There is tremendous interest in designing feedback strategy control for clusters in modern control theory. We propose a novel numerical solution to target team control problems by using the Hamilton formalism methods. In order to ensure the smooth wireless information exchange, all members of the team are located in a virtual ellipsoidal container during the whole movement process. An ellipsoidal container tube is constructed as the external state constraint of the team. The corresponding value function is then formulated based on collision avoidance conditions and energy constraints in the process of the team motion. Time-dependent partial differential equations are formulated based on Hamilton formalism, which have been solved numerically by using the traditional finite difference method (FDM). The objective of the presented method is to obtain optimal control and motion trajectory of the cluster at each moment. Lastly, we conduct a simulation study of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to demonstrate the performance of the proposed method.

This paper studies the problem of target control and how a virtual ellipsoid can avoid the static obstacle. During the motion to the target set, the virtual ellipsoid can achieve a motion under collision avoidance by keeping the distance between the ellipsoid and obstacle. We present solutions to this problem in the class of closed-loop (feedback) controls based on Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation. Simulation results verify the validity and effectiveness of our algorithm.

The rapid growth of the sharing economy has improved resource utilization in car-sharing, yet it has also sharpened market competition and diversified user demand. A persistent obstacle is the low coordination efficiency between asset-heavy operating companies and traffic-driven platforms, whose misaligned objectives waste social resources. This paper uses differential game theory to analyze their dynamic coordination strategies and benefit allocation mechanisms. The Nerlove–Arrow model captures the evolution of brand goodwill, while the company’s decisions on station layout, vehicle dispatch, and pricing, together with the platform’s advertising investment, form the core decision variables in a two-party game framework linking the asset side and the traffic side. Compared with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the cooperative mode removes the double marginalization effect, strengthens the investment incentives of both parties, and raises the system’s steady-state goodwill and total profit, achieving a Pareto improvement. To ground the cooperative framework in rigorous theory, we supply a verification theorem confirming that the linear candidate value functions satisfy the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations over the entire admissible state space. A formal proof of instantaneous rationality ensures that neither party falls into a cooperation trap on the horizon $[0,T]$, and the asymptotic stability of the steady-state goodwill trajectory is established. We further endogenize the revenue-sharing coefficient through a generalized Nash bargaining model that admits asymmetric bargaining structures, and introduce a Stackelberg leadership benchmark as a third comparative regime. Sensitivity analyses with respect to the discount rate and user heterogeneity confirm the robustness of the findings. A dedicated discussion section bridges the gap between idealized parameterization and data-driven calibration, describing practical pathways via A/B testing, user churn metrics, and econometric estimation of demand parameters. The results offer a scientific decision-making reference for strategic cooperation in the car-sharing industry.