization policy regulates the permanent and daily Muslim spaces. The government-led religious control we discuss in this article reflects a pragmatic and fragmented process in China’s economy-centered modernization and a cultural monism strategy in the global era. This government-led governance of religions is resisted by foreign Muslims who expect a multicultural governance pattern. More broadly, this article suggests a more local focus on the (re)engagement of religions in the process of secularization or modernization under the influence of multiple ways of globalization.