This paper develops the methodology for modeling decision processes in complex controlled dynamic systems. The idea of balancing such systems (driving them to equilibrium) is implemented, and a new mechanism for the equilibria’s stability is proposed. Such an approach involves economic–mathematical modeling jointly with systems analysis methods, economics, law, sociology, game theory, management, and performance measurement. A linear-quadratic positional differential game of several players is considered. Coefficient criteria under which the game has an equilibrium in sanctions and countersanctions and, simultaneously, no Nash equilibrium are derived. The economic and legal model of active equilibrium is studied through the legal concept of sanctions, which enlarges the practical application of this class of problems.
The notion of individual stability of a Pareto equilibrium of threats and counterthreats in a three-person linear-quadratic differential game without side payments is used. The corresponding equilibrium is found in explicit form.
16 September 2025 in Economics of Contemporary Russia
On May 30, 2025, at the regular meeting of the scientific seminar “Problems of modeling and development of production systems”, under the leadership of Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor, Doctor of Economics, head of the scientific direction “Mesoeconomics, Microeconomics, Corporate Economics” G.B. Kleiner, a presentation of the collective monograph “Intelligent Technologies in micro‑ and mesoeconomics” was held. edited by G.B. Kleiner and with a preface by Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.R. Bakhtizin. The reviewers were: Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.I. Mayevsky, PhD, Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Member.‑ Correspondent. RAN V.E. Dementiev, Head of the research department “Macroeconomics and Institutional Theory” at the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The monograph containing the results of research performed at the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences was approved by the Scientific Council of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The monograph’s author’s team consisted mainly of employees of the Department of Modeling of Production Facilities and Complexes at the Central Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Intelligent technologies in micro- and mesoeconomics: monograph. Ed. by G.B. Kleiner, A.R. Bakhtizina; Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow: SCIENTIFIC LIBRARY Publishing House, 2025. 324 p. ISBN 978-5-907954-80-9
By the end of the last century, four directions had been established in the mathematical theory of positional differential games (PDGs): a noncoalition version of PDG, a cooperative, hierarchical, and, finally, the least studied, a coalition version of PDG. In turn, within the coalition, there are usually games with transferable payoffs (with side payments, when players can share their winnings during the game) and nontransferable payoffs (games with side payments, when such redistributions are absent for one reason or another). Studies of coalition games with side payments are concentrated and actively conducted at the Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Management Processes of St. Petersburg University and Institute of Applied Mathematical Research of the Karelian Research Centre of Russian Academy of Sciences (L.A. Petrosyan, V.V. Mazalov, E.M. Parilina, A.N. Rettieva, and their numerous domestic and foreign students). However, side payments are not always present even in economic interactions; moreover, side payments may be generally prohibited by law. The studies we have undertaken in recent years on the balance of threats and counterthreats (sanctions and countersanctions) in noncoalition differential games allow, in our opinion, covering some aspects of the nontransferable version of coalition games. This article is devoted to the issues of internal and external stability of coalitions in the PDG class. It reveals the coefficient constraints in the mathematical model of the positional differential linear-quadratic game of six persons with a two-coalition structure, in which this coalition structure is internally and externally stable.