Remanufactured products offer better environmental benefits, and governments encourage manufacturers to remanufacture through various subsidy policies. This practice has shown that, in addition to product sales, remanufactured product can also achieve its value through social donation. Based on the remanufactured product value realization approaches, governments provide two kinds of incentive policies, which are remanufactured product sales subsidies and remanufactured product donation subsidies. This paper constructs a two-stage Stackelberg game model including a government and a manufacturer under two different policies, which can be solved by backward induction. By comparing the optimal decision of the two policies, our results show that, compared with the remanufacturing sales subsidy, donation subsidy weakens the cannibalization of remanufactured products for new products and increases the quantity of new products. It reduces the sales quantity of remanufactured products, but increases their total quantity. Under certain conditions of low subsidy, the manufacturer adopting sales subsidy provides better economic and environmental benefits. Under certain conditions of high subsidy, the manufacturer adopting donation subsidy offers better economic and environmental benefits. When untreated product environmental impact is large enough, donation subsidy policy has a better social welfare. Otherwise, the choice of social welfare of these two different policies depends on the social impact of remanufactured product donated.

Facing a growing amount of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), a recent recast of the WEEE directive has put a specific reuse target for manufacturers, aiming to reduce environmental pollution and incentivize a green product design. In this paper, in order to examine whether the above two goals can be achieved by setting a specific reuse target, we have modelled a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a supplier (the leader) and a manufacturer (the follower) with the constraint of a mandated remanufacturing target. In this model, the supplier determines the level of interchangeability in product design and the wholesale price of the key component. The manufacturer buys the key components from the supplier and makes production and remanufacturing decisions under the requirement of a mandated remanufacturing target. We have investigated the supply chain’s members’ optimal decisions and analyzed the impact of the mandated remanufacturing target on the optimal profits of the supply chain’s members and consumer surplus, and finally, we have explored the environmental implications of the mandated remanufacturing target. We found that the supply chain’s members’ optimal decisions are affected by the mandated remanufacturing target and the cost of the new component. In terms of the economic implications of the mandated remanufacturing target, we have demonstrated that the increase in the mandated remanufacturing target has negative effects on the profits of the supply chain’s members and consumer surplus. Regarding the goal of incentivizing green product design, we found that the mandated remanufacturing target cannot always incentivize the supplier to implement product design that is beneficial to remanufacturing. From the perspective of the environment, we further indicate that more stringent mandated remanufacturing targets may bring an undesirable environmental outcome.

Although remanufacturing has great economic and environmental potential, internal cannibalization, and lack of consumer acceptance of remanufactured products prevent original equipment manufacturer (OEM) from realizing the full potential value through remanufacturing. Practices show that remanufactured products can realize their value by the donation, besides resale. Thus, this paper incorporates the donation of remanufactured products with government subsidy and presents an upgraded remanufacturing strategy to expand the demand for remanufactured products and weaken the internal cannibalization of remanufactured products. We respectively construct the two-period game model with and without upgraded remanufacturing and explore the effect of upgraded remanufacturing on production decision, economic and environmental benefits. The main conclusions are as follows. The donation subsidy is negatively related with the sale quantity of remanufactured products, but is positively related with the donation quantity of remanufactured products and the quantity of new products. The donation subsidy expands the demand for remanufactured products and weakens internal cannibalization of remanufactured products. Whether the upgraded remanufacturing strategy is profitable depends on the fixed cost of the remanufacturing. When consumers consider remanufactured products environmentally friendly, the government can realize an OEM’s win-win situation where the economic and environmental benefits get improved by adjusting the donation subsidy. Otherwise, introducing upgraded remanufacturing makes the environment worse. Comparatively speaking, a low-cost and environmentally friendly manufacturer is relatively easier to achieve the win-win situation through donation subsidy.

In this paper, the Stackelberg game method is used to construct a decision-making model composed of government, a single producer and a single recycler. Considering the WEEE recycling fund policy of the government, the influence of the joint mechanism of tax-subsidy on the production and recycling decisions of relevant stakeholders in the supply chain is discussed. On this basis, this paper discusses the government's optimal tax-subsidy strategy under the current policy of maximizing social welfare, and analyzes the factors that affect the formulation of the optimal tax-subsidy standard. The conclusion shows that, first of all, the tax mainly restrains the production behavior, while the subsidy mainly stimulates the recycling behavior. However, when the manufacturer uses the recycled raw materials for production, the subsidy will also increase the manufacturer's profit. Secondly, from the perspective of social welfare maximization, the optimal government tax is positively correlated with product production cost and environmental damage, while the optimal subsidy is positively correlated with product disassembly rate and recycling environmental benefits.

Based on the one-factor CIR interest rate model, the pricing of Sherpa Target Redemption Notes (STARN) with early-excise features is investigated in this paper. Firstly, the characteristics of Sherpa target redemption notes were described and the partial differential equation was proposed. Secondly, both non-arbitrage jump conditions on the coupon date and early-excise policy on the redemption date were provided; furthermore, the boundary conditions of partial differential equations were also discussed. Thirdly, a numerical method for solving the partial differential equation was obtained based on the control volume in the theory of finite volume by making use of the upwind weighting scheme to avoid the numerical oscillation phenomenon. Finally, the sensitivity of the model parameters was analyzed. The results show that the STARN value decreases rapidly with the increase in short-term interest rates, furthermore, when short-term interest rates reached a turning point the rate of decline slowed. As volatility increases, the value of the Notes is increased; increasingly as the proportion redeemed is large, STARN value increases.