Environmentally friendly handling and efficient recycling of waste electrical on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) have grown to be a global social problem. As holders of WEEE, consumers have a significant effect on the recycling process. A consideration of and attention to the influence of consumer behavior in the recycling process can help achieve more effective recycling of WEEE. In this paper, we built a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model composed of manufacturers, retailers, and network recycling platforms. Based on the influence of customer bargaining behavior, we studied several different scenarios of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and contract coordination, using the Stackelberg game theory. The results show that retailers and network recycling platforms will reduce the direct recovery prices to maintain their own profit when considering the impact of consumer bargaining behavior, while remanufacturers will improve the transfer payment price for surrendering part of the profit under revenue and the expense sharing contract. Using this contract, we can achieve supply chain coordination and eliminate the effect of consumer bargaining behavior on supply chain performance. It can be viewed from the parameter sensitivity analysis that when we select the appropriate sharing coefficient, the closed-loop supply chain can achieve the same system performance under a centralized decision.

The pilot policy of carbon emissions trading rights covers six heavy pollution industries in the manufacturing industry and has achieved considerable emission reductions. Based on enterprise behavior, this study analyzes the impact of the carbon emissions trading rights pilot policy on the productivity of manufacturing enterprises. In addition, we examine whether the pilot policy can aid in the transformation and upgrading of China’s manufacturing industry. Furthermore, we examine the influence of carbon emissions trading rights on manufacturing enterprises of different sizes and with different property rights. The results show that the trading rights have not produced a “Porter effect” on the productivity of manufacturing enterprises in China or in subsamples based on the nature of enterprise ownership. The impact of the carbon trading rights on the productivity of state-owned manufacturing enterprises in the pilot provinces is based on the compliance cost hypothesis. Therefore, the pilot policy has yet to achieve coordinated economic, social, and environmental development. Lastly, we put forward several policy suggestions on the coordinated development of a carbon trading policy and manufacturing enterprises from the perspective of the government, enterprises, and society.

Remanufactured products offer better environmental benefits, and governments encourage manufacturers to remanufacture through various subsidy policies. This practice has shown that, in addition to product sales, remanufactured product can also achieve its value through social donation. Based on the remanufactured product value realization approaches, governments provide two kinds of incentive policies, which are remanufactured product sales subsidies and remanufactured product donation subsidies. This paper constructs a two-stage Stackelberg game model including a government and a manufacturer under two different policies, which can be solved by backward induction. By comparing the optimal decision of the two policies, our results show that, compared with the remanufacturing sales subsidy, donation subsidy weakens the cannibalization of remanufactured products for new products and increases the quantity of new products. It reduces the sales quantity of remanufactured products, but increases their total quantity. Under certain conditions of low subsidy, the manufacturer adopting sales subsidy provides better economic and environmental benefits. Under certain conditions of high subsidy, the manufacturer adopting donation subsidy offers better economic and environmental benefits. When untreated product environmental impact is large enough, donation subsidy policy has a better social welfare. Otherwise, the choice of social welfare of these two different policies depends on the social impact of remanufactured product donated.

This paper studies the impact of dual price sensitivity (product price sensitivity and extended warranty service price sensitivity) on the decision of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) where manufacturers are responsible for recycling and providing extended warranty service under different channel power structures. First, the dynamic game model is used to describe the three channel power structure models of centralized (C), Manufacturer-led Stackelberg (MS), and Retailer-led Stackelberg (RS). Then, mathematical optimization and reverse induction are used to derive supply chain decision-making and performance levels. On this basis, we further designed a contract to coordinate the supply chain, and use numerical examples to analyze and verify the impact of remanufacturing cost savings and dual price sensitivity on the supply chain system. Research shows that channel power structures, remanufacturing cost savings and dual price sensitivity all have an important impact on the supply chain and corporate profits.