Considering the network externality of remanufactured product, this paper develops the Stackelberg game models in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a retailer with dual sales channel under three scenarios, i.e., no sales effort (Model N), the retailer exerting sales effort (Model R) and the OEM exerting sales effort (Model M). The study investigates the pricing and sales effort decisions for CLSC members. The results show that: (1) Compared with no sales effort, the sales effort behavior can always improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC. The retailer’s profit can be improved in Model R, so OEM exerting sales effort could cause a loss for the retailer and the sales effort behavior can promote the sales of remanufactured products and further cannibalize the new product market. (2) Model M is more favorable to improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC, while the retailer prefers Model R. Model M is more beneficial for boosting the sales of remanufactured products. (3) As the network externality/consumer’s sensitivity of sales effort becomes more obvious, CLSC members exert more sales effort, and the OEM exerts more sales effort compared to the retailer. (4) Only when the retailer’s sales effort cost is much lower than the OEM sales effort cost is it that OEM could obtain more profit when the retailer exerts sales effort; then, the win-win situation between OEM and the retailer is achieved.

This paper examines the impact of the contrast/assimilation effect and network externality of remanufactured products on remanufacturing mode selection for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) under government subsidy. We develop a two-period Stackelberg game model in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of an OEM and a third-party remanufacturer (TPR) considering two remanufacturing modes: authorization remanufacturing mode and outsourcing remanufacturing mode. The results show the following: (1) The OEM prefers to select authorization when the contrast/assimilation effect and government subsidy level are both relatively low; otherwise, the OEM prefers outsourcing. The TPR always prefers the outsourcing mode. Therefore, a win–win situation between the OEM and the TPR could be achieved through OEM outsourcing remanufacturing when the government raises subsidy levels or the contrast/assimilation effect is relatively obvious. (2) The outsourcing mode is more beneficial in promoting the sales of remanufactured products and is more environmentally friendly, while the authorization mode is better in regards to consumer surplus and social welfare. (3) OEM, TPR and CLSC could benefit from network externality increasing. The stronger contrast effect (assimilation effect) is profitable to the OEM and CLSC (TPR), but hurts the TPR (OEM and CLSC). (4) Government subsidy can significantly reduce consumer spending on remanufactured products. CLSC members encroach government subsidies which are offered to consumers through pricing adjustments. The findings provide managerial implications for OEMs’ remanufacturing mode strategy in the context of the contrast/assimilation effect and network externality of remanufactured products under government subsidy.