The purpose of the presented research was to determine the effectiveness and sufficiency of measures put in place to protect the business continuity of critical infrastructure (CI) and key services (KSs) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The wide variety of research conducted in the area of business continuity maintenance during the COVID-19 pandemic does not change the fact that there is still a research gap in this area, particularly in terms of issues related to CI and KS protection. A systematic review of scientific publications revealed the need for continued research into this topic given the fact that only 19 papers related to CI continuity and 8 directly to KS operators could be identified. Holistic and interdisciplinary research is particularly needed to organize and systematize the existing scientific knowledge on the subject, and in practical terms, help organizations and institutions to better prepare for future continuity disruptions. A survey conducted between March and May 2021 among entities operating in Poland and classified as critical infrastructure operators as well as key service operators, subcontractors, and suppliers crucial to maintaining the continuity of critical infrastructure operations revealed that entrepreneurs, surprised by the speed and aggressive nature of the pandemic, mainly resorted to protective measures that were immediately available, standard solutions that did not require excessive financial and organizational effort. But in the face of long-term pandemic threat, such measures may no longer be sufficient, so it is important to intensify research into those precautions that require readaptation of work organization and organizational processes to protect key workers, increase supply chain resilience, and protect the work process.

Artykuł przedstawia analizę infrastruktury krytycznej (IK) jako celu ataku w operacjach hybrydowych, które łączą różne formy działań – od konwencjonalnych po terrorystyczne. Autorzy wskazują przyczyny atakowania IK. Podstawę rozważań stanowi teoria 5 pierścieni Wardena. W artykule omówiono operację Allied Force, kampanie dezinformacyjne poprzedzające synchronizację sieci energetycznych państw bałtyckich oraz atak na Colonial Pipeline. Autorzy przeprowadzają analizę porównawczą rozwiązań dotyczących budowania odporności IK wynikających z dyrektyw CER i NIS 2 Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady Unii Europejskiej.

The increasing number of natural disasters requires the use of preventive measures. One of the elements is the inclusion of risk management in crisis management. On the basis of this observation, the research problem was formulated: “In the light of new challenges, should the crisis management system continue to be built on the theory of crisis within the security sciences, or should it be based on risk management developed in the area of management sciences?” In summary, the answer to the question was provided, and a new definition of the concept of “crisis management” was proposed.

Critical infrastructure (CI) business continuity is fundamental in today’s turbulent times. The new trend is the reference to essential services (ES). This paper aims to identify lead topics in the ES area and analyze actions to provide ES business continuity. The goal will be achieved by (1) identifying leading research topics using Latent Dirichlet Allocation, (2) conducting a systematic literature review using VOSviewer, (3) mapping the results obtained, and identifying possibilities for further research. Web of Science, Scopus, and specific keywords were used to select peer-reviewed papers discussing the ES issue. The results showed that, despite the importance of the ES issue, there are few publications related to the business continuity of ES. The work focuses on the relevance of ES to individual entities such as companies, cities, municipalities, and countries. There are also isolated works on ES security, but mainly in cybersecurity. The added value of the article is that it organizes the knowledge related to leading topics in the ES area from a Business, Management, and Accounting perspective and indicates the research areas that require further scrutiny. It is the first comprehensive literature review focusing specifically on ES.

The article presents an analysis of critical infrastructure (CI) as a target for attack in hybrid operations, which combine various forms of action – from conventional to terrorist. The authors identify the reasons for attacking CI. The considerations are based on Warden’s 5 rings theory. The article discusses Operation Allied Force, disinformation campaigns prior to the synchronisation of the Baltic states’ energy networks, and the attack on the Colonial Pipeline. The authors conduct a comparative analysis of solutions for building CI resilience derived from the CER and NIS 2 Directives of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.

The stability of modern economies relies on the uninterrupted supply of electricity, heat, and transport fuels, making the energy sector highly exposed to various risks and disruptions, including floods, which are among the major natural hazards affecting energy infrastructure in Poland. Despite risks, a scalable and integrated modelling framework for operational flood risk management in energy infrastructure is still lacking. Such a framework should account for increasing climate-related hazard dynamics, integrate robust fragility and damage models with comprehensive flood risk assessments at both asset and system levels, and explicitly consider interdependencies among energy system components and associated critical infrastructure. This integration is essential for analyzing cascading failures and their consequences, while complying with the EU CER Directive requirements for resilience and continuity of critical infrastructure services. An original three-stage spatial vulnerability analysis method was developed, involving GIS data preparation, classification of asset importance, and flood scenario modelling, demonstrated on selected rivers in the Odra River basin. The Expected Damage Factor (EDF) metric was applied to combine flood probability with infrastructure significance. The analysis enabled spatial identification of the most vulnerable components of the energy system and illustrated the dynamics of threats in time and space. The EDF coefficient allowed for quantitative vulnerability assessment, supporting more precise adaptive planning. The approach innovatively combines infrastructure criticality assessment with probabilistic flood scenarios and explicitly incorporates systemic interdependencies in accordance with the CER Directive, enhancing operational flood risk management capabilities. The method provides a practical tool for critical infrastructure protection, operational planning, and the development of adaptive strategies, thereby increasing the flood resilience of the energy system and supporting stakeholders responsible for risk management.